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I. INTRODUCTIONT his has been a significant year for Texas insurance law. Texas state
and federal courts, as well as the Fifth Circuit, have decided a
large number of significant cases. Due to space limitations, the
following heart-wrenching and mind-expanding topics have been omitted:
the nature of insurance,1 health insurance,2 life insurance,3 ERISA,4 most
1. See Bekins Moving & Storage Co. v. Williams, 947 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1997, no writ) (discussing whether a mover's provision to pay for the "declared
value" of property in case of loss or damage was insurance or merely an incidental contract
of guaranty or suretyship).
2. See Boon-Chapman, Inc. v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 941 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1997, no writ) (addressing two conflicting coordination of benefits
clauses under group insurance plans); McMullen v. Employees Retirement Sys. of Tex., 935
S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied) (upholding a decision by the Board
of Trustees of the Employees Retirement System of Texas that denied an insured state
employee coverage for his son's eyeglasses and therapy under a group insurance policy).
3. See Sever v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 944 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1997, writ denied) (considering beneficiary changes); Cates v. Cincinnati Life Ins.
Co., 947 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, n.w.h.) (addressing lapsed policy for
non-payment of premiums); Board of Trustees of the Employees Retirement Sys. of Texas
v. Benge, 942 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied) (denying accidental death
benefit arising from travel).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1997). See Texas Pharmacy Ass'n v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 105 F.3d 1035, 1042 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing statutory framework for administering
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of auto insurance,5 the interaction between releases and direct actions, 6
and insurance subrogation. 7
II. INSURER BAD FAITH
We begin with the law of bad faith. Strictly speaking, insurance bad
faith is derivative upon substantive insurance law and adjustment prac-
tice. But, the exposure of insurers has, for some time, been the "hot"
topic in insurance law. Hence, we begin with bad faith.
All of the law of insurance bad faith is divisible into three parts. First is
the "Stowers Doctrine," taking its name from the venerable case, G.A.
Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co.8 This doctrine regu-
lates the conduct of liability insurers when a plaintiff offers to settle a
covered claim within policy limits, but the insurer fails to settle. Accord-
ing to Stowers, if an insured suffers a judgment in excess of policy limits,
and if the liability insurer was negligent in failing to settle that case within
those limits, when the insurer received a liquidated and unconditional de-
mand to settle within those limits, then the insurer is liable upon a negli-
gence theory for amounts in excess of the policy limits. 9 Usually, it is
assumed that the insurer is liable in tort for the entire excess judgment.
We defer the discussion of the "Stowers Doctrine" until Part VI.
The second category of insurance bad faith is statutory bad faith. Gen-
erally, this includes actions brought under article 21.21 of the "Unfair
coverage for prescription drugs); Barhan v. RyRon, Inc., 121 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1997)
(discussing the rules of civil procedure for reviewing ERISA claims); see also Clyde A.
Wilson Int'l Investigations, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 959 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(discussing rescission of plan); Leavitt v. BASF Corp., 946 F. Supp. 488, 491 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (discussing disability benefits, the terms of the plan, and the terms of the employee
brochure); Christenson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (address-
ing preemption).
5. See John Deere Ins. Co. v. Trukin' U.S.A., 122 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 1997) (ad-
dressing who is an insured under a truck policy); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Perry, 102
F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing whether the United States government may re-
ceive reimbursement under 10 U.S.C. § 1095(a)(1) (1990) for medical services provided to
a military hospital following an auto accident); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 945
S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied) (The policyholder had coverage for a
car which had been stolen, unbeknownst to him, and which was thereafter seized by the
police; He, therefore, lost to the insured.).
6. See Angus Chem. Co. v. IMC Fertilizer, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1997). The
release of an insured does not constitute the release of the insurer of that insured. Never-
theless, under Texas law, since the insurer cannot be held liable without a determination of
the insured's liability, complete and total release of the insured bars any suit in Texas
against the insurer. See id. at 139. "In a jurisdiction where a determination of the insured's
liability is not a prerequisite to an action against the insurer, and release of the insured is
not an impediment to such action, Texas law does not preclude [the tort victim] from suing
[the] insurers [of the alleged tortfeasorJ." Id.
7. See Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Seals, 948 S.W.2d 532, 533-34 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1997, n.w.h.) (holding that if a lawyer for an insured obtains a recovery that benefits
the insurer, it will owe attorneys' fees under the "common fund" doctrine, which allows the
recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees to someone who, at his own expense, prosecutes a
lawsuit and creates a benefit for others, as well as for himself).
8. 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
9. See id. at 547.
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Competition and Unfair Practices" sections of the Insurance Code, 10 ac-
tions against insurers brought under the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA), 11 actions seeking penalties
under article 21.55 of the "Prompt Payment of Claims" section of the
Insurance Code,'2 and other statutes.
Third, the rubric insurer bad faith applies to the common law tort cre-
ated by the Texas Supreme Court in 1987, whereby an insured may sue a
first-party insurer for breaching its duty of good faith and fair dealing to
the insured. 13 In 1996, the Texas Supreme Court held that common law
insurer bad faith does not extend to liability insurance.' 4 This third form
of bad faith is often referred to simply as "bad faith," and we begin with
it.
A. COMMON LAW INSURER BAD FAITH
The Texas Supreme Court decided four significant common law bad
faith cases during the Survey period. One case limits the scope of com-
mon law insurer bad faith.15 Another case changes the standard for com-
mon law insurer bad faith.' 6 In this case, four members of the Court
exhibited substantial reservations about the common law tort.' 7 In a
third case, the Court ostensibly applied the new standard in a controver-
sial situation, and four justices dissented.' 8 In the final case, the Court
applied the new standard in a workers' compensation case, which it con-
sidered a simple case.' 9
10. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
11. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
12. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
13. See Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1998); Arnold v.
National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
14. See Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 28
(Tex. 1996). First-party insurance refers to contracts pursuant to which insurers are exclu-
sively obligated to insureds. Third-party insurance involves contracts where the insurer
may, at some point, become obligated to some third-party. Liability insurance is the para-
digm of third-party insurance, while property and health insurance are paradigms of first-
party insurance. The status of life insurance is a little confusing, but it is usually thought of
as first-party insurance. Insurance that indemnifies an insured for payments he makes to
someone he has injured should be treated as first-party insurance, but most courts classify
it as third-party insurance. Workers' compensation has something of the same problem,
although Aranda classifies it a first-party insurance with both the insured business and its
worker qualifying as insureds. See Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 212. There is a real problem
under the rule in Head. Under many forms of liability insurance (such as commercial gen-
eral, homeowners, and auto), the insurer has a duty to defend its insured when the insured
is sued on a covered claim. Theoretically, that should be classified as first-party insurance,
but Head appears to classify it as third-party insurance. See Head, 938 S.W.2d at 28-29.
See also Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Bleeker, 944 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 1998 WL 169689 (Tex. Apr. 14, 1998) (applying Head to a
case in which the allegation was a botched defense).
15. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1997).
16. See Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1997).
17. See id. at 58 (Hecht, J., concurring).
18. See State Farm Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1997).




In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Aiello,20 the issue was whether the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, which a first-party insurer owes its
insured, continues after the entry of an agreed judgment against the in-
surer in favor of the insured. The Texas Supreme Court held that it did
not, because the only legal relationship left between the parties after the
entry of the judgment was the relationship of judgment creditor to judg-
ment debtor.21
In Aiello, the property owners, the Aiellos, discovered utility ease-
ments on their property that were not excepted from the title insurance
policy. The Aiellos made a claim, but Stewart Title refused to pay. The
Aiellos filed suit, and the case eventually settled. Under the terms of the
settlement, the Aiellos received $319,000, plus all court costs. The agreed
judgment provided that the costs were to include $100 per day from a
specified date until all closing papers were signed and plaintiffs received
their funds. After the trial court signed the agreed judgment, the Aiellos
attempted to contact Stewart Title several times, but neither its attorneys
nor its officers responded. A month and a half after the entry of the
agreed judgment, the Aiellos caused a constable to arrive at the offices of
the title insurer with a writ of execution. Only then did Stewart Title
commence closing. Even after it delivered the liquidated sums specified
in the agreed judgment, Stewart Title failed to pay post-judgment interest
and the $100 per day delay damages.
Thereafter, the Aiellos sued Stewart Title again claiming breach of the
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing to its insured, breach of the
DTPA, breach of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, and breach of con-
tract. Stewart Title counterclaimed for breach of contract, claiming that
the Aiellos had failed to deliver a deed as promised. (It seems that the
Aiellos had a duty to provide Stewart Title with a deed to the property
and that the Aiellos had refused to do this for a time. It further appears
that the Aiellos' duty to produce the deed was not defeated by the title
company's failure to pay delay damages.)
By the time of trial, all claims against Stewart Title had been eliminated
except those for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. At trial, the Aiellos prevailed upon both of their claims,
but Stewart Title prevailed on its breach of contract counterclaim. Based
on the jury's findings, the trial court awarded the Aiellos in excess of
$324,000, including delay damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, stip-
ulated contract damages, mental anguish damages, $200,000 in exemplary
damages, and $80,000 in attorneys' fees. Stewart Title was awarded
$10,000 for its breach of contract claim, but the court declined to award
Stewart Title any attorneys' fees. The court of appeals affirmed the
award to the Aiellos, although it reduced the attorneys' fees, and it af-




firmed the judgment for Stewart Title, awarding it attorneys' fees of
$87,500.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the fundamental issue was whether
Stewart Title owed the Aiellos a duty of good faith and fair dealing after
the agreed judgment was entered.22 The purpose underlying the duty of
good faith and fair dealing is to police the relationship between insurer
and insured, especially during the claims process, because of the disparity
of bargaining power inherent in the relationship, and because the insurer
has exclusive control over the claims process.2 3 For these reasons, an in-
surer and an insured are said to have a "special relationship ' '2 4 which
generates higher-than-arms'-length duties for the insurer-duties which,
however, do not rise to the level of fiduciary duties.25 The tort of insurer
bad faith should not, the Court implies, be extended beyond what its un-
derlying purposes make sensible. Once an insured becomes a judgment
creditor of an insurer, the claims process is over. The insurer no longer
has exclusive control over the situation, and the insured has a variety of
legal remedies available to it by which it can collect on its judgment, "in-
cluding execution, garnishment, turnover, or attachment. '26
The Aiellos relied upon Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Marshall27 in claim-
ing that Stewart Title acted in bad faith. A workers' compensation policy
was at issue in Marshall. The insurer had settled with the injured worker,
and the agreement required Aetna to pay the worker's past medical bills
as well as his future medical bills. Aetna did not pay. In Aiello, the
Supreme Court distinguished Marshall. First, the decision in Marshall
turned upon the Insurance Code and not upon the common law duty of
good faith and fair dealing.2 8 Second, in Marshall, the insurer had agreed
to continue acting as an insurer, so it breached not only the settlement
agreement, but also its duties as an insurer.2 9
Therefore, the Aiellos' common law bad faith claim failed, even though
their action on the contract embodied in the agreed judgment survived.30
Consequently, judgment would not support an award of punitive dam-
ages or an award of mental anguish. 31 In addition, although a finding of
bad faith conduct may constitute a violation of article 21.21 of the Insur-
ance Code, that claim failed, so the Aiellos could not obtain treble dam-
ages under that statute.32
There is one more aspect of the Aiello decision that is important here:
the issue of attorneys' fees. The trial court awarded the Aiellos $80,000 in
22. See id. at 71-72.
23. See id. at 71.
24. See Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
25. See Aiello, 941 S.W.2d at 71.
26. Id.
27. 724 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1987).
28. See Aiello, 941 S.W.2d at 71.
29. See id. at 71-72.
30. See id. at 74.




attorneys' fees, but the court of appeals reduced that amount to
$65,823.25. The court of appeals reasoned that the Aiellos' attorney
spent time studying and considering matters that had occurred before the
entry of the agreed judgment.33 The Texas Supreme Court reversed on
this point and restored the trial court's judgment.34 Its reasoning was
quite simple. Although the Aiellos' lawyer had attended to pre-judgment
events, he had not been retained pre-judgment. 35 Moreover, the matters
he studied were substantially related to the basis of the Aiellos' claim.
36
Indeed, he could not understand the Aiellos' claim without understand-
ing what happened before the entry of the agreed judgment. Under well-
established authority, therefore, the Court held that the Aiellos were en-
titled to their full attorneys' fees. 37
But what about the attorneys' fees awarded to Stewart Title? The
Court held that when Stewart Title paid $319,000, it had substantially
complied with the contract contained in the agreed judgment and was
entitled to the conveyance of the insured property by the Aiellos.
38
Hence, the Aiellos breached the contract contained in the agreed judg-
ment, and Stewart Title recovered the attorneys' fees of $87,500 awarded
by the jury.39
It is important to note that Aiello holds that the "special relationship"
that generates the tort of bad faith can be terminated by the entry of a
final judgment.40 There is no indication in Aiello, however, that the mere
filing of a lawsuit terminates the "special relationship." Indeed, there is
every reason to believe that the "special relationship" survives the mere
filing of a lawsuit. Although the invocation of the jurisdiction of Texas
courts levels the playing field somewhat, it does not alter the fundamental
power relations, nor does it terminate the insurer's exclusive control over
the claims process.41




37. See id.; see also Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex. 1991).
38. See Aiello, 941 S.W.2d at 74.
39. See id. The Court's opinion is not clear regarding the status of the $100 per day
delay damages. One would have thought that if Stewart Title were refusing to pay these
damages, and if they were accruing on a daily basis, then a required performance by the
Aiellos would have been excused. Apparently not. Thus, Aiello stands for the proposition
that if a promisee has done almost everything he is supposed to do, the promisor had
better perform or else risk having to pay attorneys' fees. The law does not invite strident
confrontationalism.
40. See id. at 72.
41. Does Aiello imply that if the insured has a final judgment against the insurer, there
can be no such thing as bad faith during the appellate process? Not quite. In Aiello, there




C. ELEMENTS OF COMMON LAW INSURER BAD FAITH
On July 9, 1997, the Texas Supreme Court decided three cases involv-
ing the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing that runs from
first-party insurers to their insureds. These cases, at least potentially,
have enormous implications for Texas insurance jurisprudence and prac-
tice. Although the Court has suggested that the three cases are nothing
more than technical revisions of the elements of insurer bad faith and
that nothing substantive has been altered, this disclaimer is open to some
doubt.
1. Universe Life Insurance Co. v. Giles
The leading case on this issue during the Survey period is Universe Life
Insurance Co. v. Giles,42 which dramatically changed at least the wording
of the legal standard governing the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Justice Spector wrote for the four-person plurality. Justice Enoch wrote a
concurring opinion, and Justice Hecht, writing for another group of four,
also concurred in the Court's judgment, although he held at least one
view contradictory to that of the plurality.
Before Giles, an insurer breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing
if it (1) denied a claim without having any reasonable basis and (2) either
knew or should have known that it had no reasonable basis to do so.43
After Giles was decided on July 9, 1997, an insurer breaches the duty of
good faith and fair dealing owed to its insured when it fails to attempt to
effectuate a settlement with its insured after its liability to its insured has
become reasonably clear.44 The most important thing to notice about the
new standard is that it is identical to the language of section 4(10)(a)(ii)
of article 21.21 and section 2(b)(4) of article 21.21-2 of the Insurance
Code.45 This language is also central to the Model Act from which both
articles 21.21 and 21.21-2 are derived. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court
has brought the common law tort of insurer bad faith into conformity
with statutory requirements in Texas and elsewhere.
According to Justice Spector, writing for the majority, the reasons for
assimilating the elements of common law insurer bad faith into the lan-
guage of section 4(10)(a)(ii) of article 21.21 are several and significant. 46
First, by recasting the elements of the tort of bad faith in positive terms,
42. 950 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1997).
43. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tex. 1994); see also
Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 213. Interestingly, the plurality opinion did not cite Arnold v. Nat'l
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987), which established the tort of bad
faith in Texas.
44. See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 55-56. The new standard carries forward important fea-
tures of the old standard. Most significantly, insurers continue to have a duty to investigate
claims. The Court takes this to be implied in the duty to adjust claims promptly, fairly, and
equitably. How, implies the Court, could this be done if the insurer does not investigate
the claim promptly, fairly, and equitably? See id. at 56 n.5.
45. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(10)(a)(ii) (Vernon Supp. 1998); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
46. See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 55.
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its conflict with the no evidence standard of review is eliminated. 47 No
one, implies Justice Spector, has had any difficulty with no evidence re-
view under article 21.21, so that standard apparently works. Second, by
assimilating common law insurer bad faith into article 21.21, the Court
creates a unity between the common law and the statutory law.48 This
will make fact finding by the jury more straightforward and will simplify
the jury charge. Finally, both the bench and the bar are familiar with the
liability-has-become-reasonably-clear standard because it has been
around in one form or another since 1973.
49
The plurality also decided that issues of insurer bad faith should remain
issues for the jury. 50 As far as Justice Spector is concerned, that should
not even be a significant issue. According to her, the Texas Supreme
Court has "long recognized that the Texas Constitution confers an excep-
tionally broad jury trial right upon litigants. And we have warned that
courts must not lightly deprive our people of this right by taking an issue
away from the jury.'51
If the action of the Court in Giles is simple, its reasoning is not. The
plurality based the change on an argument that appellate courts have had
difficulty applying the no evidence standard of review. 52 No evidence ap-
pellate review requires that the reviewing court take as true all evidence
favoring the judgment and disregard all evidence not favoring the judg-
ment.53 If a judgment says that an insurance company has acted in bad
faith, then the reviewing court must disregard all evidence suggesting that
the insurance company did not act in bad faith.54 But the essence of de-
feating a common law bad faith case is for the insurer to show that there
was a bona fide dispute. In other words, the insurer must show that there
was at least one respectably arguable-though erroneous-reason on the
basis of which it could deny coverage. 55 Given the logical structure of no
evidence review, however, it is unclear how an appellate court can look at
evidence on the basis of which a claim might rationally but erroneously
be denied. Thus, it becomes virtually impossible for an appellate court
ever to perform a no evidence review of a judgment finding an insurer
liable on a common law tort theory of insurer bad faith. But, the Court
implies, there should always be the possibility of no evidence appellate
review for every tort.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 56.
49. See id.; see also Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 132-33
(Tex. 1988).
50. See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 56.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 51; see also Columbia Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Miles, 923 S.W.2d 803,
808-10 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, writ denied). The Texas Supreme Court had recognized
this problem before in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d 373, 376
(Tex. 1994) and Lyons v. Miller's Cas. Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. 1993).
53. See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 51.
54. See id.
55. See id. Of course, there can be no bad faith denial of a claim if the insurer cor-
rectly denied coverage. There could still be bad faith delay, however.
1998] 1139
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The plurality considered adopting a standard that has been widely used
elsewhere and upon which there is substantial commentary: the "fairly
debatable" standard. 56 According to this standard, when an insurer's de-
nial of a claim is fairly debatable, then the insurer cannot be guilty of bad
faith. 57 The plurality believes that the advantage of this standard is that
the supreme courts of sixteen other states have adopted it.58 Although
the Court does not mention them, there are two other advantages. First,
it is the well-known standard of review in some parts of administrative
law. Second, there is a fair chance that Texas adopted this standard when
the Court said that an insurance company could not be guilty of bad faith
if its controversy with the insured was a "bona fide dispute." 59
The plurality rejected the fairly debatable standard, however, on the
ground that it did not eliminate the no evidence review problem. 60 Un-
fortunately, the Court does not elaborate upon this observation, and we
have difficulty understanding the argument. Justice Spector's discussion
of the fairly debatable standard is extremely important, however, because
she believes that it is virtually synonymous with the no-reasonable-basis
standard that is being replaced.61 The reason that this observation is im-
portant is quite simple. The Texas Supreme Court regards the no-reason-
able-basis standard and the liability-has-become-reasonably-clear
standard as essentially the same standard. If the no-reasonable-basis
standard is really identical to the fairly debatable standard, then it follows
that the liability-has-become-reasonably-clear standard is also (at least
substantially) identical to it. Thus, although the Court has rejected the
wording of the fairly debatable standard, it has adopted its substance.
That fact is good news. It can now be used in making arguments to courts
and juries.
The Court's discussion of the law of bad faith is hardly concerned with
the facts of the Giles case at all.62 Indeed, although the justices differ
sharply about the foundation and contours of this part of the common
law, they completely agree about the facts of this case. Under virtually
any standard, the entire Court implies, the insurer was guilty of bad
faith.63 Roughly speaking, the plaintiff was insured under a health policy.
The insurer declined to pay hospital and physician charges on the ground
of a pre-existing condition. Unfortunately, the insurer had misread the
medical records to some degree, and the medical records were both erro-
neous and confusing. The plaintiff and her doctors wrote the insurer to
get this problem straightened out, but the insurance company still refused
to pay. It was this continued refusal to pay that constituted the insurer's
56. See id. at 55.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 10.
60. See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 55.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 56-57.
63. See id. at 57-58, 79.
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bad faith, so the Court upheld the bad faith portion of the judgment.6 4
At the same time, the Court found that no evidence supported an award
of punitive damages.65 Consequently, the Court "affirm[ed] the judg-
ment of the court of appeals for bad faith and actual damages, reverse[d]
the judgment for exemplary damages, and reform[ed] the judgment to
award Giles only actual damages, prejudgment and postjudgment inter-
est, and costs."
66
From a historico-political standpoint, the real problem in Giles was
whether to abolish the common law tort of insurer bad faith completely.
67
A number of factors suggested that it might be a good time to get rid of
the tort. Judicial and political philosophies of the individual justices have
changed substantially since 1987 when the tort was created. So-called
"tort reform" has been flying high in the Texas political scene for several
years. Plaintiffs attorneys are not very powerful, politically speaking,
these days, and insurance companies absolutely hate the tort because it
opens the door to punitive damage assessments against them.
Obviously, in Giles, the Court rejected any bold eradication of the tort,
and the reasoning of the plurality-at least-tends to suggest that the tort
will remain part of the jurisprudential canon, at least for a little while.
Indeed, Justice Spector indicated that the tort of common law insurer bad
faith serves a valuable purpose. In particular, it levels the playing field
between insurer and insured, and thereby reduces the inequality inherent
in the claims process. 68 Justice Spector also defends the existence of the
tort on three different grounds. First, most states allow some recovery of
extra-contractual damages from miscreant insurers, while only a very few
have refused the remedy. 69 Second, even critics of the tort of bad faith
admit that some fair means must be implemented to level the playing
field between insurers and insureds in the claims process.70 Third, she
points out that Texas law now carefully regulates awards of both punitive
damages and mental anguish. 71
64. See id. at 57.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 52-54.
68. See id. at 52.
69. See id
70. See id.
71. See id. at 54. Bad faith activities by an insurer justify punitive damages only when
they are accompanied by "malicious, intentional, fraudulent, or grossly negligent conduct,"
and then only when the "insurer was actually aware that its action[s] would probably result
in extraordinary harm not ordinarily associated with breach of contract or bad faith denial
of a claim-such as death, grievous physical injury, or financial ruin." Moriel, 879 S.W.2d
at 18, 24. Justice Spector remarked that the "relatively stringent standard of proof [estab-
lished in Moriel] ensures that punitive damages will ordinarily be available only in excep-
tional cases," although she rejects the idea that the recovery of punitive damages is
"'virtually impossible,"' as one commentator has suggested. Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 79 n.3.
Moreover, it is a general feature of tort cases that mental anguish damages may not be
recovered unless plaintiffs introduce "direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity
of their mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiffs' daily
routine." Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995). According to Justice
Spector, when the rule in Parkway is applied to bad faith cases, "mental anguish damages
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Justice Enoch joined in the judgment of the Court but wrote separately
in order to accomplish three purposes.72 First, he suggested that Lyons
and Dominguez had already set forth sound appellate procedures for no
evidence review of trial court judgments based upon the common law tort
of insurer bad faith.73 One cannot simply look at the insurer's reasons for
denying a claim individually and ask for each of them whether it consti-
tutes an arguable reason. Instead, an insured "must take all of the infor-
mation available to the insurer and present some evidence that no
reasonable insurer would have denied or delayed payment of [the] claim
based on that information. '74 Second, Justice Enoch pointed out that the
new standard does not substantively revise the old one.75 He suggests
that the new standard really is nothing but a "semantic recasting, '76 as
opposed to a substantive revision. Third, Justice Enoch suggests that the
other two opinions do not come to grips with the animating issue before
the Court:
What really is going on here is that most members of the Court are
unsettled about the efficacy of the tort of bad faith in the first in-
stance. Indeed, cogent arguments have been made that the tort
should be eliminated. The bottom line, however, is that the Court
has concluded that under certain facts and as between certain con-
tracting parties, the bad faith tort (or some variation of that cause of
action) should continue to exist. 77
Justice Hecht also wrote a concurring opinion; however, in some ways,
it reads more like a dissent than a concurrence. This is true for three
reasons. First, he would have defined insurance bad faith as "unscrupu-
lous, arbitrary conduct .... -78 According to him, insurance bad faith oc-
curs when an insurer oppresses an insured. 79 If the Legislature had not
acted, Justice Hecht would have been inclined to recast "arbitrary con-
duct" in terms of the fairly debatable standard. But, the Legislature had
acted. It made the liability-has-become-reasonably-clear standard not
only part of article 21.21-2, but also part of article 21.21.80 Conse-
quently, the judiciary should bring the common law sister-tort into con-
formity with the Legislature's conception of how insurance claims should
be regulated. At the same time, Justice Hecht would not impose liability
will be limited to those cases in which the denial or delay in payment of a claim has seri-
ously disrupted the insured's life." Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 54. In 1997, the Texas Supreme
Court further curtailed the availability of mental anguish damages. In City of Tyler v.
Likes, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 174, 1997 WL 760284, at *6 (Dec. 11, 1997), the Court indicated
that mental anguish damages were not available where the only other source of damage
was injury to property.
72. See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 79.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 81.
75. See id. at 81-82.
76. Id. at 80.
77. Id. at 79-80 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 59.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 69.
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if the insurer's conduct was a mere mistake or even a negligent error.81
He does not want the common law tort of insurer bad faith to become
insurer claims malpractice.8 2 Justice Hecht would reserve the tort of bad
faith for intentional or reckless conduct. 83
Numerous problems beset the tort of insurer bad faith. Insurers must
weed out fraudulent claims if insurance prices are to be controlled. Yet,
insurers face allegations of bad faith if they attempt to ferret out fraudu-
lent claims and guess wrong. Further, because of their vagueness, the
elements of common law bad faith are subject to substantial manipula-
tion. Manipulation is also made possible, Justice Hecht implies, because
insurance claims involve a process as opposed to merely isolated events. 84
Wherever there is a process, of course, participants therein may engage in
opportunistic behavior by means of which they set each other up for lia-
bility. Again, because of the vagueness of the elements, the tort of insur-
ance bad faith is essentially unpredictable. In addition, it is intractable
from an administrative (i.e., settlement) point of view. It therefore drives
up the price of insurance, enriching the few while visiting the resulting
costs upon the many.
If the courts are to sanction this situation, Justice Hecht implies, the
deterrent value of the tort needs to be quite clear. Alas, it is not, and the
courts have done little to clarify it. For example, ten years after its crea-
tion, it is still not clear whether comparative bad faith or reverse bad faith
exist. Nevertheless, Justice Hecht kept the standard of fair debatability
alive because he believes that the liability-has-become-reasonably-clear
standard is met if and only if the fairly debatable standard is also met.85
Second, Justice Hecht expressed substantial doubts about the tort of
bad faith. Fundamentally, Justice Hecht objects to the tort because its
conceptual structure is vague, changing, and immature, making it impos-
sible to use in analyzing facts and predicting results.8 6 Therefore, "to be
viable [the elements of the tort] must be made more definite. '87
Third, Justice Hecht would make the core issue of insurance bad faith
an issue of law and thereby get rid of juries. 88 He would do this for the
81. See id. at 64.
82. See id. Justice Hecht spends some time distinguishing common law insurer bad
faith from the tort of negligence, as well he might. The liability-has-become-reasonably-
clear standard sounds very much like negligence. Interestingly, Justice Spector's plurality
opinion neither affirms nor confutes Justice Hecht's discourse contrasting insurer negli-
gence and insurer bad faith. Does silence imply agreement or its opposite? Justice
Spector's omission will lead to substantial confusion among practicing lawyers. During the
Survey period, at least two courts have observed that Texas jurisprudence does not recog-
nize the tort of insurer claims negligence. See Higginbotham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 103 F.3d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1997); Jimenez v. State Farm Lloyds, 968 F. Supp. 330, 334
(W.D. Tex. 1997).
83. See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 60-73.
84. See id. at 60-61.
85. See id. at 69-70. Thus, eight members of the Court link the new standard inti-
mately to fair debatability.
86. See id. at 59.
87. Id.




(1) Whether something has become reasonably clear is, in many con-
texts, considered an issue of law-for example, whether a contract is am-
biguous, whether the intent to create a trust is reasonably clear, whether
administrative regulations pass constitutional due process muster, and so
on.
89
(2) Other states have made the fairly debatable standard a legal, rather
than factual, matter.90
(3) The core issue as to whether the insurer's liability for a claim has
become reasonably clear is essentially a legal issue, even if threshold fac-
tual issues need to be decided by the jury. 91
(4) As a matter of public policy, courts are better suited than juries to
work out the contours and limits of the tort of bad faith. 92
(5) Applying the liability-has-become-reasonably-clear standard in-
volves defining insurers' legal duties. Defining legal duties has tradition-
ally been reserved for the courts. Juries are fact finders. In a variety of
contexts, "policy-laden" matters are considered legal issues to be resolved
by courts.93
As is often the case with position papers that represent the views of
several people, Justice Hecht's argument is not entirely clear. The es-
sence of his position, however, seems to be this: an insurer's liability has
become reasonably clear when an insurer has or should have investigated
a claim, and there is no arguable reason why the claim should be denied.
A reason for denying a claim is arguable when it is the type of reason
about which a reasonably well informed and judicious person might hold
three beliefs: (1) that the reason is legally respectable; (2) that the appro-
priate court might well adopt it; and (3) that courts should adopt it.94 In
other words, it is the type of reason that might very well prevail in the
court system. Notice that an arguable reason is not necessarily one to
which ordinarily prudent insurers are attracted or one that ordinarily pru-
dent insurers would like to see adopted. A judgment that a reason is an
arguable reason-as opposed to a meritless reason-involves rationally
predicting what courts might well do. It does not involve predicting that
a court will adopt some rule or make some holding. It involves predicting
that a court will regard it as a legally respectable position, even if ulti-
mately erroneous. The discussion as to whether a reason for denying a
claim is a bona fide reason, or whether an insurer's reason for denying
the claim is fairly debatable, is really a discussion about how courts think




92. See id. at 70-71.




matter for a jury. 95
Justice Hecht does not believe that changing the elements of the tort
solves the no evidence review problem. If an insurer commits the tort of
bad faith, it has committed the tort because something is missing. This is
true regardless of how the elements of the tort are formulated. "Bad
faith is an unscrupulousness, an arbitrariness, a taking of unfair advan-
tage; it is not a bona fide disagreement. '96 When an insurer commits bad
faith, he must lack an even arguable reason for denying the claim.97 So
long as bad faith essentially involves the absence of something, no evi-
dence review is problematic, precisely because the appellate court must
ignore all evidence inconsistent with the verdict. The only way to circum-
vent this problem is to make the existence of bad faith a legal matter to
be decided by the courts. "Only if the liability standard is a legal one can
bad faith be kept separate from coverage disputes." 98
2. State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau
Every member of the Court regarded Giles as an easy case, factually
speaking, because there was unanimous agreement that the insurance
company had acted arbitrarily and oppressively.99 The focus of contro-
versy in Giles was the law. State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau1°° is completely
different. It is very much about the facts. Also, in Giles, there was a
plurality opinion, along with two separate concurring opinions. In Nico-
lau, there was a five-person majority opinion, again written by Justice
Spector;10 1 there was a concurring opinion written by Justice Enoch, who
also joined in the majority opinion; 02 and there was a dissenting opinion
written by Justice Hecht, in which three other justices joined.10 3
Nicolau grew out of a coverage dispute under a homeowners policy.
The Nicolaus' Corpus Christi home sustained substantial foundation
damage. The homeowners policy excluded losses caused by "'inherent
vice,' or by 'settling, cracking, bulging, shrinkage, or expansion of founda-
tions." '1 4 However, there was an exception to these exclusions: they did
not apply to losses caused by "'[a]ccidental discharge, leakage or over-
95. Thus, insurer bad faith can never be simply negligence. Whether an insurer has an
arguably meritorious reason for denying a claim is not determined by whether a reasonably
prudent insurer would articulate that reason, but whether a court would find the insurance
company's reasoning arguable. See id. at 70. It seems to us that the best argument in
support of this position is the fact that causation in appellate malpractice is not treated as
an issue of fact. See Millhouse v. Wiesenthal, 775 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. 1989). Curiously,
the Court does not deploy this argument.
96. Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 79.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 57, 79, 82.
100. 951 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1997).
101. See id. at 446-53. Justice Cornyn, who joined in the majority opinion, has now left
the Court.
102. See id. at 453.
103. See id. at 453-64.
104. Id. at 446.
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flow of water' from within a plumbing system.' 10 5 In other words, foun-
dation damage caused by water leaks would be covered.
The Nicolaus noticed cracking in 1984. They had piers installed in the
front of the house, but they noticed more cracking in 1986 and 1988. In
1989, their foundation contractor became alarmed by what appeared to
be considerable movement. They could not tell, however, whether the
front was sinking or the back was rising. The contractor, therefore, tested
the plumbing system and discovered plumbing leaks toward the front of
the house. Thereupon, the Nicolaus filed a claim with State Farm.
State Farm hired Haag Engineering, which provided State Farm with a
report suggesting that these water leaks could not have caused the foun-
dation damage. The Nicolaus thereafter obtained a second report from
another engineering firm. The report hypothesized that there were ab-
normally large amounts of moisture toward the back of the house and
that the moisture could have moved along the plumbing pipes from the
point of the leakage to the back of the house. State Farm provided this
report to Haag, but Haag rejected its conclusions and even remarked that
moisture toward the back of the house was not abnormally large. State
Farm denied coverage.
The Nicolaus filed suit. The jury found that State Farm breached the
insurance contract and awarded damages for past mental anguish, puni-
tive damages, and attorneys' fees. The trial judge set aside the jury ver-
dict with respect to bad faith and entered a judgment for breach of
contract. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on
contract damages, but it reversed the trial court's refusal to enter judg-
ment on the bad faith components of the verdict. Consequently, the
court of appeals reversed and rendered on the issues of bad faith and
entered a judgment favoring the Nicolaus.
State Farm, the petitioner before the Texas Supreme Court, no longer
disputed contract damages. It took issue only with the bad faith compo-
nents of the judgment. State Farm's argument was simplicity itself.
Premise One: Haag Engineering is an internationally reputable engi-
neering company with substantial experience in the relevant subject
matter.
Premise Two: Haag investigated the loss and provided reports conclud-
ing that plumbing leaks did not cause this foundation damage.
Premise Three: If an insurer relies upon a report prepared by a reputa-
ble engineering firm which investigates the loss, then it cannot be guilty
of bad faith.
Conclusion: State Farm was not guilty of bad faith.
The Texas Supreme Court rejected this simple argument because it re-
jected Premise Three.10 6 The Court held that reliance upon an expert's
report is not sufficient to immunize an insurer from bad faith; the reliance
105. Id.
106. See id. at 448.
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itself must be reasonable. 10 7
Justice Spector found that there was some evidence supporting the
proposition that State Farm's reliance upon Haag's report was not rea-
sonable.' 0 8 Justice Spector detailed this evidence at some length:
(1) Haag did a lot of work for insurance companies. Indeed, one of its
engineers testified "that eighty to ninety percent of his work consisted of
investigations for insurance companies."' 0 9
(2) The same engineer testified that he knew that if he reported that
plumbing leaks caused foundation damage, the insurer would have to
pay."10
(3) Haag Engineering held the "general view that plumbing leaks are
unlikely to cause foundation damage," and the State Farm adjuster knew
that this was Haag's general view when he hired Haag."'
(4) An attorney for the policyholder testified upon cross-examination
by the insurer that she had personal knowledge as to State Farm practices
and the practices of the adjuster and "that it was a 'fair inference' that
[the State Farm adjuster], whom she knew, hired Haag because he was
aware that Haag, as a general rule, would not agree that a leak caused
foundation damage."" 2
(5) The Nicolaus' foundation repair contractor testified that he had
reviewed eighty or ninety Haag studies of local foundation damage and
that Haag had reported only twice that plumbing leaks contributed to
foundation movement." 3
(6) Neither State Farm nor Haag conducted an adequate investigation
of the Nicolau site." 4
(7) The Nicolaus obtained two expert reports. Haag apparently did no
investigation after the second report, but merely criticized the second re-
port of the insureds' experts based upon what it already believed. 1 5
(8) Several expert witnesses, including one for State Farm, itself, dis-
puted Haag's assertion that soil moisture contents under relevant por-
tions of the Nicolau home were not abnormally high.116
Thus, there was some evidence, concluded the majority, to support the
jury's finding of insurer bad faith. 1 7 At the same time, there was no
evidence to support the jury's finding of malice, and hence, its assessment
107. See id. at 448-50.
108. See id. Note that the Texas Supreme Court did not say that the reliance was unrea-
sonable. It only said that there was some evidence to support the proposition that it was
unreasonable.
109. Id. at 448.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 448-49.








of punitive damages.118 Nor was there any evidence to support the jury's
finding that State Farm had acted unconscionably." 9 Nevertheless, the
Court held that the Nicolaus might be entitled to additional damages
under the DTPA because the jury found that State Farm had knowingly
engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 120 Upon this ground, the
Court remanded the case to the court of appeals.121
The plurality opinion noted that this case was submitted in accordance
with the old bad faith standard, whereby the insurer's duty is breached if
the insured denies a claim with no reasonable basis. 122 Indeed, the opin-
ion focused on evidence supporting the proposition that State Farm's reli-
ance upon Haag's report was not reasonable. 123 The Court also held that
there was sufficient evidence in the record to sustain a bad faith finding
under the new Giles approach. 124 However, the Court wholly failed to
identify the evidence required under Giles. It is unclear what evidence
showed that State Farm knew (or should have known) that it was reason-
ably clear that the claim was covered.
Justice Enoch's concurring opinion appears to pick up on this fact. This
very short opinion notes that "[t]he court in Giles announces a 'modifica-
tion' to the bad faith standard of liability. While I adhere to my view that
such a modification was neither warranted nor particularly meaningful,
my view did not prevail."'1 25 Even so, the Court's opinion in this case
reflects the continuing vitality of Lyons and Dominguez.126
Justice Hecht wrote a lengthy, stinging dissent.127 Justices Gonzales
and Owen joined in his entire opinion. Chief Justice Phillips joined in all
of the dissent except the first and most combative part.
The first part of Justice Hecht's dissenting opinion is a strongly worded
critique of the common law tort of insurer bad faith. Justice Hecht
brands it "nebulous," "unpredictable," and outside the rule of law.128
118. See id. at 450-51.
119. See id. at 451.
120. See id. at 453.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 448.
123. See id. at 448-50.
124. See id. at 448.
125. Id. at 453.
126. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1994); Lyons
v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1993).
127. See Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d at 453-64.
128. Id. at 453. Justice Hecht quotes Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit. See id.;
Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1989). Judge Kozinski de-
scribed an analogous tort as "more resembling a brick thrown from a third story window
than a rule of law." Id. at 315. Justice Hecht remarks that the "only flaw in Judge Kozin-
ski's metaphor is the implication that bad faith liability is limited to hapless passersby. A
more accurate comparison would be to an assault weapon fired into a crowd at random."
Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d at 453. Justice Hecht notes that that is "the defendant's perspective."
Id. From the plaintiffs perspective, Justice Hecht observes that
bad faith is more like Hollywood television's Wheel of Fortune, or closer to
home, like the Texas lottery: it costs almost nothing to play, you can play
whenever you want, and if you win you hit the jackpot-tens, maybe hun-
dreds, of thousands of dollars for the awful mental anguish that invariably
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The rule of law, after all, requires that a citizen be able to determine what
is legally required of him, and a well-run legal system should permit liti-
gants to be able to predict probable outcomes. 12 9 Only then will the set-
tlement dimension of the litigation process be rational. But, says Justice
Hecht, common law insurance bad faith is inconsistent with this aspect of
the rule of law. 130
Justice Hecht does not favor abolishing the tort of bad faith, although
he probably would not have created it. Instead, he would utilize contract
law; correctly applied, it would permit the recovery of consequential
damages.1 3 ' However, Justice Hecht observed that Texas courts are "so
far down the tort road it would be hard to retrace our steps."' 32 Never-
theless, since Texas has the tort of bad faith, it is the responsibility of the
Texas Supreme Court to infuse that tort with "the principles, logic and
limits necessary for any rule of law."' 33 It is the responsibility of the
Court to create real, genuine, and meaningful standards for judging ac-
tual cases. It may not simply leave this work to juries because "[j]uries
are entitled to be told what the law is.'134 Juries cannot fulfill their fact
finding function in the absence of legal standards which are not suffi-
ciently precise to be used in the practical world. Mere rationalizations
about general standards will not help.135 The rule of law requires rules of
law.
Justice Hecht did not believe that there was any evidence to support
the proposition that State Farm had acted in bad faith.' 36 "By any fair
measure, the disagreement over what caused the shifting in the founda-
tion of the Nicolaus' house was serious and substantive."1 37 Justice Hecht
cites the following considerations in support of his view:
(1) The Nicolaus themselves, for the five years between 1984 and 1989,
did not perform the kind of testing which was held against Haag.138
(2) Though Haag held the general view that plumbing leaks seldom if
ever caused foundation damage, there was a published study by engineers
at the University of Texas at Arlington "which concluded that localized
seems to accompany denial of even the smallest insurance claim, and millions
in punitive damages. And like the lottery, bad faith liability is paid ulti-
mately by the public. Insurance companies have not been authorized to print
their own currency; the money to pay successful plaintiffs and their attorneys
comes from policyholders, and they obtain the money to pay premiums from
wages or sales. In effect, bad faith is a levy on everyone to benefit a few-
what some have called a tort tax.
Id. at 453-54.
129. See id. at 454.
130. See id.




135. Chief Justice Phillips did not join Justice Hecht in his vivid general critique of the
foundations of the tort of insurer bad faith. See id. at 453.
136. See id. at 461-65.
137. Id. at 456.
138. See id. at 457.
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leaks in an unpressurized sewer line under a slab foundation rarely
caused significant shifting."'1 39
(3) The Haag Engineers studied reports prepared by the Nicolaus' ex-
perts, and they relied upon them.140
(4) After the plumbing leaks were repaired, the Nicolaus' house con-
tinued to shift and crack.' 41
(5) The leaks were quite a long way away from the area of the house
that shifted. 14 2
(6) The Haag engineers constructed an experiment costing more than
$4,000 to test their hypothesis, and the experiment tended to support
their conclusion. The Nicolaus' engineers created their own experiment,
which tended to suggest that more water might escape than in the Haag
experiment. Even in that experiment, not enough water leaked to vindi-
cate the Nicolaus' position. 14 3
(7) The testimony of the Nicolaus' lawyer, elicited on cross-examina-
tion, should be assigned no weight whatever, precisely because the wit-
ness was the Nicolaus' lawyer.' 44
Justice Hecht would have reversed the bad faith findings. 145 Even he,
however, would not subscribe to State Farm's simple argument. State
Farm's Premise Three was too simple. Justice Hecht agreed that an in-
surer's reliance must be reasonable; he simply thought that State Farm's
reliance was reasonable' 46
3. United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Williams
United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Williams147 rounds out the 1997 bad
faith trilogy. Giles revised the law on simple facts and found bad faith.' 48
Nicolau applied the revised law to complicated facts and found bad
faith.149 In Williams, a united Court, writing a per curiam opinion, ap-
plied the revised law to simple facts and found no bad faith.' 50 Signifi-
cant Supreme Court decisions on insurer bad faith have tended to come
in pairs, with one of the cases involving workers' compensation insur-
ance.15' Williams continues part of this pattern.
139. Id. at 458.
140. See id. at 460.
141. See id. at 457.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 460.
144. See id. at 463. Is Justice Hecht suggesting that the testimony of very interested-
even partisan-witnesses should be assigned no weight? Texas law appears to be other-
wise. If Justice Hecht's conclusions were adopted, Texas law of evidence and trial proce-
dure would be revolutionized.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. 955 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1997).
148. See supra notes 42-98 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 99-146 and accompanying text.
150. See Williams, 955 S.W.2d at 269.
151. See, e.g., Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987)
(uninsured motorist coverage) and Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210
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Nathaniel Williams died in 1992 in the course and scope of his employ-
ment. U.S. Fire provided Mr. Williams' employer with workers' compen-
sation insurance and also provided accidental death benefits to the
beneficiaries of any worker killed while in the course and scope of his
employment. The employer's report to the insurance company indicated
that Mr. Williams' spouse was named "Lessie." Subsequently, another
woman, Essie Williams, claimed the same benefits.
U.S. Fire took recorded statements from both Essie and Lessie. The
facts were not really at issue. Essie and Nathaniel married in 1957 and
separated in 1978 but never divorced, although though they intended to
do so. At all times since 1978, Nathaniel lived with Lessie. U.S. Fire
applied Workers' Compensation Commission Rule 132.3152 and "deter-
mined that Essie was deemed to have abandoned Nathaniel."'1 53 In rele-
vant part, Rule 132.3 provides that if a surviving spouse has abandoned
the employee, without good cause, for more than a year immediately
before the death of the employee, that surviving spouse shall be ineligible
to receive death benefits. 154 The surviving spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the employee "if the surviving spouse and the employee
[have] not been living in the same household for more than one year
preceding the employee's death."'1 55 There are several exceptions to this
deemer-clause, although none of the specific clauses is relevant. There is
a catch-all exception clause, however, which provides that the surviving
spouse is not deemed to have abandoned the employee if they are living
apart for some reason and "it is established that their separation is not
due to the pending breakup of the marriage."'1 56 There was no dispute
that Essie and Nathaniel had not lived together during the year preceding
Nathaniel's death. None of the exceptions to the deemer-clause was rele-
vant. Consequently, U.S. Fire denied Essie's claim and paid benefits to
Lessie.
Nearly a year later, Essie filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation
Commission. The Benefits Review Conference officer determined that
Essie was not entitled to benefits. Subsequently, a contested hearing was
held. The hearing officer concurred. Thereafter, Essie appealed to the
Appeals Panel, which is the highest administrative level. The Panel re-
versed the decision of the contested case hearing officer in a split deci-
sion. The dissenting member of the Panel agreed with U.S. Fire, as had
the benefits review officer and the contested case hearing officer.
Thereafter, Essie sued U.S. Fire for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, violations of the DTPA, and violations of the Texas In-
(Tex. 1988); Lyons v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. of Tex., 866 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1993) (non-work-
ers' compensation case) and National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d 373
(Tex. 1994).
152. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 132.3 (West 1997).
153. Williams, 955 S.W.2d at 268.





surance Code, as well as for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court granted U.S. Fire a summary judgment as to all counts.
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in part but reversed the
judgment as to Essie's claim under the law of insurer bad faith. Thus,
Essie had prevailed on her compensation claim at the administrative
level. It was not, however, an issue in the trial court. The trial court
poured her out on the common law and statutory bad faith claims. The
court of appeals agreed as to the statutory bad faith claims (as well as the
intentional infliction claim) but reinstated the common law bad faith
claim and ordered the district court to put it to trial.
The matter then came before the Texas Supreme Court. Since the sum-
mary judgment was at issue, the Court was bound to resolve all doubt
against U.S. Fire and to view the evidence most favorable to Essie. The
issue before the Court was quite simple: had U.S. Fire established as a
matter of law that it did not breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing
that every first-party insurer owes its insured? 157
Erroneous denials do not automatically amount to bad faith. Bona fide
disputes about an insurer's liability under the insurance policy do not rise
to the level of bad faith. Therefore, U.S. Fire was entitled to a summary
judgment if the "summary judgment proof established that there was no
more than a good faith dispute regarding the applicability of
Rule 132.3."158 At worst, what happened in this case was that the insur-
ance company misinterpreted Rule 132.3. The Court held, however, that
"[a]n insurer cannot be liable for bad faith simply because it misinterprets
a rule.' 59 If the insurer had an arguable interpretation of the rule, even
if it was wrong, then it could not be guilty of bad faith. The Court found
that "U.S. Fire's interpretation of the rule was at least arguable; three out
of the five Commission reviewing officers shared that interpretation. 1 60
Therefore, U.S. Fire won, and the Court rendered a take-nothing judg-
ment in its favor. 61
As sound as the result in this case is, the logic of the case is troubling.
Does it imply that if a respectable quasi-judicial authority supports the
insurance company's position, then the insurance company cannot be lia-
ble for bad faith? What if the insurer has received authoritative legal
advice from acknowledged coverage experts? Williams tends to suggest
such facts may completely defeat a bad faith case. Of course, the deci-
sions of quasi-judicial officers must not involve any irregularity, and the
coverage olinion letter must not be subject to criticisms analogous to
those leveled at Haag Engineering. Nevertheless, this is a relatively easy
standard from a defendant's point of view. 162
157. See Williams, 955 S.W.2d at 268.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 269.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Courts of appeals around the state and the Fifth Circuit have decided several cases
involving the common law tort of insurer bad faith. See Higginbotham v. State Farm Mut.
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D. STATUTORY BAD FAITH
The Texas Supreme Court has not decided any cases involving either
the Insurance Code or the Deceptive Trade Practices Act during the Sur-
vey period. Intermediate appellate courts, however, have rendered a
number of such decisions. 163
1. Article 21.21.
Yazdi v. Republic Insurance Co. 164 was a theft-of-contents case arising
under a homeowners policy. The insured-plaintiff-appellant sought re-
covery for the theft of oriental rugs, a gold Rolex watch, a stereo, and a
leather jacket. The insurer, which had issued a $50,000 homeowners pol-
icy, had its doubts and denied coverage. The insurer based its doubts
upon the following facts: the insured had never purchased insurance
before, although he claimed to have owned the items for a number of
years; the insurance policy was about to expire; the insured had at-
tempted to increase the value of the insurance; the insured had not at-
tempted to purchase new insurance; the insured was unable to produce
receipts for the purchase of the items claimed; and the insured's account
of relevant facts was inconsistent on several points. Republic denied the
insured's claim upon the ground of fraud. The insured sued for breach of
contract, negligent claims handling, breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, violations of the Texas Insurance Code, and violations of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Republic claimed that the insur-
ance policy was void because of a provision prohibiting concealment of
fraud and countersued for attorneys' fees under both the DTPA and the
Insurance Code. The jury was unanimous in its verdict for the insurance
company on the fraud defense, and it valued the insurer's attorneys' fees
and costs at $35,000.
The significant issue for insurance law upon appeal was the award of
attorneys' fees to the insurer. The appellate court affirmed the award on
the ground that the trial court had not acted arbitrarily or unreasonably
in deciding that the insured's claim was groundless and brought in bad
faith.165 The standard of review was abuse of discretion. 166 Hence, the
trial court's determination that a party's claim was groundless and
brought in bad faith would be reversed only if the trial court's decision
Auto. Ins. Co., 103 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 1997), where the property insurer was not guilty of
bad faith when it had some reason to believe that the insured may have stolen his own car,
even when it was ultimately found that the insured's company was wrong. See id. at 459-60.
The overriding question in this case was, what constitutes bias (a bad thing) as opposed to
preliminary hypothesis (an absolutely necessary thing)? Higginbotham also held that
"Texas law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent claims handling." Id. at 460.
163. In one such decision, a court of appeals decided that recovery under the DTPA
and recovery under the Insurance Code do not constitute a double recovery. See Bekins
Moving & Storage Co. v. Williams, 947 S.W.2d 568, 584 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997,
n.w.h.).
164. 935 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
165. See id. at 879-80.
166. See id. at 879.
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was arbitrary and capricious. The specific test for whether a claim is
groundless and in bad faith is "whether the totality of the tendered evi-
dence demonstrates an arguable basis in fact and law for the consumer's
claim. 167
The court of appeals found that the record supported the trial judge. 168
This was true for several reasons. First, the insured's claim fit the pattern
of questionable claims encountered by insurance company investigators
in the past, e.g., it occurred shortly before the policy expired; the insured
could not produce receipts; the policy had excessive coverage limits; and
the insured tried to hustle the insurance company to move quickly. Sec-
ond, there were many inconsistencies in the insured's story. Third, vari-
ous facts about the insured indicated that he had a history of deceit; for
example, he consistently used different spellings of his name, different
birthdays, different addresses, and different social security numbers.
Fourth, he had filed at least two previous personal injury claims. Fifth, he
had deportation proceedings pending against him, and, sixth, he had been
charged with petty theft several times.169 In sum, the trial court had sized
up the insured as a scam-artist, and the court of appeals thought the evi-
dence supported that view. Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed
the award of attorneys' fees. 170
In Keightley v. Republic Insurance Co.,171 National County Mutual Fire
Insurance Company issued a liability insurance policy to Morish. Due to
National County's financial difficulties, Republic Insurance Company,
who would reinsure the National County policy, began to administer the
reinsured policies. Morish was sued by the Keightleys, who recovered a
judgment against Morish in excess of the limits of the National County
policy. Thereafter, Morish sued Republic on causes of action allegedly
arising from Republic's refusal to settle within policy limits. It was undis-
puted that Republic took over the duties and responsibilities with regard
to settlement authority and claims adjusting on the lawsuit. Republic ar-
gued that Morish could not sue him based upon an article 21.21 violation
because Morish was not a party to the reinsurance contract between Re-
167. Splettstosser v. Myer, 779 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. 1989); see Donwerth v. Preston II
Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. 1989).
168. See Yazdi, 935 S.W.2d at 880.
169. See id. at 879.
170. See id. at 880.
171. 946 S:W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ). In an unpublished opinion
dated July 24, 1997, the court withdrew its judgment. See Keightley v. Republic Ins. Co.,
No.03-96-00073-CV (Tex. App.-Austin July 24, 1997) (not designated for publication),
1997 WL 420787. The parties filed a joint motion requesting that action. They had settled
the case. The court still reversed the judgment of the trial court, and it still remanded the
cause to the trial court. The purpose of the remand, however, was to enter judgment in
accordance with the settlement agreement of the parties. See id. at *1. The original opin-
ion is still precedentil authority. It was published; the decision withdrawing the original
opinion was not published, and the action taken by the court of appeals remained un-
changed. The decision of the trial court was reversed. (At this point, it is well to remem-
ber that orders, judgments, and decisions not designated for publication under Rule 90 of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure may not be cited as authority.) One suspects that
Rule 90 will not be universally followed when it comes to Keightley.
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public and National County. The court of appeals disagreed, noting that
article 21.21, section 16(a) states the requisite elements for the statutory
cause of action: (1) actual damages, (2) sustained by any person, and
(3) caused by others engaging in an act or practice declared unfair or
deceptive in section 4 of the article. 172 The court noted that privity of
contract is not a stated element and held that the statutory elements are
exclusive and should not be judicially altered by adding to them the ele-
ment of contractual privity.173
In Canutillo Independent School District v. National Union Fire Insur-
ance Co.,174 a school district was sued based on the molestation of several
elementary school students. The fact of the molestation was not in dis-
pute. When the school district turned to its insurance company for cover-
age and defense under a School Leader's Errors and Omissions Act, the
insurer disclaimed coverage based upon an exclusion in the policy for
criminal conduct and assault. The court of appeals upheld the validity of
this exclusion. 175 In addition to this substantive coverage claim, the
school district alleged that the insurer violated section 21.21 of the Insur-
ance Code by making misleading statements concerning the scope of cov-
erage available under the policy. The letter from the insurance company
to the insured stated that the policy covered, among other things, "al-
leged violations of federal or state constitutional civil rights.' 76 One of
the claims against the school district involved Title IX claims based upon
the sexual molestation. The court held that this description in the policy
could not constitute a misrepresentation as a matter of law.' 77 Specifi-
cally, the statement did not indicate that all civil rights claims would be
covered regardless of applicable exclusions.' 78
2. D TPA
The only significant DTPA-insurer bad faith case decided during the
Survey period involved a liability policy.' 79 The DTPA claim came up in
the context of a Stowers problem.' 80 We, therefore, defer the discussion
172. See Keightley, 946 S.W.2d at 127-28.
173. See id. at 128. Another case describing the scope of article 21.21 is Cypress Fair-
banks Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 110 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 1991). The
issue in Cypress was whether ERISA pre-empted a hospital's article 21.21 claims against an
insurance company. The Fifth Circuit held that the hospital's claims were not pre-empted.
See id. at 282. Similarly, ERISA may not always pre-empt actions under § 21.21-6, which
prohibits discrimination in the provision of insurance. See Christenson v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 950 F. Supp. 179, 182-83 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (possibly unlawful discrimination).
174. 99 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1996); see infra Section V.G.
175. See Canutillo, 99 F.3d at 708-09.
176. Id. at 709.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Bleeker, 944 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1997), affd in part, refd in part, 1998 WL 169689 (Tex. Apr. 14, 1998). For a case
touching on the DTPA liability of insurers, see Bekins Moving & Storage Co. v. Williams,
947 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, n.w.h.) (holding that recovery for both
breach of contract and a DTPA claim is a double recovery).
180. See infra notes 472-86 and accompanying text.
1998] 1155
SMU LAW REVIEW
of this case until Section VI of this Article.
In Keightley,'8' a DTPA issue also arose. In addition to article 21.21
violations, Morish sued the reinsurer for alleged DTPA violations. On
this cause of action, the court of appeals sided with Republic. Specifi-
cally, the court noted that a statutory cause of action under the DTPA "is
available only to 'consumers,' a word defined as a person who acquires
goods or services 'by purchase or lease."'' 182 The court held that Morish
did not purchase or lease goods or services from Republic.183 Further,
there was no indication in the reinsurance contract between National
County (Morish's insurer) and Republic (National County's reinsurer)
that Morish was intended to be a beneficiary under the contract. 184 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that Morish did not have standing to assert a
DTPA action. 185
3. Article 21.55
Higginbotham v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.186 is a
significant case applying article 21.55 of the Insurance Code. Higginbot-
ham was an auto theft case in which the insured recovered contract dam-
ages, but not extra-contractual damages. Article 21.55 provides for an
eighteen percent penalty "[i]f an insurer delays payment of a claim fol-
lowing its receipt of all items, statements, and forms reasonably requested
and required ... for more than sixty days,"1 87 unless certain other condi-
tions, not relevant here, apply. The Fifth Circuit found that the insured
had made a claim for proceeds on June 9, 1993. The claim was denied,
and a payment was therefore not made within the prescribed period of
time.188 The issue before the court was whether non-payment after claim
denial constituted a delay for the purposes of article 21.55. The court
held that it did: "[a] wrongful rejection of a claim may be considered a
delay in payment for the purposes of the 60-day rule and statutory dam-
ages.' 89 The insurer asked the panel to reconsider its opinion or, in the
alternative, to certify the question to the Texas Supreme Court, but the
panel declined to do either. 190
Teate v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York' 91 is another 21.55
case. The insurer denied life insurance benefits on the ground of material
misrepresentation in the application process. The jury found in favor of
the insured, and the district court assessed the eighteen percent penalty
181. Keightley, 946 S.W.2d at 128; see supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.




186. 103 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 1997); see supra note 82.
187. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 § 3(f) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
188. See Higginbotham, 103 F.3d at 461.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 462.
191. 965 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
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under article 21.55. The court expressly relied upon Higginbotham.192
The issue before the court was whether the eighteen percent per annum
penalty should be compounded annually from the date of the denial of
the claim.193 The insurance company suggested that it should not be
compounded because the statute did not call for that. The district court
sided with the insurer, noting that the statute says absolutely nothing
about compounding the penalty.1 94 "Consequently, the court must calcu-
late the statutory damages by applying the 18 percent per annum rate as
simple interest. '195 Article 5069-1.03 (applicable in this case but since
repealed) provides for pre-judgment interest to accrue at the rate of six
percent per annum with no compounding. 196 The district court held that
the pre-judgment interest statute does not apply to the eighteen percent
penalty provided under article 21.55.197
Teate also contains significant law on the calculation of attorneys' fees
under article 21.55.198 The parties had stipulated that a one-third contin-
gency fee was reasonable. The problem was: How do you calculate the
one-third? If the courts simply multiply the award by one-third and add
one-third to the award, then, since the fee contract calls for the attorney
to get one-third of the total, the plaintiff will not be made whole. More
exacting mathematics is apparently required. The district court
researched Texas law and reported that at least one court of appeals has
held that "the trial court must calculate the total amount of the recovery
so that after the attorney's percentage is allocated to attorney's fees, the
remaining sum equals the amount of the claim plus eighteen percent per
annum." 199 This issue-the question of how to calculate the amount of
contingency fees-is one of the truly burning issues in the Texas law of
civil procedure and insurance. Most personal injuries, settlements, and
recoveries are funded by insurance, and when fee shifting statutes are
involved, insurance companies have to pay more on judgments when the
Teate-Barclay approach is utilized.
III. PROPERTY INSURANCE
Significant property insurance cases decided under Texas law during
the Survey period have involved arson, plumbing related foundation
damage, the appraisal procedure, interpleader procedure, and the debris
removal clause.
192. See id. at 893.
193. See id. at 893-94.
194. See id. at 894.
195. Id.
196. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (now codified as TEX. FIN. CODE
ANN. § 302.002 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
197. See Teate, 965 F. Supp. at 893-94.
198. See id. at 894.





Homeowners insurance policies, like other property insurance policies,
do not contain an exclusion for arson. Instead, it is universally recog-
nized that policyholders may not recover if they deliberately burn their
own property. After all, it is an honored common law maxim that no
person shall profit from his own wrong doing.200 At the same time, many
jurisdictions, including Texas, have developed an "innocent spouse rule,"
whereby if one spouse burns the property, the other spouse may
recover.
20
Chubb Lloyds Insurance Co. of Texas v. Kizer202 concerned the inno-
cent spouse rule. In 1986, the Texas Supreme Court decided that if a
husband intentionally destroyed the separate property of his wife, the
wife might recover. 203 The issue in Kizer was whether an innocent spouse
might recover insurance proceeds when her spouse deliberately de-
stroyed community property.
The Kizers, a married couple, owned a home and its contents. A fire
destroyed the property, and the Kizers filed a claim. Chubb refused to
pay upon the ground of arson, and the Kizers sued. A jury determined
that Mr. Kizer deliberately set the fire, but Mrs. Kizer did not. The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals held that the judgment entered upon the jury
verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence for the following
reasons: Mr. Kizer was the last to leave the house before it burned;
Mrs. Kizer took her dog to work that morning, which she often did; only
Mr. and Mrs. Kizer, plus their son, had keys to the house; the house was
locked up when the fire department got there; the Kizers were experienc-
ing financial difficulty; they had engaged in some financial maneuvers in-
volving property transfers to protect their assets; and various members of
the fire department testified to physical evidence which supported the
idea that the fire had an incendiary origin.20 4
Whether Mrs. Kizer was entitled to recover under the policy was a
more difficult issue. The trial court had awarded her $87,000 for one-half
of the contents coverage 20 5 and $34,800 for attorneys' fees, plus pre-judg-
200. There is no arson exclusion. There is no deliberate-destruction-of-property-by-
the-insured exclusion. So how are these implied? Courts are usually unsympathetic to
implied exclusions. One standard argument is that intentional destruction, such as arson, is
not really a risk, and hence, is not covered. This is, of course, conceptual legerdemain.
Any piece of property faces the risk of being destroyed by its owner. Or it may be better
simply to say that intentional destruction is an implied exclusion made necessary by some
types of policies.
201. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW, § 63A, 385-86 (2d
ed. 1997).
202. 943 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
203. See Kulubis v. Texas Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955
(Tex. 1986).
204. See Kizer, 943 S.W.2d at 950.
205. The opinion is rather confusing regarding whether Mrs. Kizer had an interest in
the house as well as the contents. The facts are roughly as follows. Mrs. Kizer had exe-
cuted a conveyance of her interest in the house to her husband. Arguably, therefore, she
had no interest in the house. In the court of appeals, Mrs. Kizer suggested that the convey-
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ment interest. The court of appeals reversed the judgment and denied
Mrs. Kizer any recovery.206 The problem, of course, was that any pay-
ment to Mrs. Kizer for her share of the community property would itself
be community property so that the payment would, in part, be the prop-
erty of the person who intentionally destroyed the property. This has
troubled courts deeply, and two Fifth Circuit decisions have not allowed
this result.207 In the only state court decision that has permitted such
recovery of community property which had been destroyed, the commu-
nity property was converted into separate property by a divorce.20 8 So,
absent the division of the community estate, Mrs. Kizer could not recover
for her community property without benefiting her husband, an adjudged
arsonist. The court of appeals acknowledged that the result appeared
harsh, but pointed out that "preventing a wrongdoer from benefitting
from his wrongdoing must be an overriding policy concern. '20 9
B. PLUMBING RELATED FOUNDATION DAMAGE
In Sharp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,210 the Sharps
filed a claim with State Farm for structural and cosmetic damage to their
house. That damage resulted from a shifting foundation, which was in
turn caused by a plumbing leak beneath the house. State Farm denied
the claim.
The Sharps' homeowners policy was divided into two sections. Cover-
age A covered damage to the dwelling, while Coverage B covered dam-
age to personal property. Coverage A provided "all risk" coverage. This
means that any damage to a dwelling is covered, unless it is specifically
excluded. The insuring agreement in Coverage A was subject to Exclu-
sion h, and State Farm argued that Exclusion h precluded coverage for
the Sharps' claim. That exclusion eliminated coverage for losses caused
by "settling, cracking, bulging, shrinkage, or expansion of foundations,
walls, floors, ceilings, roof structures, walks, drives, curbs, fences, retain-
ing walls or swimming pools. '211 The exclusion, however, was subject to
an exception. There was coverage for an "ensuing loss caused by ...
water damage .. .if the loss would otherwise be covered under [the]
policy. ' 212 The Fifth Circuit held that Exclusion h eliminated coverage
on its face.213
ance was invalid, for various reasons, so she owned fractional interests in the house. Had
her move been successful, the rule in Kulubis would have applied. The court of appeals
refused this gambit, however, upon the ground that the point had not been preserved for
review. See id. at 952-53.
206. See id. at 953.
207. See Webster v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 953 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1992); Norman v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1986).
208. See Travelers Co. v. Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
209. Kizer, 943 S.W.2d at 952.
210. 115 F.3d 1258 (5th Cir. 1997).





There was another question, however. Coverage B covered personal
property for losses caused by certain named perils. Accidental discharges
and leaks of water from within the plumbing system were a named peril.
Moreover, Coverage B specifically stated that Exclusion h would not ap-
ply to a loss within the accidental discharge and leakage peril. The
Sharps took the position that the language of Coverage B overrode Ex-
clusion h when the cause of the loss was an accidental plumbing leak.
This position was the crux of the Sharp case.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the proposition that the text specifically in-
cluded in Coverage B, "[a coverage] which applies only to personal prop-
erty, may be imported into Coverage A, which applies to the dwelling or
house, in order to create coverage for a loss that does not involve per-
sonal property damage. ' 214 Indeed, the judge regarded the Sharps' posi-
tion as nonsense "and a rejection of the obvious structure of the
policy .... "215
The Sharps further argued that there would have been coverage under
the previous state-approved standard homeowners policy and that the
committee charged with revising that form did not have the authority to
restrict their coverage in any significant way. Moreover, the Sharps sug-
gested that the Texas Department of Insurance had indicated that the
accidental discharge language was ambiguous.2 16 The Fifth Circuit re-
jected the extrinsic evidence upon the ground that the policy was not am-
biguous.21 7 It rejected the observations of the Department of Insurance
because they were not precisely relevant to the language of Coverage B
pertaining to Exclusion h and because the court did not think that the
Department's remarks had binding legal significance.2 18
The Texas Department of Insurance was not at all pleased with the
Sharp decision. On August 22, 1997, the Department issued Commis-
sioner's Bulletin Number B-0032-97,219 which addressed all property and
casualty insurance companies. This four-page document, which bears the
signature of Elton Bomer, the Commissioner of Insurance, is severely
critical of Sharp, and it warns insurers not to rely upon the case:
Because decisions of the federal circuit courts of appeals and fed-
eral district courts with respect to issues of state law are not binding
on Texas state courts, the Department expects insurers to pay claims
in accordance with the Department's position as stated in this bulle-
tin, and the Department will monitor insurers for compliance . . .
[and] insurer's refusal to pay claims . . . for damage to the insured
dwelling, including damage to the foundation caused by settling,
cracking, bulging, shrinkage, or expansion caused by the peril of acci-
214. Id. at 1262.
215. Id.
216. See 20 Tex. Reg. 10398 (1995) (proposed) (Oct. 6, 1995).
217. See Sharp, 115 F.3d at 1264.
218. See id. at 1262. Interestingly, shortly before Sharp was decided, a federal district
court decided almost the same issue in almost the same way. See Jimenez v. State Farm
Lloyds, 968 F. Supp. 330 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
219. Commissioner's Bulletin No. B-0032-97, Aug. 22, 1997.
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dental discharge, leakage or overflow of water from within a plumb-
ing, heating, air conditioning system or household appliance may
subject the insurer to disciplinary action for violations of the Texas
Insurance Code, including unfair claim settlement practices pursuant
to Article 21.21 § 4(10)(a) and Article 21.21-2.220
The reasoning in the Bulletin begins with the principal argument
presented by the Sharps: the previous state-approved homeowners form
provided coverage for foundation damage resulting from plumbing leaks,
the body appointed to revise the policy had no authority to make substan-
tive changes, and therefore, the current policy must be construed in con-
formity with its predecessor.221 In addition, the Commissioner points out
that the price of homeowners insurance includes allocations for dwelling
damage caused by plumbing leaks.2 22 The Commissioner is especially
troubled by the situation around Corpus Christi, where, he says, nearly
eighty percent of homeowners' losses result from the accidental discharge
of water.223
Obviously, there will be further litigation on the subject. In his Bulle-
tin, Commissioner Bomer also points out that the Legislature has a sub-
stantial interest in this matter.224 No doubt, there will be further
statutory revision, further administrative directives, and probably some
revision of the homeowners policy.
C. CARE, CUSTODY, OR CONTROL
All property policies contain exclusions. They are especially important
in so-called "all risk" policies, where the grant of coverage is very broad
and subsequently shaped by the exclusions. One common exclusion is
discussed in AIU Insurance Co. v. Mallay Corp.225 This case concerned
both liability insurance and property insurance. We consider the prop-
erty aspects here and the liability aspects in Section V.
Mallay milled and ground parts used by Dow Chemical in one of its
plants. In 1995, Dow sent Mallay a turbine, which Mallay was to burnish.
After Mallay had completed the job at one end of the turbine, it used a
crane to lift the turbine, to turn it 180 degrees, and then to replace it in
the lathe. When the crane operator set the turbine in the lathe, however,
it rolled, fell out, and dropped several inches. The turbine was so dam-
aged that it could not be used without further repairs that Mallay could
not perform.
Mallay sought coverage for the turbine under its property policy. That
policy contained a Special Extended Coverage Endorsement that in-
cluded the turbine. The grant of coverage in the Endorsement, however,
was subject to a number of exclusions. One of them stated that the
220. Id. at 2-3.
221. See id. at 1-2.
222. See id. at 2.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. 938 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Tex. 1996), affd, 116 F.3d 1478 (1997).
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"[p]olicy does not insure against loss [of] [a]ny property undergoing alter-
ations, repairs, installation or servicing, including materials and supplies
therefore, if directly attributable to the operations or work being per-
formed thereon. 226
The insurer argued that the unambiguous language of the exclusion
was a straightforward elimination of coverage. In response, Mallay
pointed out that the lathe was not on at the time of the accident and that
the turbine was merely being loaded onto the lathe in preparation for
being worked upon. Thus, the insured argued that the damages were not
directly attributable to actual operations or work being performed by
Mallay and, hence, fell within the coverage. The court was neither con-
vinced nor amused. It "commend[ed] counsel [for Mallay] for the auda-
cious creativity of this surreal argument," but the court would not
"permit an abrogation of common sense. ' 227
More interestingly, the Endorsement also contained a liberalization
clause that extended coverage under some circumstances. The clause
provided that if the relevant state agency prescribed the use of a new
form within relevant time parameters, and if there was no increase in the
premium for the use of that form, then the insured was to receive the
benefit of that state-prescribed new form. The Texas State Board of In-
surance approved the use of a new form within the relevant time parame-
ter, and it provided coverage for the personal property of others that
were within the care, custody, or control of the insured. Mallay sought to
invoke coverage under this extension.
The extension, however, contained a restriction. The new form created
coverage for the "'direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property
at the premises described [elsewhere in the insurance policy]."' 228 Fur-
ther, the term "Covered Property" was restricted to property "'for which
a Limit of Insurance is shown in the Declarations.' ' 229 The declarations
showed a limit of insurance for the insured's "stock," but the court found
that the turbine was not "stock. '230 Consequently, the liberalization
clause was no help. 23'
226. Id. at 411 (alterations in original).
227. Id. at 412.
The fact that the lathe was not turned on at the time is not dispositive. Argu-
ing that the turbine was not being worked on because the lathe was not
turned on and milling a turbine is analogous to arguing that a person is not
'painting' unless the brush is actually touching the wall. Every dip into the
paint can would terminate the painting, only to have it resume again once the
brush touched the wall.
Id.
228. Id. at 411.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 412.
231. Mallay also argued that the turbine constituted "stock" and, hence, was insured.
The term "stock," however, is defined as "'merchandise held in storage or for sale, raw
materials and in-process or finished goods, including supplies used in their packing or ship-
ping."' Id. at 413.
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D. THE APPRAISAL PROVISION
Virtually all homeowners policies contain an appraisal clause. Such
clauses provide for something resembling binding arbitration when an in-
surance company and the insured cannot agree on the value of the loss.
Either party may request an appraisal in writing.
In Toonen v. United Services Automobile Association,232 the policy-
holder reported a claim for roof damage resulting from a hail storm.
United Services Automobile Association (USAA) inspected the roof but
found no storm damage. The insured requested a second inspection and
hired a public adjuster. USAA performed the second inspection but
again found no hail damage. The public adjuster demanded appraisal on
behalf of the insured and appointed himself. USAA also appointed an
appraiser. There the matter "sat" for approximately three months.
Thereupon, the policyholder hired a lawyer who wrote the customary de-
mand letter. Shortly thereafter, however, the two appraisers selected an
umpire, and the appraisal board eventually found that the policyholder
was entitled to $1266.35 to replace three missing shingles. Apparently, all
members of the appraisal board agreed. USAA received the appraisal
decision and dispatched a check. Neither the insured nor her lawyer re-
sponded. Instead, approximately six weeks later, suit was filed.
USAA moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim
based on its appraisal and moved for summary judgment on the bad faith
claim based upon the lack of any breach of contract. The trial court
granted the motions. The court of appeals held that the public adjuster
had implied actual authority, apparent authority, or both, to seek ap-
praisal. 233 In addition, because neither the policyholder nor her lawyer
explicitly responded to the insurance company's acknowledgment of the
appraisal results when it sent her a check, the policyholder may have rati-
fied the public adjuster's request.234 Finally, the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's judgment that there was no bad faith because
there was no breach of contract. 235
E. INTERPLEADER PROBLEMS
Marine Indemnity Insurance Co. of America v. Lockwood Warehouse
& Storage236 concerned recovery under a commercial property insurance
policy for a warehouse. A fire destroyed the warehouse in 1993. It con-
tained millions of dollars worth of property belonging to others which
was also destroyed. The claims exceeded proceeds, so the insurer insti-
tuted an interpleader action. The insurer interpleaded nearly $1.3 million
in coverage so that the various insureds could fight it out and the insurer
232. 935 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
233. See id. at 941.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. 115 F.3d 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Grant Lockwood Partners Ltd. Part-
nership v. Maxwell House Coffee Co., 118 S. Ct. 414 (1997).
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could get out of the way. The district court referred the matter to a spe-
cial master, and she decided two general issues.
First, the policy, as written, did not apply to subleases on the premises.
There were at least three levels of leases. The owner had executed a
master lease to the premises manager. The premises manager in turn
leased to others. At least two of those lessees had leased again. It was
the leases on this third level (the sublessees) that concerned the court.
The insurance policy provided coverage for the personalty of persons
other than the insured when (1) the property was "directly connected"
with the insured's business, (2) when the property was in the "care, cus-
tody, or control" of the insured, or (3) when the insured was either "re-
sponsible" for the property or had "agreed in writing prior to the loss to
insure [it]. ' ' 237 The special master found that none of these conditions
was satisfied as to the sublessees. Moreover, the insurance policy in ques-
tion contained an "other insurance" clause. It provided that the property
insurance was excess with respect to every other kind of insurance. The
special master found that the two sublessees had been fully compensated
by other insurance funds, and hence, that the insurance policy in question
(together with considerations of equity) precluded coverage. The district
court adopted the decisions of the special master, and the Fifth circuit
affirmed. 238
The second issue concerned debris removal. The special master
awarded the property owner money for sums it had incurred moving deb-
ris from the warehouse and cleaning up the property site after the fire.
The property owner alleged that a master lessee and property manager
had terminated its lease after the fire and had refused to clean up, even
though it was obligated to do so under the lease. The Fifth Circuit re-
versed the special master and the district court on this point. 239 The court
held that the policy made it clear that it was only the property manager/
master lessee who could make a claim for debris removal and cleanup
expenses. 240 Hence, the property owner could not demonstrate that it
was an unnamed insured but intended beneficiary under the insurance
policy. 24' The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to re-
calculate and redistribute the interpleader funds. 242
IV. BUSINESS CRIME INSURANCE
Property insurance protects the insured against the loss or destruction
of tangible property, whether real or personal. But what about intangible
property, such as money, securities, accounts, and the like? One problem
facing business is the theft of money, and sometimes this theft comes in
237. Id. at 285.
238. See id. at 291.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 290.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 291.
1164 [Vol. 51
INSURANCE LAW
the form of employee embezzlement. There is insurance for some
defalcations.2 43
One of the most interesting cases decided during the Survey period is
Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Insurance Co. 244 Lynch Properties had
an employee fidelity policy. Lynch Properties was in the commercial real
estate business; however, it also performed a number of accounting serv-
ices for the mother of the principal. She paid the company a fee for these
accounting services, which was part of a larger $50,000 annual fee she
paid to the corporation to manage investments that she had in one of its
entities.
One of the bookkeepers embezzled approximately $19,000 from the
personal account of the principal's mother. When the problem was dis-
covered, the corporation transferred its own funds to replace those that
had been embezzled. The corporation sought coverage from its insurer.
The insurer denied coverage, and the insured sued. The district court
sided with the insurance company.2 45
The policy covered losses resulting directly from employee dishonesty.
The corporation's loss, however, did not directly result from employee
dishonesty. The direct result of the employee's embezzlement was a loss
in the personal account of the principal's mother. The corporation sus-
tained a loss when it replenished funds that had been stolen. That should
be counted, said the court, as an indirect loss. 246 Moreover, only certain
forms of employee dishonesty are covered. Only those dishonest acts
that are undertaken with the "manifest intent" to cause the insured to
sustain a loss constitute insured events.247 The insurer argued that the
employee clearly intended to enrich herself but that there was no evi-
dence that she had the manifest intent, i.e., the apparent or obvious in-
tent, to injure the company.248 Finally, the insurance policy restricted
covered property to property that the insured owns, holds, or of which it
may be legally liable. It is entirely unclear, reasoned the court, that the
243. Not all dishonesty is covered. See Dickson v. State Farm Lloyds, 944 S.W.2d 666,
668 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ) (holding that dishonest procurement of in-
creased salaries is excluded from employee dishonesty insurance). See also Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 1084 (5th Cir. 1997). The court held that the
Bankers Blanket Bond provided insurance for losses resulting from the insureds taking
real estate mortgages (or similar instruments) which "prov[ed] to have been defective by
reason of the signature thereon of any person having been obtained through trick, artifice,
fraud or false pretenses." Id. at 1086. The court characterized the policy as requiring that
mortgages or related instruments be defective and that the defect would be caused by a
signature upon that mortgage or instrument being obtained by fraud. See id. at 1088. Cer-
tainly, the mortgages upon which the bank relied were defective in the sense of being
relatively worthless. On the other hand, that defect was not caused by obtaining the bank's
signature on any particular instrument. Moreover, the fact that the bank's signature was
fraudulently procured did not cause defects in the mortgages.
244. 962 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
245. See id. at 964.
246. See id. at 961.
247. See id. at 962.
248. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th
Cir. 1994) (defining "manifest intent").
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corporation would be legally liable for the employee's defalcation. 249
The corporation was not in the business of looking after the funds of
others. Family ties, and not business relationships, were the essence of
these dealings.
One wonders if this case was correctly decided. In fact, the person
whose funds were stolen was a customer of the corporation. She paid a
fee for a variety of services, including looking after her accounts. To be
sure, that was not the main business of the corporation, but it did take a
fee for its services. The corporation was legally responsible for her losses;
in fact, the corporation was probably a trustee of her funds. Further, it is
not clear that the phrase "manifest intent" is a subjective one. By any
objective standard, someone in the position of the bookkeeper would re-
alize that this conduct would cause injury to his employer. Hence, under
frequently employed rules of insurance interpretation, the bookkeeper
should be deemed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his
criminal conduct. The most difficult issue is the requirement in the policy
that the loss must "result directly from the employee's dishonesty." The
court's position was that the corporation's loss was caused directly by its
own decision to replace the lost funds and not by the embezzlement. 250
This is a very constricted view of what counts as a direct loss. Surely, the
corporation's loss of funds is traceable in an obvious and direct way to the
activities of the felonious bookkeeper. The intervening act of the corpo-
ration in making its customer whole did not divert, transform, or overly
complicate the causal chain. Indeed, what the corporation did was en-
tirely normal and reasonable under the circumstances.
V. LIABILITY INSURANCE
As previously stated, insurance is frequently divided into first-party in-
surance and third-party insurance. Contracts of insurance whereby an in-
surer agrees to pay damages on behalf of a tortfeasor are usually
considered third-party, or liability, insurance. Often, contracts of liability
insurance include a clause pursuant to which the liability insurer agrees to
defend the insured if a suit is filed alleging that the insured is a tortfeasor
of a covered sort. Often, insurers defending insureds have the discretion
to settle such cases, but sometimes not. Sometimes defense expenses are
part of policy limits; however, more usually they are not. Invariably, in-
sureds are required to cooperate with the insurers in mounting a defense.
A. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
The Supreme Court of Texas addressed the duty to defend four times
during this Survey period. The cases uphold the continued validity of the
"Complaint Allegation Rule," which is also known as the "Eight Corners
249. See Lynch Properties, 962 F. Supp. at 963.
250. See id. at 964.
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Rule. '2 51 The rule is quite simple. If a petition alleges facts which would,
if proved, require the insurer to make payments on behalf of the insured,
then the insurer has a duty to defend. The truth of the allegations in the
petition does not matter in the slightest. Under the Eight Corners Rule,
courts are not to "read facts into the pleadings. '252 Furthermore, courts
should not look "outside the pleadings, or imagine factual scenarios
which might trigger coverage. '253
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Merchants Fast Motorlines,2 54
the issue was whether a truck owner's allegedly negligent discharge of a
firearm, which caused the death of a passenger in another vehicle, trig-
gered a duty to defend under the truck owner's liability insurance. The
insurer brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a judgment that it
owed a defense neither under its commercial general liability policy nor
under its trucker's policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to
the insurer, but the court of appeals reversed. The insurer brought a sin-
gle point of error to the Texas Supreme Court, complaining only that the
court of appeals erred in holding that there was a duty to defend under
the trucker's policy, which contained the following insuring agreement:
"'We will pay all sums an insured legally must pay as damages because of
bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies, caused
by an accident and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a
covered auto.' 255 The parties agreed that the truck was a "covered
auto."
The Texas Supreme Court held that there was no duty to defend.2 56 No
factual allegation contained in the petition suggested that the plaintiff's
injury and death resulted from the use of the truck. To be sure, negligent
discharge of the firearm took place while the truck was being used. But,
there was nothing to suggest that the discharge of the firearm resulted
from the use of the truck. In order to trigger the insuring agreement,
there must be a causal relationship between the injury and the use of the
covered auto (i.e., the truck). 257
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Cowan,258 issues concerning the
duty to defend arose under a homeowners policy. The insuring agree-
ment stated that the insurer would provide a defense at its expense, by
counsel chosen by the insurer, if a suit was brought against an insured for
damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by a cov-
251. "Eight corners" refers to a comparison of the four corners of the petition with the
four corners of the policy. Of course, the locution "eight corners" is metaphoric. No insur-
ance policies and few petitions are ever to be found on a total of two pages.
252. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast Motorlines, 939 S.W.2d 139, 142
(Tex. 1997).
253. Id. Thus, insurance law has restored "fact pleading." At least where a plaintiff
wants to trigger insurance coverage, she is well-advised to eschew "notice pleadings."
254. 939 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1997).
255. Id. at 141.
256. See id. at 142.
257. See id.
258. 945 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1997).
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ered occurrence. As is customary, the policy stated that the insurer had a
duty to defend even if the suit was groundless, false, or fraudulent. The
policy defined the phrase "bodily injury" to mean "bodily harm, sickness
or disease, ' 259 and the term "occurrence" was defined as an
"accident., 2 60
The gist of the tort case was simple and outrageous. A young man
lived at home with his family. He worked at a grocery store as a photolab
clerk. Someone delivered for development a roll of film containing re-
vealing pictures of a young woman. The young man made extra prints of
several of the pictures and took them home. He later flashed them
around among his friends and word got back to the young woman of
whom the pictures had been taken. She sued, alleging "severe mental
pain, a loss of privacy, humiliation, embarrassment, fear, frustration,
[and] mental anguish," both in the present and in the future.261
The Texas Supreme Court denied that the insurer had a duty to defend
on two grounds. First, it held that pure mental anguish is not bodily in-
jury.2 62 This matter has been considered by a number of jurisdictions,
and, according to the Texas Supreme Court, "[a] substantial majority of
those courts considering the question ... have held that purely mental
injuries ... do not constitute 'bodily injury." 263 Moreover, although the
physical manifestations of mental anguish might trigger a duty to defend,
pleading mental anguish does not automatically imply physical manifesta-
tions. As the Court succinctly stated the matter, "[p]hysical
[m]anifestations [a]re [n]ot [i]mplicit in a [c]laim for [m]ental
[a]nguish. ' '264
Second, there was no occurrence pleaded, and hence, the insuring
agreement was not triggered. The term "occurrence" is defined by means
of the term "accident." Hence, the insuring agreement would be trig-
gered only if plaintiff had pleaded an accident. The defendant's conduct
was intentional at every turn, and all of the consequences of his conduct
were foreseeable. Therefore, it was no accident.265 The Court based this
finding on a series of its own decisions, thereby making sure that every-
one understands that its historic decisions on the duty to defend are alive
and well.266 The Court also took pains to point out that courts should
take the term "accident" seriously for reasons of public policy.2 6 7 "To
hold otherwise would inappropriately enhance rather than minimize the
259. Id. at 822.
260. Id. at 826.
261. Id. at 822.
262. See id. at 824.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 825.
265. See id. at 827-28.
266. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S. & G.W., 858 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1993); Repub-
lic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1976); Argonaut Southwest Ins.
Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1973); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 416 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. 1967).
267. See Cowan, 945 S.W.2d at 828.
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moral hazard inherent in insurance. '268
At the same time, the Court took pains to indicate that the mere inten-
tional performance of an act does not necessarily mean that there has
been no accident.2 69 The occurrence of an accident is to be determined
by the effects of the act, not the performance of the act.270 The Court
expressly rejected an argument from the insurer to the effect that "if an
actor intended to engage in the contact that gave rise to the injury, there
could be no 'accident.' 271 First, such a construction would render one of
the exclusions surplusage, and it is a fundamental norm of insurance con-
tract construction that no passage in an insurance policy shall be rendered
redundant.2 72 Second, insurance is purchased to cover negligent acts.
Many negligent acts are intentionally performed but performed in a con-
text where the consequences are unanticipated. Think of a hunter firing a
gun at an object he believes to be a deer but which is really a person. In
that case, an act is performed intentionally, but the consequences are
quite accidental. 273
At the end of his unanimous and vigorous opinion, Justice Cornyn held
that if a petition does not establish a duty to defend, an insurer has no
duty to go beyond the petition and investigate.274 Under the "Complaint
Allegation Rule," insurers are "entitled to rely solely on the factual alle-
gations contained in the petition in conjunction with the terms of the pol-
icy to determine whether [they have] a duty to defend. '2 75 Thus, the
Court held that, under the facts of the Cowan case, there was no duty to
investigate.276
The duty to defend came up again in Farmers Texas County Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Griffin.277 The Texas Supreme Court first decided this
case on the same day it decided Merchants Fast Motorlines, 78 but it is-
sued another opinion on November 13, 1997.279 Griffin involved a drive-
by shooting. Farmers insured James Royal, III. Royal had apparently
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 827.
271. Id. at 828.
272. See id. The exclusion in question is the intentional injury exclusion, according to
which the insurer is relieved of the responsibility of paying damages for any injury which is
"expected or intended." Do the Court's arguments here really make sense?
273. See id. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between fact pleadings and cause-of-
action pleadings when making duty to defend decisions. See HVAW v. American Motorists
Ins. Co., 968 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (When an allegation of negligence is
contained within a larger allegation of a fraudulent conspiracy, the allegation of negligence
will not trigger a duty to defend.).
274. See Cowan, 945 S.W.2d at 829.
275. Id.
276. See id. There is a puzzle in this holding. It is quite narrow. It is restricted to the
facts of the case. Why? Given the breadth of the "Complaint Allegation Rule," why
would the Court signal that under different facts, an insurer might have a duty to
investigate?
277. 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 362, 1997 WL 78574 (Feb. 21, 1997).
278. 939 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1997); see supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
279. Farmer's Texas County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1997).
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driven a car from which shots were fired, injuring Griffin. Farmers de-
fended Royal subject to a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking a determination as to both its duty to defend and
its duty to indemnify.
In the first decision and in the second decision, the Texas Supreme
Court held that the petition in the underlying case did not trigger either a
duty to defend or a duty to indemnify.280 This was true for two reasons.
First, there were no factual pleadings that added up to an accident. In-
stead, the pleadings added up to intentional conduct, not negligent be-
havior.28 1 Second, the insurance policy insured only against "auto
accidents." Drive-by shootings are not auto accidents. 282 On these twin
bases, the Court, in both decisions, held that there was no duty to defend
and no duty to indemnify.283
Griffin filed a motion for rehearing. Sua sponte the Court asked the
parties to brief whether the Court had jurisdiction to decide whether the
insurance company had a duty to indemnify. Some years ago, the Texas
Supreme Court, in Firemen's Insurance Co. v. Burch,284 held that the De-
claratory Judgment Act 285 did not give the Court jurisdiction to decide
duty-to-indemnify questions before the resolution of the underlying tort
case. The Court held that it had no jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions
and that there was no justiciable controversy regarding the insurer's duty
to indemnify before a judgment had been rendered against an insured.286
The Burch case is now nearly thirty years old. The courts of most states
and the Fifth Circuit regard many duty-to-indemnify questions as justicia-
ble before the underlying tort case is resolved, and the Texas Supreme
Court itself has suggested that the parties should seek declaratory judg-
ments as to the duty to indemnify before the underlying tort suit is
resolved. 287
But Burch was based on a provision in the Texas Constitution, and
courts are loathe to overrule constitutional decisions. Fortunately, arti-
cle V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, the provision at issue, was
amended in 1985 and significantly broadened the scope of district court
280. See id. at 84.
281. See id. at 83.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 82-83.
284. 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1968).
285. Act of April 26, 1943, 48th Leg., ch. 164 (current version at TEX. CiV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 37.001 et. seq. (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998)).
286. See Burch, 442 S.W.2d at 333.
287. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex. 1996).
Gandy requires an insurer to either accept coverage or make a good faith
effort to resolve coverage before adjudication of the plaintiff's claim, and
also suggests that the plaintiff may wish to participate in that litigation. If, as
Burch held, coverage issues other than the duty to defend are always nonjus-
ticiable, it would be impossible for an insurer to make a good faith effort to
fully resolve coverage before a judgment has been rendered in the underly-
ing claim.
Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84.
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jurisdiction. 288 In particular, under the old constitutional provision, dis-
trict courts had jurisdiction only over controversies valued at $500 or
more.289 Consequently, said the Griffin Court, because district courts
could only speculate as to the value of the underlying tort case, they
could not take jurisdiction over duty-to-indemnify questions before the
resolution of the underlying case.290 Now that the monetary limit has
been eliminated, the district courts have original jurisdiction over "all ac-
tions, proceedings, and remedies. ''291
Consequently, duty-to-indemnify questions are now justiciable before
the underlying tort case has been completed. At the same time, district
courts retain the discretion to abstain from resolving indemnity issues un-
til the underlying tort suit is resolved. This is obviously true when cover-
age hinges on tort issues. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court held that "the
duty to indemnify is justiciable before the insured's liability is determined
in the liability lawsuit when the insurer has no duty to defend and the
same reasons that negate the duty to defend likewise negate any possibility
the insurer will ever have a duty to indemnify. 292 Federal district courts
have always had the highly flexible, and nearly unreviewable, discretion
to abstain. Now Texas courts have roughly the same power, but they
have a rule to inform their decisions. 293
Other courts have opined on the duty to defend during the Survey pe-
riod.294 Perhaps the most interesting discussion came up in Western Alli-
ance Insurance Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. 295 This case involved a
288. See id. at 83.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 84.
291. Id. Strangely, the Burch decision had nothing to do with monetary limits. It had
to do with whether the decision as to duty to indemnify constituted an advisory opinion.
292. Id. (emphasis added).
293. The duty to defend is always relative to a given pleading. Thus, if an insurer ob-
tains an adjudication that it has no duty to defend and the plaintiff files a new petition in a
tort case, necessarily, the former adjudication does not cover the amended pleading. If the
changes in the pleading are minor, inconsequential, or factually immaterial, the insurer
may be confident of its position. On the other hand, if the plaintiff has substantially
changed his petition and has asserted new facts, the insured may acquire a duty to defend.
Hence, it is difficult to see how a judgment declaring that an insurer has no duty to defend
could ever completely foreclose the possibility that the insurer has no duty to indemnify,
even if an insurer has a duty to indemnify only if it has a duty to defend-a proposition
that is itself subject to some doubt.
294. See, e.g., HVAW v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 968 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Tex.
1997) (holding that an allegation of professional malpractice by an attorney did not trigger
a duty to defend under CGL policy); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Metropolitan Baptist
Church, 967 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that misrepresentations can be occur-
rence under Texas law, triggering a duty to defend); Nguyen v. State Farm Lloyds, Inc., 947
S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, writ denied) (holding that a homeowners
carrier need not defend as to allegation of slander, as that cause of action is not expressly
covered); Dear v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 947 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ
denied) (holding that a carrier may settle without the permission of the insured, unless the
policy expressly provides otherwise); State Farm Lloyds v. Kessler, 932 S.W.2d 732, 733,
739 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied) (finding no duty to defend where insured
knowingly made false statements that caused purely economic damages to purchaser of
insured's house).
295. 968 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
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dispute between an excess liability carrier and a primary liability carrier.
The primary carrier alleged that it had no duty to pay for an insured's
defense because it had previously exhausted its coverage. It, therefore,
resisted the excess insurer's attempt to obtain monies it paid on behalf of
the insured through its subrogation rights.2 96
There were two underlying tort suits. Both of them arose out of an
apartment building fire. In the first suit, the decedents' survivors sued
the property manager, among others. They alleged that the property
manager had negligently installed a water heater and had failed to install
a smoke detector on the premises. The property manager was an addi-
tional insured under the Northern policy, as well as the Western Alliance
policy. However, the Western Alliance policy was designated to be ex-
cess of the Northern policy. Nevertheless, Western Alliance defended the
property manager, while unsuccessfully trying to persuade Northern to
do so. The case against the property manager settled for $25,000 in ex-
cess of Western Alliance's limits. Western Alliance paid its limits, and
Northern Insurance paid the rest. The two insurers agreed to mediate the
coverage issues. The plaintiffs filed a second tort action, this one against
the property owner, the FDIC. The FDIC was unquestionably an insured
under Northern's policy, and Northern defended. After approximately a
year and a half, Northern settled on behalf of the FDIC, exhausting its
policy limits.
Thereafter, Western Alliance sued Northern, seeking to recover policy
limits it paid on behalf of the property manager, plus its defense ex-
penses. Northern refused to pay on the ground that its policy was ex-
hausted by the FDIC suit. Northern's position was that an insurance
company has no duty to defend once its policy limits are exhausted and,
obviously, has no further duty to indemnify. The position of Western Al-
liance was that Northern had exhausted its policy after the case against
the property manager was settled. Hence, Northern had limits available
when the first suit settled, so it had a duty to pay, as well as a duty to
defend. The court agreed with the arguments of Western Alliance and
held that Western Alliance was entitled to reimbursement from Northern
for defense expenses and indemnity sums. 297
B. INSURING AGREEMENT
The insuring agreement of the commercial general liability policy states
that the insurer "will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property dam-
age' to which this insurance applies. ' 298 This language is perfectly stan-
dard. Does this apply to all sorts of liability, or does it apply only to
296. See American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.
1992) (holding that excess carriers may subrogate against primary carriers).
297. See Western Alliance, 968 F. Supp. at 1170.




liability that the insured faces as a result of being a tortfeasor? This ques-
tion had never been answered under Texas law, but it came up in Data
Specialties, Inc. v. Transcontinental Insurance Co.,299 and the Fifth Circuit
selected the narrower, tort-based interpretation of the clause.
In Data Specialties, the insured was an electrical contractor. He was
hired to reconstruct the electrical system at a factory. As he was testing
the electrical switchboard that had been installed, there was a short cir-
cuit, resulting in an explosion. Apparently, "a defective General Electric
circuit breaker caused the explosion. '300 No one contended that Data
Specialties was responsible for the accident. Nevertheless, pursuant to its
contract, and pursuant to a sound customer relations philosophy, Data
Specialties paid additional sums to complete the work. The question was
whether Transcontinental was legally obligated to reimburse Data Spe-
cialties for those amounts.
The Fifth Circuit noted that there was no Texas authority on this issue.
It reviewed authority from a number of other jurisdictions, as well as the
writings of several commentators, and concluded that Texas courts would
not require Transcontinental to pay unless its insured had tort-based lia-
bility.30 1 The panel suggested that in making an insurance claim, Data
Specialties was confusing liability with builder's risk insurance, which is a
species of property coverage. 30 2
C. VOLUNTARY CONDUCT
Primary liability insurance policies, such as commercial general liability
insurance, homeowners insurance, and automobile insurance, generally
insure only against accidents. Umbrella policies and other excess insur-
ance policies are somewhat broader, but all insurance is said to insure
only against fortuities. 30 3 Sometimes, however, intentional conduct that
accidentally causes an unexpected and injurious remote consequence
generates coverage. But the intention of the tortfeasor may not be the
299. See id.
300. Id. at 910.
301. See id. at 912.
302. See id. at 913-14.
Normally a party will have two primary insurance needs: insurance against
loss of his property and insurance against his liability for the claims of others.
When a contractor negligently causes an accident damaging his own property
and that of others, he needs two separate policies to collect for his lost prop-
erty and to be protected against claims of others whose property he dam-
aged. The CGL policy covers the contractor for its tort liability. Builder's
risk insurance, however, provides property insurance for a project under con-
struction. This coverage reimburses the owner, or any party with an insura-
ble interest such as a mortgage holder, for the accidental loss, damage, or
destruction of the property, regardless of fault.
Id. at 914.
303. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 635 F.2d 379, 386 (5th Cir. 1981); Morri-
son Grain Co., Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424, 430 (5th Cir. 1980); Two Pesos, Inc.
v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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only question. Fortuitousness is the real issue. Shouldn't the insured's
conduct also be less than fully voluntary if there is to be coverage?
This question was addressed in Wessinger v. Fire Insurance Ex-
change.30 4 In this case, the tortfeasor got blind drunk and beat the tar out
of the tort plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the tortfeasor negligently
caused him injury, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $127,187 in dam-
ages. The insured-tortfeasor and the tort plaintiff joined together to sue
the tortfeasor's insurer. The insurer claimed there was no accident.
The Dallas Court of Appeals relied upon Argonaut S.W. Insurance Co.
v. Maupin30 5 for the general rule regarding accidents: if the tortfeasor's
acts are voluntary and intentional and if the injury is the natural result of
the act, then the result was not caused by an accident, even if the result
was subjectively unintended, unforeseen, and unexpected. 30 6 The Wes-
singer court construed Maupin to require a two-step analysis. First, the
court must determine whether the tortfeasor's acts were voluntary and
intentional. If the tortfeasor acted either involuntarily or unintentionally,
then the inquiry stops, for there was an accident. 30 7 If the conduct was
either intentional or voluntary, then a second step is necessary, and the
court must analyze the consequences of the act. "When a result is not the
natural and probable consequence of an act or course of conduct, it is
produced by accidental means. '30 8 Natural results are those which ordi-
narily follow, which the reasonable person would anticipate, and which
ought to be expected. The standard for judging whether consequences
are natural and probable is an objective standard as "a person is held to
intend the natural and probable results of his acts even if he did not sub-
jectively intend or anticipate those consequences. '309
With respect to the first step, the court held that there was no evidence
suggesting that the tortfeasor slipped, fell, or contacted the victim by mis-
take. 310 Hence, his conduct was intentional and voluntary, and the fact
that he was dead drunk was irrelevant.311 Second, physical injury is a
natural and probable consequence of a beating; the fact that the
304. 949 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, n.w.h.).
305. 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1973).
306. See id. at 635.
307. See Wessinger, 949 S.W.2d at 837.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See id. at 838.
311. See id. at 839-40. Here, the court rejected the approach of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, which held that voluntary intoxication may defeat voluntariness for ac-
tions undertaken while intoxicated. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Tachouni, 604 N.E.2d 689
(Mass. 1992). Instead, the court followed a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, hold-
ing that voluntary intoxication could not defeat voluntariness or intentionality. See Group
Ins. Co. v. Czopek, 489 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Mich. 1992). The court was unimpressed with the
public need to finance compensation for victims. Instead, it found that there was a "gen-
eral policy in Texas not to excuse conduct simply because the actor was voluntarily intoxi-
cated." Wessinger, 949 S.W.2d at 840. This general policy is reflected in the Texas Penal
Code, which states that "[v]oluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the com-
mission of a crime." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 8.04 (Vernon 1994). In addition, the court
was concerned about relieving individuals of personal responsibility for their own conduct,
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tortfeasor was drunk and did not subjectively anticipate this consequence
is irrelevant. 312
An analogous issue came up in State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Fullerton.313 Here, the issue was not drunkenness but insanity. More-
over, the substantive issues were once removed because the primary issue
was preclusion. The tortfeasor killed his wife and stepdaughter. He
pleaded guilty and was convicted of simple (as opposed to capital) mur-
der. His defense lawyers believed that he had a good chance of acquittal
if he pled not guilty by reason of insanity. However, they decided not to
enter that plea because the tortfeasor was seventy years old. If he went
to prison and became terminally ill, he would be sent home to die. If he
were committed to a state mental hospital and became terminally ill, he
would die there. So, the judgment of conviction recited that the
tortfeasor was mentally competent.
The decedents' survivors sued the tortfeasor. State Farm provided the
defense under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment
action, seeking judgment of no coverage. In the declaratory judgment
action, the tortfeasor apparently filed an affidavit pleading that he did not
think insurance coverage existed and stating that "any action taken by me
was intentional and intended to cause harm .... "314 The other defend-
ants in the declaratory judgment action-the plaintiffs in the underlying
case-moved for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, claiming that
the tortfeasor was not mentally competent. State Farm opposed the mo-
tion, but it was granted anyway.
The issue before the Fifth Circuit panel was whether the previous judg-
ment of conviction precluded third parties from collecting on the in-
sured's policy. State Farm had consistently argued in the trial court that it
did. State Farm filed both a motion for summary judgment and a motion
for judgment as a matter of law to close the evidence. The trial court
denied those motions. At trial, decedents' survivors presented expert tes-
timony that the tortfeasor was severely mentally ill and that he was suf-
fering from delusions. The jury believed the testimony and found that the
killings were unintentional. The district court entered judgment against
the tortfeasor. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the guilty plea pre-
cluded a finding of unintentional conduct under the insurance policy.315
Judge Patrick Higginbotham wrote an opinion of case-book quality,
depth, and precision.
Preclusion of fact issues is governed by state law. 316 Therefore, the
responsibility of the panel is to make what Judge Higginbotham called
and it was reluctant to create the possibility of "self-immunity" for responsibility through
drunkenness. See Wessinger, 949 S.W.2d at 839.
312. See id. at 841.
313. 118 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1997).
314. Id. at 377. For an interesting case involving an insanity exclusion-a very rare bird
indeed, at least in these parts-see Cary v. Allstate Ins. Co., 922 P.2d 1335 (Wash. 1996).
315. See id. at 378.
316. See id. at 377.
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the right "Erie-guess.' '317 In Texas, collateral estoppel requires that
"(1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and
fairly litigated in the first action; (2) those facts were essential to the judg-
ment in the first action; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the
first action. ' 318 The third requirement contains an important twist: "[t]o
satisfy the requirements of due process, it is only necessary that the party
against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a
party in the first action. '319
The second requirement did not detain the court. Obviously, the show-
ing of voluntariness of intentional conduct is necessary for a conviction of
murder. The other two requirements were a bit more complicated. Nev-
ertheless, Judge Higginbotham found that Texas would likely treat the
tortfeasor's plea as a "full and fair" litigation. 320 First, Texas courts have
given default judgments in civil cases preclusive effect in spite of the su-
perficial nature of the adjudication leading to those judgments.321 Sec-
ond, the Texas Supreme Court has suggested some willingness to give
guilty pleas in murder cases heavy weight in subsequent civil proceed-
ings,322 even though this language is to be found in an aging case. 323
Third, Texas courts have characterized the law of issue preclusion in
Texas as identical to federal law, and federal courts routinely give preclu-
sive effect to guilty pleas. 32 4
The third element of the Texas doctrine of collateral estoppel, as ap-
plied to this case, revolves around privity. Although Judge Higginbotham
was concerned about "the dangers of formalism tied up in the word 'priv-
ity,"' he recognized that the label is alive and well in Texas legal dis-
course.325 Hence, the court's inquiry was "whether Texas law allows [the
insurer] to extend the preclusive effect of the murder conviction from [the
tortfeasor] to the heirs of [his] victims. '326 Significantly, the decedents'
heirs had no direct action against the insurance company. If they did, of
course, collateral estoppel would not bar their claim.327
317. Id. at 378.
318. Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994). The most
recent pronouncement of the Texas Supreme Court on collateral estoppel is Johnson &
Higgins of Texas, Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 268, 1998 WL 19542
(Dec. 16, 1998). It will be discussed in detail in the next Survey period. It is part of a
seemingly never ending series of cases that began in the mid-1980s. See Armada Supply,
Inc. v. Wright, 858 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1988); Armada Supply, Inc. v. Wright, 665 F. Supp.
1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Kenneco Energy, Inc. v. Johnson & Higgins of Texas, Inc., 921
S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), rev'd, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 268, 1998 WL
19542 (Jan. 16, 1998).
319. Sysco Food, 890 S.W.2d at 802 (emphasis added).
320. Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 381.
321. See id. at 381-82.
322. See id. at 382.
323. See Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 221 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1949).
324. See Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 383. Perhaps the most interesting part of the court's
discussion of element one from Sysco is its scholarly discussion of cases from other jurisdic-
tions addressing the point. See id. at 377-382.
325. Id. at 384.
326. Id.
327. See id. at 384-85.
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Instead, the plaintiff was claiming the right to insurance proceeds
through the rights of the insured, the criminally convicted tortfeasor. "In
other words, [the insurer's] duty is to pay its insured; third parties can
recover proceeds under the policy only insofar as their rights derived
from [the insured's] right to recover proceeds. '328 Thus, the claims of the
plaintiff are derivative upon his claims, and so they should be deemed to
be in privity with him. According to Judge Higginbotham, this result
places Texas squarely among the majority of the jurisdictions that have
considered the problem. 329
The court inferred the existence of privity from the fact that the tort
plaintiffs had no direct action against the insurance company. It is cer-
tainly true that insurance companies may not be impleaded into tort ac-
tions. 330 Nevertheless, under most liability policies, tort victims may sue
insurance companies to recover upon final judgments entered against an
insured and obtained after an actual trial. Such provisions are routinely
found in homeowners policies, commercial general liability policies, com-
mercial umbrella policies, and commercial excess policies. Moreover, lia-
bility policies do not state that the insurer will pay indemnity sums to the
insured. Rather, they state that the insurer will pay sums to others on
behalf of the insured if the insured is adjudged to be a tortfeasor. There-
fore, one wonders if Judge Higginbotham's argument that there was priv-
ity between the tort plaintiffs and the tortfeasor will hold up.
D. "TRIGGER"
Insurance policies are issued for definite time intervals. It is, therefore,
important to know when the injurious act or injury took place. Generally
speaking, in determining which policy covers what injuries, dates are im-
portant. Courts have developed different trigger rules for bodily injury
and for property damage. In asbestos and other mass torts involving
creeping injuries, it is often not possible to determine the precise time of
injury. Some courts hold that asbestos injures the human body immedi-
ately upon breathing it in. This is called the exposure trigger. Some
courts hold that the body is injured when injury becomes known or
should become known. This is the manifestation trigger. And some
courts hold that injury occurs not only upon exposure or upon manifesta-
tion, but at any time the noxious substance is contained within the body.
This is called the "triple trigger." This rule is confined to bodily injury
cases, however. In general, the manifestation rule applies to property
328. Id. at 385.
329. See id. Texas courts treat collateral estoppel as an equitable issue. Consequently,
courts may decline to apply it if the results would be unfair. The panel found no unfair-
ness. Moreover, the goals of issue preclusion were served by recognizing collateral estop-
pel in this case. In particular, it is important to prevent inconsistent judgments. Moreover,
the panel recognized that "the Due Process Clause places limits on the use of offensive,
non-mutual issues of preclusion." Id. at 386-87. The panel did not believe, however, that
any due process rights of the tort plaintiffs were affected. See id. at 387.
330. See Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988) (Cook, J., concurring).
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damage. This is true nationally, and it is true in Texas.331
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Unitramp Ltd.,332 the court sought
to apply the manifestation trigger rule in a property case. The responsi-
bility of the district court, therefore, was to determine the date of the
property damage.
Unitramp chartered a ship. While the ship was in Corpus Christi Bay,
Unitramp ordered fuel from a fuel broker. It delivered the fuel on
June 8, 1993. Unitramp kept the fuel in segregated bunkers. The ship left
port on June 9. On June 14, after the ship was at sea, a surveyor reported
that the water content of the fuel oil was too high. Although the ship had
enough good fuel to complete its voyage to Africa, it diverted itself to
Tampa to exchange the fuel.
Unitramp sued the fuel broker, which filed for bankruptcy. During the
course of the bankruptcy proceedings, the stay was lifted and the parties
agreed to a judgment of $210,000. Unitramp attempted to obtain pay-
ment from American Home, the broker's insurance carrier. American
Home Assurance denied coverage on the ground that the insurance pol-
icy at issue became effective June 12, 1993, and the property damage oc-
curred on June 9, 1993.
The Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, reviewed the decision of
the district court in this case and remanded the case so that the district
judge could apply the manifestation rule.333 According to that rule, prop-
erty damage manifests itself when property damage is actually sustained.
Property damage is actually sustained when there is identifiable damage
or identifiable injury. There is coverage for property damage when the
identifiable damage or identifiable injury takes place during the policy
period.334 Performance of a negligent act or the negligent omission of an
act is not itself property damage. 335 However, "[a] claimant's damage
may be identifiable but not identified. '336 The court suggested that prop-
erty damage manifests itself when "harm is reasonably detectable," 337
rather than when the act takes place or when the property damage is
actually found. This rule is especially important when the property dam-
age is difficult to perceive. 338
The district court found that Unitramp could easily have found the con-
tamination in the fuel oil before it left port.339 It simply chose a slower
method for economic reasons. It could have had a local test made and
331. See, e.g., Snug Harbor, Ltd. v. Zurich Ins., 968 F.2d 538, 544 (5th Cir. 1992); Cul-
len/Frost Bank v. Commonwealth Lloyds Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 252, 257 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1993, writ denied); Dorchester Dev. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, no writ).
332. 945 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
333. American Home Assurance Co. v. Unitramp, Ltd., 91 F.3d 141 (5th Cir. 1996).





339. See id. at 1064.
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received results before leaving port. "Unitramp chose to save money on
the local test and to risk the greater costs. Having cut its cost, the ship
wants to impose liability for the loss, consequent on its 'savings' on the
fuel seller. The vessel bears the full cost of its frugality. '340
There is an unexplained difficulty in the Unitramp case. For insurance
purposes, property damage arises when a tortfeasor damages existing
property. There is no property damage if the tortfeasor merely sells a
defective product.341 On the basis of the reported opinions, the court had
difficulty finding any property damage in this case. For there to have
been property damage, the defective fuel oil would have had to injure the
ship somehow. There is no indication that any such injury took place.342
E. WHO Is AN INSURED?
Frequently, insurance litigation is concerned with which persons or en-
tities are insureds under the policy. Sometimes this is a simple question.
A number of entities may be named on the declaration sheet or on an
endorsement to the declaration sheet, and each of those entities is
counted as a named insured, but there may be additional unnamed in-
sureds. Most liability policies contain sections specifying the identity of
additional unnamed insureds.343
The question of "who is an insured?" was addressed in Western Indem-
nity Insurance Co. v. American Physicians Insurance Exchange,344 a case
involving two medical malpractice liability carriers. In this case, a minor
emergency center employed a physician. As part of his compensation,
the center was to provide the physician with professional liability insur-
ance. In addition, the physician was covered by an individual profes-
sional liability policy. Several months after he came to work for the
center, the physician was sued for medical malpractice. Eventually, a jury
verdict exonerated the physician.
The physician's personal professional liability insurance policy pro-
vided a defense. It requested contribution from the carrier for the center,
which also scheduled the physician as an insured. The second carrier,
after some waffling, decided that its policy was excess with respect to the
individual policy and refused to contribute to the defense.
340. Id. There are three kinds of property damage cases. First, there are cases where
an act causes observed property damage immediately. Second, there are cases where the
act causes property damage immediately, but it is not discovered. Third, there are cases
where an act causes delayed damage. The district court implies that the manifestation rule
is really best designed for cases of the third sort. See id. at 1065.
341. Indeed, most commercial general liability insurance contracts exclude coverage for
such situations. See generally General Mfg. v. CNA Lloyds, 806 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1991, writ denied).
342. See Unitramp, 945 F. Supp. at 1067.
343. See DONALD S. MALECKI & JACK P. GIBSON, THE ADDITIONAL INSURED BOOK
(3d ed. 1998); GARY D. NELSON, "Additional Insured" Endorsements, 24 THE BRIEF 29
(Summer 1995).
344. 950 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, n.w.h.).
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Both carriers relied upon the other's insurance clause. The policy is-
sued by the carrier for the center contained a clause which stated that
[t]his insurance is excess over any other valid and collectible insur-
ance available to each [i]nsured.. ., whether such insurance is stated
to be primary ... or otherwise, except this insurance is not excess
over any other valid and collectible insurance available to those Ad-
ditional Insureds to which the Named Insured may be obligated by
virtue of a written contract to provide insurance such as is provided
by this policy. .... 345
The same policy defined the terms "Named Insured," "Additional
Named Insured," and "Additional Insured." The designation "Named
Insured" included anyone named in the policy as an insured and various
officeholders of the insured. Thus, one could be a "Named Insured"
without actually being named in the policy. "Additional Named In-
sureds" included physician-employees of the center while acting within
the scope of their employment. The category of "Additional Insured"
included hospitals, persons, or organizations to whom the Named Insured
was obligated by written contract to provide insurance as would be pro-
vided under the policy.346
The key question was whether the physician was an "Additional In-
sured," an "Additional Named Insured," or both. According to the court
of appeals, the physician could not be an "Additional Insured" because
he was added to the policy by name, and one person (or entity) cannot be
both a named insured and an additional insured. 347
There is another reason why the physician-employee could not be both
an "Additional Named Insured" and an "Additional Insured." Notice
and reporting provisions in the policy referred only to "Named Insureds"
and "Additional Named Insured." It is the notice and reporting by these
entities that triggers the "Claims Made Policy." There were no notice or
reporting provisions for "Additional Insureds." If one were both an "Ad-
ditional Named Insured" and an "Additional Insured," it might be impos-
sible to determine when a claim was made for the applicable coverage
period.348
345. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
346. See id.
347. See id. at 188-90. The court acknowledged that the physician was not explicitly
designated as a "Named Insured" in the policy. However, there was an endorsement to the
policy listing "Scheduled Medical Professional." In the context of the entire policy, that list
was clearly intended to be a list of additional named insureds. See id. at 188.
348. Sometimes the question of "who is an insured?" is truly esoteric, though interest-
ing. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Oryx Energy Co., 957 F. Supp.
930 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (involving the interaction between the Federal Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act and the other insured provisions of the policy); Progressive County Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Carway, 951 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied)
(involving the interaction between the Texas Motor Carrier Act, the Interstate Commerce
Commission Regulations, the Texas Safety Responsibility Laws, and the other insured pro-




Manufacturers who purchase liability insurance may purchase vendors'
endorsements. The endorsements extend coverage to wholesalers and re-
tailers who merely sell the manufactured goods. They do not cover dis-
tributors who change the goods, change the packaging, or who are sued
for independent torts.349
Thousands of women have sued Dow-Corning for manufacturing de-
fective breast implants. Many of them have also sued the physicians who
inserted them. These physicians have obtained defenses from medical
malpractice carriers. Those carriers would like to see the manufacturers
take over, or at least contribute to, the defense of the doctors. Interest-
ingly, many of the physicians are uncomfortable about being denomi-
nated vendors of products.
This issue was addressed in Texas Medical Liability Trust v. Zurich In-
surance Co.350 Zurich insured Dow-Corning by means of six contracts
from 1989 to 1994. Several of these contracts contained vendors' en-
dorsements making vendors additional unnamed insureds. Two of the
contracts restricted that status to the entities actually named in the at-
tached schedules. Two of the contracts contained no such restrictions,
and two of them contained a restriction but then left the schedule blank.
Those four contracts were at issue in Zurich.
Each of the relevant vendors' endorsements included as an additional
insured "'any person ... (referred to below as vendor) ... but only with
respect to 'bodily injury' . . . arising out of 'Dow Corning's products'...
which are sold in the regular course of the vendor's business... ",351
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Zurich, and
the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed. 352 It did so upon two grounds.
First, it held that the physicians were not vendors. 353 An authoritative
dictionary, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, defines the
term "vendor" as "'one that offers goods for sale esp[ecially] habitually
or as a means of livelihood.'"354 The court held that plastic surgeons do
not sell breast implants as a means of livelihood, nor do they do it habitu-
ally. 355 The court implied that when a plastic surgeon sells a breast im-
plant, it is simply incidental to the medical services he is providing.
356
Second, the court pointed out that the endorsement itself requires that
the manufactured product be sold in the "regular course of the vendor's
business." According to the court, doctors are in the business of render-
349. See Michael Sean Quinn, Vendors' Endorsements, 18 INS. LITG. RPrR. 375, 375-78
(July 1996).
350. 945 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-Austin 1979, pet. filed).
351. Id. at 843 (emphasis added by the court).
352. See id. at 841-42.
353. See id. at 843.
354. Id. (alteration and emphasis added by the court) (citation omitted).




ing medical services, not selling manufactured products.357 Hence, the
plastic surgeon who sells a breast implant in the context of rendering
medical services is not selling the implant in the regular course of her
business.
The seam between sales and services for products liability law has a
long history.358 This line has been especially problematic in medicine.359
Nevertheless, one wonders if this decision is soundly conceived. If a doc-
tor actually includes the cost of the implant in the price she charges her
patient, then, surely, she is selling the implant. If the doctor performs
many breast implant surgeries, and if each of them involves the sale of
the implant, then, just as surely, the doctor is selling implants in the regu-
lar course of her business, even if they are not a large profit center.
Surely, one does not need to do something as habitually as one brushes
one's teeth in order to be a vendor. If I am in the business of selling fine
china and antiques, and I sell one or two antique wooden tricycles a year,
I am a vendor of antique wooden tricycles. Yet, I do not sell them habitu-
ally (in the sense that I brush my teeth), and they do not make a substan-
tial contribution to my livelihood.
G. SEXUAL MOLESTATION
Liability insurers do not wish to be in the business of insuring against
damages inflicted by sexually deviant conduct. Perhaps this is because
the damages are simply too unpredictable and the defense costs too high.
Historically, insurers have tried to avoid liability on the ground that there
has not been an accident or that the injuries and damages that are either
expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured are excluded.
We shall examine some of these cases below. In recent years, many com-
mercial general liability policies, medical malpractice policies, umbrella
policies, and other excess policies have contained express exclusions for
sexual molestation. Homeowners policies often do not. We will also look
at some insurance contracts involving sex exclusions.
In Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. v. Watson,360 three children
were allegedly molested by an employee of a church day-care center. The
children and their parents filed two lawsuits. The church and its insur-
ance company settled with the children; $100,000 was allocated among
the children on a pro rata basis. The insurer put another $100,000 in es-
crow for the children, pending the outcome of a declaratory judgment
action.
The church's insurance policy contained a sexual misconduct endorse-
ment limiting coverage to $100,000 per "occurrence" and $300,000 per
357. See id.
358. See William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict
Liability 62 N.C. L. REV. 415 (1984); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968); see also
Walten v. Jeffery, 907 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1995); WILLIAM POWERS, JR., TEXAS PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW, § 10.0721 (2d ed. 1995).
359. See generally Powers, supra note 358.
360. 937 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
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policy. The insurer suggested that all of the childrens' claims constituted
but a single "occurrence." It took this position based on the express lan-
guage in the endorsement, to wit: "All acts of sexual misconduct by one
person.., will be considered one occurrence." '361 The court held that the
language of the endorsement was unambiguous and that there was only
one occurrence. 362 The court noted that other cases finding multiple oc-
currences were not relevant, since they did not include a technical defini-
tion of the term "occurrence. '363
Canutillo Independent School District v. National Union Fire Insurance
Co.364 concerned a School Leaders Errors and Omissions Policy. An ele-
mentary health and physical education teacher abused at least five sec-
ond-grade girls. The fact of the molestation was not in dispute. The
school district notified the insurance company and requested a defense.
Before they filed suit, the families offered to settle all claims against the
school district for $30,000 per family-a total of $150,000. The district
rejected the settlement, the families filed suit, and the insurer denied cov-
erage, relying upon an exclusion in the policy for claims arising out of
"criminal conduct, assault, battery, and bodily injury. ' 365 The families
amended their complaint several times. In the second amended com-
plaint, they sought money damages and declaratory relief under
Title IX.366
On the eve of trial, the school district settled the underlying tort cases
for $1,040,000. The school district partially satisfied the judgment by pay-
ing $40,000. The insurance company bought the rest of the judgment
from the plaintiffs for $1 million; thereby, the insurer stepped into the
shoes of the plaintiffs and became a judgment creditor of the school dis-
trict. However, it was agreed that the insurance company would seek to
recover the $1 million only if it obtained a declaratory judgment of no
coverage. This was a very creative move. Senior officials of the insurance
company would have been involved. Line adjusters do not generally
have the kind of authority necessary to make a deal like this work.
The insurer filed the declaratory judgment action, and the school dis-
trict counterclaimed with a declaratory judgment of its own, an action for
contract damages, and an action under article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code. The district court held that the insurer had a duty to defend be-
cause the tort plaintiff sought damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and because it was unclear whether pure mental anguish
constituted bodily injury under Texas law.367 Moreover, the court held
361. Id. at 149.
362. See id. at 150.
363. See id.
364. 99 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1996).
365. Id. at 699.
366. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994); see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503
U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that the plaintiffs may recover money damages for sexual abuse
by teachers through a private cause of action under Title IX).
367. See Canutillo, 99 F.3d at 702. This case was decided several months before the
Texas Supreme Court decided Cowan, 945 S.W.2d at 823 (holding that "bodily injury" does
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that the insurance company was obligated to indemnify the school district
because the Title IX claims arose out of the conduct of the school district
and not out of the conduct of the abusive teacher. The same was true of
the intentional infliction claim.
Judge Emilio M. Garza, writing for the panel, reversed and ren-
dered.368 He held that the plain language of the policy excluded any
claim involving allegations of criminal acts.369 Actual sexual abuse
clearly involved criminal acts-for example, assault and battery-so that
any claim arising out of that conduct was excluded. This would include
any claim that the school district failed to prevent the abuse, failed to
protect the children from the abuse, or somehow detained the children
and prevented their escape from the abuse. Each of these claims arose
out of physical injuries inflicted upon the children. The district court
thought otherwise, said the Fifth Circuit, because it focused on the causes
of action rather than upon the facts. 370 For example, perhaps a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not arise out of
acts of sexual abuse. When one looks beyond the cause of action itself
and examines the facts, it is clear that the facts of the intentional infliction
of emotional distress alleged and the facts of the sexual abuse are inti-
mately intertwined. When Texas courts determine whether an exclusion
in an insurance policy applies, they
examine the factual allegations showing the origin of the damages
rather than legal theories asserted by the plaintiff. Where the legal
claims asserted by the plaintiffs are not independent and mutually
exclusive, but rather related to and dependent upon excluded con-
duct, the claims are not covered, even if asserted against the insured
who did not himself engage in the prohibited conduct. 371
Therefore, both the intentional infliction claim and the Title IX claim
were related to, and dependent upon, the teacher's criminal sexual as-
saults, and they were excluded from coverage. 372
Sexual abuse came up again in Cornhill Insurance PLC v. Valsamis,
Inc. 373 The issue in Cornhill was whether claims of sexual harassment
give rise to coverage. In the underlying tort case, the female plaintiff al-
leged that her supervisor made sexual remarks to her, touched her inap-
not include purely emotional injuries or pure mental anguish); see supra notes 258-76 and
accompanying text.
368. See Canutillo, 99 F.3d at 710.
369. See id. at 708-09.
370. See id. at 703.
371. Id. at 704 (citations omitted). Judge Garza thought the Texas law was clear:
"where a claim against an insured would not exist 'but for' conduct explicitly excluded by
the policy, the dependent claims are also not covered under the policy, regardless of
whether the insured against whom the derivative claims are directed actually engaged in
the excluded acts." Id. at 704-05.
372. See id. at 705. The school district argued that if it could not recover on this claim,
there would be no coverage for anything, so the policy would be vacuous and its language
meaningless. The Fifth Circuit rejected this view because it could think of many situations
in which the insurer would have to pay. See id. at 706.
373. 106 F.3d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 69 (1997).
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propriately, exposed himself to her, made obscene gestures, and
attempted to force himself upon her. When she reported this conduct,
the supervisor tried to kiss her, asked her out repeatedly, and arranged to
meet her alone. The employer-defendant sought coverage, but it was re-
fused under three different policies: a comprehensive general liability
policy, an excess comprehensive general liability policy, and an umbrella
liability policy.
The insurance companies filed a declaratory judgment action. The tort
plaintiff settled her suit against her employer and took an assignment
against its insurance companies. The district court granted summary
judgment for the insurers, and the Fifth Circuit panel affirmed.374 One of
the three policies at issue provided coverage for "personal injury," as well
as for "bodily injury," and the term "personal injury" included publica-
tion in violation of an individual's right of privacy. Judge Higginbotham
held that the facts pleaded in the plaintiff's underlying complaint did not
amount to the tort of invasion of privacy because that requires an "'intru-
sion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private af-
fairs.' 375 It is not at all clear that offensive behavior by itself constitutes
invasion of privacy, he said, for at least one Texas court has restricted the
tort to physical invasion of property or some sort of spying. 376 Therefore,
the plaintiff did not plead facts adding up to the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy, much less an invasion of privacy achieved through publication, as
was required by the definition of "personal injury" in the policy.
The plaintiff sought coverage under the same policy for false imprison-
ment, which is also a species within the genus "personal injury." Here
again, the panel found no pleading of false imprisonment.377 There was
no pleading of wilful detention. To be sure, plaintiff alleged that her su-
pervisor attempted to force himself upon her in an unlocked supply
room. Nevertheless, she did not allege that he kept her there by physical
force or by threatening her with physical force. The allegation that she
was detained did not amount to false imprisonment.378
The second policy contained an exclusion barring coverage for injuries
to employees of the named insured. The exclusion was quite broad and
covered both "bodily injury" and "personal injury." The exclusion, there-
fore, also knocked out coverage for plaintiff's negligent hiring and negli-
gent supervision claims.
The same policy included an unusual endorsement, creating coverage
for ship repairing operations. The tort victim claimed that her secretarial
duties included accounting and scheduling for the ship repairing opera-
tions, and hence, that she was covered under that endorsement. Signifi-
374. See id. at 89.
375. Id. at 85 (quoting Industrial Found. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668,
682 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977)).
376. See id. at 85 (citing Wilhite v. H. E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. App.-Corpus





cantly, that endorsement was not subject to the employment exclusion.
Nevertheless, the ship repairing endorsement provided coverage only for
personal injuries that arose from ship repairing operations. Judge Higgin-
botham held that none of the plaintiff's allegations arose from covered
activities.379
The third policy was an umbrella policy. Under that policy, coverage
for personal injury required an "occurrence." The policy defined an "oc-
currence" as "an accident or a happening or event ... which unexpect-
edly and unintentionally results in personal injury. '380 The court held
that no intentional conduct could ever be an "occurrence," as that term is
defined in insurance policies. 381 Furthermore, the plaintiff's negligence
claims were so intertwined and dependent upon her intentional tort
claims that they could not stand alone. 382 As a result, plaintiff's claims
raised no possibility of coverage, so the insurers were entitled to sum-
mary judgment.383
Technically, Cornhill does not depend upon a sexual molestation exclu-
sion. Nevertheless, it should be considered with the sexual molestation
cases because it illustrates the hostility of the courts to coverage cases
based upon sexual misconduct. In Cornhill, for example, the court as-
sumed that case law regarding the definition of "occurrence" applied to
the definition contained in the umbrella policy at issue. That assumption
is almost certainly false. In most insurance policies, the term "occur-
rence" is defined by means of the word "accident." That was not the case
in the umbrella policy at issue in Cornhill; "occurrence" was defined in
terms of the words "accident," "happening," or "event. '384 While this
definition is characteristic of many umbrella policies, it is much broader
than the definition of "occurrence" to be found in primary liability poli-
cies. Indeed, it is virtually certain that the plaintiff's injuries were caused
by happenings or events, although they were probably not caused by
accidents.
A sexual abuse exclusion was explicitly at issue in Acceptance Insur-
ance Co. v. Bhugra Enterprises, Inc. 385 This case arose out of an alleged
rape at a motel owned by the insured. Unquestionably, rape is a form of
sexual physical abuse and, therefore, excluded. In the underlying tort
case, the plaintiff also sued the motel for DTPA violations. The court
held that the DTPA claims were so intertwined with the excluded claims
that they too were excluded from coverage.386
Bhugra contains an additional important point regarding federal de-
claratory judgment procedure. The insurance company filed a claim for
379. See id. at 86.
380. Id. at 87.
381. See id.
382. See id.
383. See id. at 88-89.
384. See id. at 87.
385. 946 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
386. See id. at 482.
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attorneys' fees, litigation-related expenses, and taxable court costs. The
federal declaratory judgment statute does not provide for recovery of at-
torneys' fees, although it does not forbid such recovery either. 38 7 Hence,
where jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship, state law con-
trols. The Texas declaratory judgment statute provides that courts may
award attorneys' fees and costs if they are "equitable and just," as well as
"reasonable and necessary. '388
Some of the defendants in Bhugra were insureds under the applicable
policy but did not know it until the action arose. They, therefore, claimed
that it would be inequitable and unjust to charge them with attorneys'
fees. The court disagreed.389 The defendants tendered the defense to the
insurer per the policy and were not at all self-critical about their status as
insureds or about the existence of coverage. 390 Since they put the insur-
ance carrier to unnecessary expense, the assessment of the attorneys' fees
was appropriate.
H. POLLUTION EXCLUSIONS
One of the most vigorously contested topics in liability insurance in
recent years has been insurance for environmental exposures. Many
parts of various liability policies come up: the "occurrence" language, the
"expected or intended" exclusion, trigger, notice, and others. The focal
point of much environmental insurance litigation, however, has been vari-
ous pollution exclusions with which liability insurers have experimented.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds' London v. C. A. Turner Construction
Co., Inc.391 concerned an absolute pollution exclusion. 392 In this case, a
construction company appealed a declaration of no coverage for a per-
sonal injury suit arising from of the discharge of chemical fumes.
C. A. Turner Construction Company had a subsidiary. William Gal-
breath was a pipe-fitter employed by the subsidiary, and he was injured
while welding pipe at a Texaco chemical plant. Galbreath was welding
outside the building, but he was enclosed within a plastic tent to protect
him from rain. The pipe contained rags, whose function was to prevent
chemical leakage. When the rags were removed, either the rags or chemi-
cals in the pipe came into contact with the very hot pipe that had just
been welded. This contact created a cloud of phenol gas. Galbreath
escaped the gas by diving out of the plastic tent. He suffered injuries as a
result of inhaling the gas and of falling to the ground. Galbreath sued C.
A. Turner, the parent of his employer, among others. Turner sought cov-
erage from Lloyds' Underwriters, but it denied coverage on the ground of
387. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997).
388. See id.
389. See Bhugra, 946 F. Supp. at 483.
390. See id. at 481.
391. 112 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1997).
392. The exclusion is called "absolute" because it does not involve an express excep-




the pollution exclusion. Among other things, that exclusion rendered the
insurance contract inapplicable to liability for any bodily injury "directly
or indirectly caused by or arising out of" the pollution or contamination
of air, "irrespective of the cause."'393 Galbreath, the injured worker, con-
tended that there was no contamination of the air because injurious gas
"fumes were confined to the temporary tent over the scaffolding. '394 In
other words, plaintiff tried to distinguish between "traditional environ-
mental pollution" and a "simple workplace accident" caused by fumes.
395
The Fifth Circuit panel acknowledged that there was a split of authority
on this issue. 396 Some courts hold that not every injury caused by what
could be classified as a pollutant constitutes pollution. These courts hold
that, under some circumstances, the so-called absolute pollution exclu-
sion is ambiguous. 397 Other courts, including a different panel of the
Fifth Circuit, upheld the plain language of the exclusion, holding that it
precludes coverage for "liability arising out of releases that do not cause
widespread environmental harm. '398
One wonders if the court got this one right. A necessary condition for
the applicability of the exclusion is that there be "contamination of air,
land, water and/or any other property and/or any person. '399 It is per-
fectly reasonable that the gas sprayed directly onto the worker's face. If
so, then his injuries did not result from the contamination of air. More-
over, the phrase "contamination of air, land, water, or property" suggests
that the injury must result from the contamination. It suggests that there
must first be pollution in the form of contamination which then causes
injury. If so, then C. A. Turner Construction may not have been correctly
decided.
The Fifth Circuit took up coverage for pollution again in
SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indemnity.400 SnyderGeneral owned a
facility in Wilmington, North Carolina, where it manufactured air-condi-
tioning and heating equipment from 1982 until 1988. Its operations in-
volved the use of an industrial degreasing solvent, trichloroethane
(TCA), and enormous amounts of ground water.
In 1983, there was an accident at the Wilmington plant. Approximately
500 gallons of TCA spilled from an above-ground storage tank.
SnyderGeneral reported the spill to North Carolina authorities and cle-
aned it up to the satisfaction of the government. However, somewhat
later, TCA, probably traceable to this spill, was found in the ground
water at the Wilmington facility. SnyderGeneral cleaned up the site, and
393. Id. at 186.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 187.
396. See id.
397. See id.
398. Id. (citing American States Ins. Co. v. Nethery, 79 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 1996)). Judge
W. Eugene Davis, writing for the Certain Underwriters panel, lists the two lines of cases.
See id. at 187 n.3-4.
399. Id. at 186.
400. 113 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 1997).
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the court reported that it spent approximately $2 million on the effort.40 1
SnyderGeneral had both primary liability coverage and umbrella cov-
erage. The umbrella carrier, which had $25 million in limits, rejected the
claim, and SnyderGeneral sued. The district court held that environmen-
tal clean-up costs are more like restitution than damages. It noted that
the umbrella liability policy obligated the carrier to pay for damages im-
posed upon the insured. Consequently, the insurer was not liable to pay
restitutionary sums.
The panel reversed. It held that "environmental cleanup costs,
whether incurred by the federal government under CERCLA or by an
individual who voluntarily undertakes the task of cleaning up hazardous
waste, are damages and thus are covered by the language of [typical in-
suring agreements]. ''40 2 The court believed this holding to be compelled
by a previous case which found that "CERCLA-compelled clean-up costs
were damages. ' 40 3 Judge Davis, writing for the SnyderGeneral panel,
thought he was simply extending that rule to situations in which insureds
clean up voluntarily before the government cleans up itself and sends the
insureds a bill. 40 4
The insurer also contended that the limited pollution exclusion clause
barred coverage. The district court disagreed. The court held that (1) the
term "sudden" in the exception to the pollution exclusion clause had a
temporal component, i.e., that "sudden" means "quick, '40 5 and
(2) SnyderGeneral had created a fact question as to whether the 1983
accident was sudden.406
The insurer also claimed that there was an exclusion that precluded
coverage for property that was in the care, custody, or control of the in-
sured. The district court held that this exclusion "only precludes insur-
ance coverage in cases in which the insured totally and physically
manipulates property. '40 7 Upon that ground, the district court denied
summary judgment. The court of appeals agreed because the insurer had
not established that SnyderGeneral "totally and physically used or con-
trolled the entire pool of groundwater at the Wilmington facility. '408
In Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Rust Scaffold Builders, Inc.,409
two employees of a contractor sued Crown Central for injuries resulting
from exposure of the workers to airborne hydrofluoric acid at a battery
unit in one of Crown's plants. The accident took place entirely indoors.
401. See id. at 538.
402. Id. at 539.
403. Id. at 538-39 (citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 75 F.3d 1048
(5th Cir. 1996)).
404. See id.
405. See id. at 539. The court relied upon Mustang Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 76 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1996).
406. See SnyderGeneral, 113 F.3d at 539.
407. Id.
408. Id. (citing Hartford Cas. Co. v. Cruse, 938 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1991)).
409. 951 F. Supp. 636 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Judge Nancy Atlas arrived at the same conclu-
sion that the Fifth Circuit later reached in C. A. Turner Construction, 112 F.3d at 184.
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Indeed, it took place in an enclosed space within the interior of the build-
ing-a tank-like unit-where the workers were building scaffolding.
Crown settled and sought recompense from an insurance carrier. That
carrier insured the firm that was building the scaffolding. The firm had
agreed to defend and indemnify Crown, and the firm's carrier insured
that agreement. The carrier denied coverage based on the absolute pollu-
tion exclusion, and Crown sued to establish coverage.
The pollution exclusion stated that the insurance afforded by the policy
did not apply to "[t]he contamination of any environment by pollutants
that are introduced at any time, anywhere, in any way[, and] [a]ny bodily
injury ... arising out of such contamination. ' 410 The court held that this
language unambiguously excluded coverage. 411
Crown suggested that the language of the exclusion needed to be un-
derstood in terms of a brochure issued by the insurer describing its pollu-
tion coverage. The language of the brochure was: "Pollution Liability.
The new policies do not cover this liability if the pollutants escape from
your premises .... ',412 The exclusion in the previous policy did not apply
to "sudden and accidental" emissions of pollutants; the new exclusion did
not have this exception. District Judge Nancy Atlas rejected the proposi-
tion that the brochure had significance in construing the exclusion. 413
Moreover, she did not believe that the brochure supported Crown's posi-
tion.414 After all, the brochure eliminated the "sudden and accidental"
exception to the exclusion.
Judge Atlas's decision may not be completely uncontroversial. The ab-
solute pollution exclusion at issue was a non-standard one. It appeared to
exclude bodily injury that arose out of the contamination of any environ-
ment by any pollutants. In other words, pollutants must have contami-
nated an environment, and that contamination must have caused bodily
injury. The opinion does not state how the injured workers were exposed
to hydrofluoric acid. If the exposure was direct, rather than through the
intermediation of a polluted environment, then the terms of the exclusion
would not be met. Moreover, the language of the brochure is extremely
interesting. The brochure implies that the new, absolute pollution exclu-
sion does not bar coverage if the pollutants have not escaped from the
insured's premises. Unquestionably, Crown is considered an insured, and
the pollutants did not escape from its premises.
Perhaps the most interesting environmental insurance case of the year
is Highlands Insurance Co. v. Kelley-Coppedge, Inc. 4 15 Kelley-Coppedge
laid a four-inch natural gas pipeline. During this operation, it struck a
sixteen-inch crude oil pipeline, causing the release of approximately 1,600
barrels of crude oil. Much of the oil was recovered, but there was sub-
410. Crown, 951 F. Supp. at 638 n.3.
411. See id. at 624.
412. Id. at 640-41.
413. See id. at 641.
414. See id.
415. 950 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. granted).
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stantial property damage to the land through which the pipeline ease-
ments passed. Kelley-Coppedge cleaned up after itself and attempted to
mitigate the damage. It sought coverage under its commercial general
liability policy from Highlands, and Highlands refused to pay. Kelley-
Coppedge then filed suit seeking $296,225 in damages. It obtained sum-
mary judgment in this amount, plus interest and attorneys' fees. The is-
sue in both the trial court and the court of appeals was the scope and
applicability of the "Absolute Pollution Exclusion."
The Kelley-Coppedge policy provided that the property damage cover-
age would not apply to the discharge, disposal, or escape of pollutants
"[a]t or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time ...
occupied by ... any insured .... ,"416 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals
thought that this was a simple case: it hinged entirely on whether Kelley-
Coppedge occupied the premises, site, or location from which the pollu-
tion was discharged, disbursed, or released.417 The court observed that
one can "occupy" sites without owning them or without having any prop-
erty interest in them at all, so long as one has "the right to occupy such
portions of the property as are necessary to perform the obligations he or
she has assumed. '418
This case has caused something of a furor. Kelley-Coppedge filed a
petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. A number of entities
have filed amicus briefs, including the Office of the Public Insurance
Council, a number of contractor and subcontractor associations, and the
Texas Association of Insurance Agents. One Amicus also filed a brief on
behalf of the litigants.
Possibly, there are other exclusions that also apply to this case, but
which have not been litigated. First, the policy excludes property damage
arising from the discharge of pollutants "from any premises, site or loca-
tion on which any insured ... [is] performing operations ... if the pollu-
tants are brought on or to the premises, site or location in connection
with such operations by such insured .... ,,419 Literally speaking, Kelley-
Coppedge brought the oil onto the site from which it was disbursed. It
did this by inadvertently punching a hole in the pipeline. If it had not
punched the hole, the pollutants would not have come to the site, and the
contamination would not have occurred. Of course, the image most peo-
ple have of bringing substances on or to a site does not normally include
accidentally punching a hole and causing a leak. This is mere imagery,
however; literally understood, the words "bring on or to a site" include
exactly what happened in the Kelley-Coppedge case. Second, the policy
excludes coverage for clean-up costs incurred at the instance of a third
416. Id. at 418.
417. See id. at 418-19.
418. Id. at 419. See Tri-County Serv. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 873 S.W.2d 719,
720 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).
419. Kelley-Coppedge, 950 S.W.2d at 418.
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party. Unquestionably, the damages of Kelley-Coppedge were clean-up
costs. It is a mystery why this issue was not litigated in the trial court.
I. EMPLOYEE EXCLUSIONS
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies generally exclude cover-
age for "bodily injury" to employees of the insured when the injury arises
within the course and scope of the employee's employment.420 We have
discussed this exclusion cursorily in Section V.G.421
During the Survey period, one case, Nautilus Insurance Co. v.
Zamora,422 considered the employee exclusion squarely. Zamora was a
cashier in a restaurant. One day, three men entered the restaurant and
began shooting. They killed two people. Zamora was wounded in the
chest. She sued the restaurant in state court for negligence. The restau-
rant sought coverage under its commercial general liability policy. The
carrier invoked the employee exclusion, filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in federal court, and obtained summary judgment.
The employee exclusion ruled out coverage for "bodily injury" to any
"employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of employment
by the insured .... ,423 All parties agreed that Zamora's injuries occurred
in the course of her employment. Therefore, the sole question before the
circuit court was whether the injury arose out of her employment. The
district court utilized the doctrine of "positional risk" employed in work-
ers' compensation cases.424 This test is a "but for" test whereby injury
arises out of employment when the injury would not have been suffered
but for the employment.425
The circuit court disagreed with the district court's "Erie guess. ' '426
The court held that, first, the positional-risk doctrine has been restricted
to workers' compensation cases, and, second, Texas courts have utilized
different tests for construing this kind of policy language. 427 Under Texas
law, an injury arises out of employment if the injury occurs "while the
employee is performing work-related duties. '428
420. Generally speaking, derivative claims of spouses, children, parents, and siblings of
the employee are also excluded. Moreover, if the employer has an obligation to reimburse
a third party for damages it has to pay (e.g., under an indemnity agreement), the exclusion
applies.
421. See supra notes 373-84 and accompanying text (discussing Cornhill, where an em-
ployer-defendant sought coverage under a general liability policy for claims that the em-
ployee had been sexually harassed, and the employee exclusion barred coverage for
injuries to the employee, as well as for claims based upon the employer's negligent hiring
and negligent supervision).
422. 114 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 1997).
423. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
424. See id. at 538; see also, Walters v. American States Ins. Co., 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex.
1983); Employers' Cas. Co. v. Bratcher, 823 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ
denied); North River Ins. Co. v. Purdy, 733 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no
writ).
425. See Zamora, 114 F.3d at 537-38.
426. See id. at 538.
427. See id. at 538-39.
428. Id. at 539.
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court.429 The
panel of the court of appeals disagreed with the district court only about
which body of case law should be invoked to support the holding.
J. CARE, CUSTODY, OR CONTROL
AIU Insurance Co., v. Mallay Corp.430 is discussed in Section III.C
above. 431 The insurance policy at issue in Mallay involved both property
aspects and liability aspects. Mallay, a repair contractor, dropped Dow
Chemical's turbine and damaged it. The repair costs were $91,000, and
Dow Chemical alleged that it suffered over $2.9 million in economic
losses. Mallay sought liability coverage from AIU, its property and liabil-
ity insurer.
AIU denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action. CGL
insurance policies uniformly define "property damage" as "physical in-
jury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that prop-
erty" or "loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured." 432
Such policies also uniformly contain an exclusion for property damage to
personalty of others which is in the care, custody, or control of the in-
sured.433 AIU argued that this exclusion applied and that it covered both
damage to the turbine and Dow's economic losses.
Mallay argued that Dow lost the use of its chemical plant, even though
the plant sustained no physical injury. By the definition of "property
damage" in the policy, Dow's loss of its plant constituted property dam-
age. Mallay contended that "property damage" was covered because it
was never within the care, custody, or control of the insured.
The court sided with AIU.434 Whatever loss of use Dow sustained re-
sulted from physical injury to tangible property.435 That property was




Liability insurance policies contain a number of provisions governing
the claims process. For example, insureds must give timely notice to their
insurance companies, insureds must cooperate with their insurance com-
panies, and so forth. Other legal principles governing the claims process
429. See id.
430. 938 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Tex. 1996), affd, 116 F.3d 1478 (5th Cir. 1997).
431. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
432. See, e.g., Mallay, 938 F. Supp. at 410.
433. See, e.g., id. at 411.
434. See id.
435. See id.
436. See id. at 410-11. Mallay also sued its insurance agent. The court declined to exer-
cise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, and it dismissed them. The court was
apparently exasperated with some aspects of this case. It ordered the parties "to file noth-
ing further on these issues in this Court, including motions to reconsider and the like.
Instead, the parties are instructed to seek any further relief to which they feel themselves
entitled in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit." Id. at 413-14.
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have been judicially created. Insurance companies must use so-called
"reservation of rights" letters. They must have, roughly speaking, certain
contents. In addition, there are principles governing the relationship be-
tween insurers and third-party claimants.
1. Notice
Hanson Production Co. v. Americas Insurance Co. 437 considered the
insurer's late notice defense. The issue before the court was whether a
surplus lines liability insurer must prove prejudice in order to avail itself
of a late notice defense. Hanson Production operated an oil and gas field.
In 1991, a non-operator sued Hanson in state court, alleging that Hanson
had damaged the reservoir of oil and gas through overproduction.
Twenty-seven months after service of the initial suit, Hanson notified its
liability insurance company for the first time of the lawsuit and demanded
a defense. The lawsuit went to trial approximately six months after Han-
son gave notice, and a little over two months later Hanson settled the
lawsuit for $795,000. The insurers declined to fund the settlement.
The insurance policy required the insured to provide the insurer with
notice of suit "immediately" or "as soon as practicable" after the suit was
served. Texas courts have construed this language to mean that the in-
sured must provide the insurer with notice "within a reasonable time in
light of the circumstances. '438 The language at issue is a condition prece-
dent to the insurance company having any duties. Traditionally, Texas
courts enforced this language as written and did not require that the in-
surance company demonstrate prejudice with the benefit of the condi-
tion. However, in 1972, the Texas Supreme Court invited the State Board
of Insurance to issue an order creating a prejudice requirement. 439 The
State Board did just that.440 Board Orders, however, apply only to poli-
cies issued by licensed insurers. That is the extent of the Board's author-
ity.44 1 The question before the court was whether the prejudice
requirement should apply to a surplus lines carrier, which is, by defini-
tion, an unlicensed insurer. 442
Since Texas law was at issue, Judge Thomas Reavley, writing for the
panel, followed Erie and tried to determine what Texas law might be. He
stated that the panel was convinced that the Texas Supreme Court would
require a showing of prejudice for surplus lines carriers, even though the
State Board Order had never been extended to them, and even though
the Cutaia case had not been overruled in twenty-five years.443 Judge
Reavley issued an important and controversial ruling:
437. 108 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 1997).
438. McPherson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 1965).
439. See Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cutaia, 476 S.W.2d 278, 280-81 (Tex. 1972).
440. See Board Order No. 23080 (superseded in 1987 by Board Order No. 50602, which
maintains the prejudice requirement).
441. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.13-2, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
442. See TEX. INs. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-2, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
443. See Hanson, 108 F.3d at 629.
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We believe the [Texas Supreme C]ourt would opt for a uniform rule
of construction, reasoning that surplus lines insurers are surely aware
that their policies, like all policies issued to Texas residents, are sub-
ject to Texas law and the rules of construction followed by the Texas
courts. We note that nothing we can find in the Insurance Code sug-
gests the Legislature intended to deprive the Texas Supreme Court
of its traditional authority, under common law, to adopt rules of con-
struction for insurance policies, as it does for all contracts. 444
The court indicated that it was influenced by the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds.445 In that case, the Court
held that when an insured violates a clause in the uninsured/underinsured
motorist coverage section of an auto policy that restricts settling without
the insurer's consent to the settlement, the insurer must show prejudice
to it before the clause will be enforced.446 Judge Reavley also remarked
that he thought that the Texas Supreme Court would look to the law of
other jurisdictions and indicated that there is a modern trend in favor of
requiring proof of prejudice before applying the late notice condition.447
2. Reservation of Rights Letters
Under some circumstances, if a carrier becomes active in the claims
process without informing the insured that it has doubts about coverage,
the insurer can find itself estopped from denying coverage, especially if it
wishes to rely upon an exclusion. Of course, estoppel here requires prej-
udice, just as it does everywhere else. 448
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Oryx Energy Co. 4 4 9 con-
cerns "reservation of rights" letters. In Certain Underwriters, a man was
badly injured on a drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico. He was em-
ployed by Mallard Bay Drilling, but the platform was owned and oper-
ated by Oryx Energy. The worker sued Oryx, and Oryx sought indemnity
from Mallard. The indemnity agreement was funded by insurance. Oryx
was an additional insured under the policy, and Oryx made demands di-
rectly upon the insurer, including a demand to settle within policy limits.
It is important to note that the insurer did not provide Oryx a defense.
Mallard provided Oryx a defense; it hired independent trial counsel who
apparently defended the case and negotiated the settlement. During
those discussions, the worker offered to settle for $6 million in annuities.
There was a sharp conflict over the amount of coverage available to
Oryx. Accordingly, Lloyds Underwriters agreed to provide $11,050,000
to fund the settlement upon the understanding that it could seek to hold
444. Id. at 630.
445. 875 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1994).
446. See Hanson, 108 F.3d at 630.
447. See id. at 631; see also 8 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 4732 (1981).
448. See Michael Sean Quinn, Reserving Rights Rightly: The Romance and the Tempta-
tions, 7 COVERAGE 23, 25 (July-August 1997).
449. 957 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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Oryx responsible and seek reimbursement for all sums paid in excess of
Oryx's coverage, which the insurer believed to be $500,000.
Lloyds sued to recover the settlement dollars from Oryx. Oryx resisted
on the grounds that Lloyds had either waived its coverage defenses or
was estopped from asserting them. The district court rejected this move
on two grounds.450 First, Lloyds was not a volunteer. It did not intend to
make a payment that it could not recover. At all times, it was perfectly
clear that Lloyds Underwriters would seek the return of its money.
Therefore, Lloyds did not waive its right to recover from Oryx.451
Second, the district court did not agree that Lloyds Underwriters was
estopped from asserting coverage defenses. 452 The doctrine of estoppel
only applies, the court held, when the insurer assumes the defense of its
insured without obtaining an enforceable non-waiver agreement or com-
municating a reservation of rights letter.453 The court held that the in-
surer never assumed or took control over the defense.454 Since this
necessary precondition on the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel
was not satisfied in this case, the doctrine did not apply. The mere fact
that the liability insurer did not communicate its reservation of rights for
a year is of no consequence when one or more of the elements of estop-
pel is not satisfied.455
3. Liability Insurer/Victim Relations
Tort victims may not sue the insurance companies of tortfeasors until a
final judgment is in place. Furthermore, the law of bad faith does not
create any duties running from liability insurers to tort claimants.456 Nev-
ertheless, there are some legal nexuses between insurers and tort claim-
ants. Notice that in Griffin, the insurer sought a declaratory judgment
against both the insured and the tort plaintiff.45 7 What is available to the
insurer, however, may not always be available to the insured.
In Gracida v. Tagle,458 a mandamus case, the appellate court consid-
ered whether the district court must permit an injured plaintiff to inter-
vene in a declaratory judgment action between the insurer and the
defendant-insured. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Corpus Christi sued
two entities for defects in a building at a church. The insurer for one of
the defendants, after receiving notice of the suit, filed a declaratory judg-
ment action. Bishop Gracida, acting on behalf of the church, sought to
intervene since "all of the Diocese's property is owned by Bishop Gracida





455. See Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kitty Hawk Airways, Inc., 964 F.2d 478,
481 (5th Cir. 1992) (articulating the elements of estoppel under Texas law).
456. See generally Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Industrial Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938
S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1994).
457. See supra notes 277-93 and accompanying text.
458. 946 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, n.w.h.).
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as a corporate sole. . . .,459 The district court refused the intervention,
and the Bishop brought a mandamus action against the judge.
The court of appeals began with the premise that a person has a right
to intervene if (1) he could have brought the action, or part of it, in his
own name; or (2) if the action had been brought against him, he would
have been able to defeat recovery, or at least part of it.460 Furthermore,
trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether an intervention
should be stricken.461 Striking a plea is an abuse of discretion if (1) one
component of the above test is satisfied; (2) intervention will not unduly
complicate an already existing case by multiplying the number of issues to
be litigated; and (3) "the intervention is almost essential to effectively
protect the intervenor's interests. '462
The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion.463 In effect, it held that no elements of the proper test were met.
The Bishop could not have brought this action in his own name. He had
no contractual rights under the insurance policy until he obtained a judg-
ment, and he was not a third-party beneficiary of the insurance policy.
Since he had no contract rights, he could not enforce any contract rights,
nor could he defeat the insurer's claim against the insured.464
It is important to notice that, at least under Griffin, the insurance com-
pany could have included the church as a defendant in its declaratory
judgment action. That simple fact, however, does not give the tort claim-
ant the right to intervene in that action. One wonders if this discrepancy
in rights is a good thing.
Relations between insurers and tort claimants came up again in
DiGrazia v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,465 where the issue was
whether a tort claimant could sue the liability insurer of another for in-
dependent misrepresentations. This was the second appeal of the case,
and many of the facts are laid out in the first opinion.466 The tort plaintiff
owned a two-year-old thoroughbred filly. Plaintiff took the horse to a
race-horse training farm. The owner of the farm took the horse to a vet-
erinarian for treatment of a tendon problem. While the horse was at the
veterinary hospital, there was an electrical storm, after which the vet-
erinarian found the horse dead in her stall. The veterinarian reported
that the horse probably died of electrocution during the storm or blood
poisoning. The veterinarian thought that blood poisoning was the more
probable cause of death. He notified his liability insurer, Atlantic Mu-
tual, and forwarded his report to it. The owners of the horse did not
459. Id. at 506.
460. See id.; see also Guaranty Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d
652, 657 (Tex. 1990); TEx. R. Civ. P. 60.
461. See Gracida, 946 S.W.2d at 506.
462. Id.; see Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. 1982).
463. See Gracida, 946 S.W.2d at 507.
464. See id.
465. 944 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, no writ).
466. See DiGrazia v. Old, 900 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ).
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receive the report until November 30, 1991, over five months after the
incident.
On November 8, 1993, the owners of the horse sued both the training
farm and the veterinarian. Since the horse died on June 5, 1991, the trial
court granted both defendants summary judgment based on the statute of
limitations. The Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed as to the vet-
erinarian upon the ground that he may have been guilty of fraudulent
concealment. 467 The court of appeals remanded the case. Subsequently,
the appellant sued the veterinarian's insurance company alleging that it
had stated falsely that electrocution was the cause of the horse's death,
thereby preventing them from asserting claims against the horse training
farm. These claims were asserted on theories of fraud, DTPA violations,
and violations of the Insurance Code. Atlantic Mutual defended on the
grounds that it owed no duty to the plaintiffs, that the DTPA and the
Insurance Code were inapplicable, that there was no independent cause
of action for fraudulent concealment, and that they did not-as a matter
of law-cause the plaintiffs any damages.
On appeal, the DTPA and Insurance Code issues were not assigned as
error. The appellants challenged only the propositions that fraud was not
actionable, that the veterinarian's insurer owed them no common law du-
ties, and that the insurer's conduct could not have been the proximate
cause of any harm.
The insurer argued that it did not have a duty to tell them about the
veterinarian's report, so withholding it could not constitute fraud. The
insurance company argued that fraud falls into two classes: affirmative
misrepresentations and failures to disclose. Failures to disclose constitute
actionable fraud only if the defendant had a duty to make disclosure, and
this duty generally depends upon the antecedent existence of fiduciary or
confidential relationships. The insurance company alleged that no such
relationship existed between it and the owners of the horse. The court of
appeals responded by pointing out that the owners of the horse were not
relying upon the insurer's failure to disclose anything.468 Rather, they
accused the insurance company of affirmatively and falsely asserting that
the sole cause of the horse's death was electrocution.
Accordingly, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs
were not suing for fraudulent concealment, but for fraud.469 The court
noted that, under Texas law, a fiduciary relationship is not required for a
finding of fraud by affirmative misrepresentation. 470
VI. STOWERS DOCTRINE
Under Texas law, if a liability insurance company that is providing its
insured a defense negligently fails to settle within policy limits after it
467. See id. at 503.
468. See DiGrazia, 944 S.W.2d at 735.
469. See id.
470. See id.; see also Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1983).
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receives an unequivocal demand to settle within those limits, then the
insured may be liable for extra contractual damages. This is called the
Stowers Doctrine.471 The Stowers Doctrine is part of the law of insurer
bad faith. The essence of insurer bad faith is the exposure of an insurer
to extra contractual damages. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to defer the
discussion of the Stowers Doctrine until after the discussion of liability
insurance, since the Stowers Doctrine actually pertains to one dimension
of liability insurance, namely, the situation in which a liability insurer is
defending its insured. It is usually assumed that the insurance company
will be liable for all damages in excess of the policy limits, although that
question has never been squarely presented to the Texas Supreme Court.
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Bleeker,472 the Stowers Doctrine
was the central issue. Bleeker struck a pickup truck on 1-35 while drunk.
It contained fourteen members of two families. One of these people was
killed, and the thirteen others were all injured, some of them seriously.
Southern County Insurance Company provided Bleeker auto liability
coverage for the legal minimum of $20,100 per person and $40,000 per
accident. Trinity Universal reinsured Southern County and handled its
claims. Bleeker had no other assets, the victims incurred substantial med-
ical bills, and the hospitals filed liens in excess of $40,000 shortly after the
accident.
One of the families hired an attorney to represent the estate of the
decedent, the decedent's spouse, and her minor children. The attorney
testified that he repeatedly communicated oral offers to settle the claims
of his clients for as little as $20,000. He testified that all such offers were
rejected. Eventually, he dispatched a letter containing an offer to settle
in exchange for the insurance company's interpleading $40,000. The let-
ter gave the insurance company thirty days to respond. When the attor-
ney wrote the letter, he had not communicated with the hospitals
regarding their liens. Trinity did not interplead the demanded sum within
the allotted thirty days. However, it did tell the lawyer that it would like
to settle the case for the policy limits if all parties would release Bleeker
as part of the arrangement. For its part, Trinity did not communicate with
Bleeker to discuss the attorney's letter or the alleged oral settlement
offers.
After the allotted thirty days elapsed, the attorney agreed to represent
all of the potential plaintiffs. The case proceeded to trial, and it resulted
in a judgment exceeding $11 million. Subsequently, the plaintiffs sued the
insurance company. The jury assessed damages of $12,836,976.75, and
the court trebled that sum to $38,510,930.25. The attorneys' fees were
471. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved); see also American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia,
876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994).
472. 944 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ granted). Bleeker was re-
versed in part and affirmed in part on April 14, 1998. See infra note 486.
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intended to represent fifty percent of the judgment, so the court eventu-
ally entered a judgment for $77,021,860.50.
With respect to the Stowers-demand, the court of appeals first held that
oral offers to settle were sufficient to trigger Stowers duties.473 Second,
the court held that a Stowers-demand need not specifically state that the
claimants will release the insured.474 If the letter makes a policy-limits
demand and mentions the Stowers doctrine, then the letter implies a will-
ingness to release. 475 Third, the court of appeals rejected the insurer's
argument that the hospital liens constituted conflicting and prior claims
so that it could not make payments without creating exposure for itself
above policy limits. 476 The court of appeals held that liens do not consti-
tute ownership.477 Therefore, until the insurer actually makes some pay-
ment, it retains full policy limits. Fourth, under the circumstances, thirty
days may not have been enough time to make a rational decision.478 But
the tort claimants repeatedly made oral offers to settle before the written,
thirty day offer was communicated. Hence, that period of time may have
been enough. Fifth, although Bleeker expressed satisfaction with his in-
surance company's handling of the case, that did not constitute a bar to
recovery under the Stowers Doctrine.479
The DTPA claim against Trinity was that Trinity failed to disclose to
Bleeker the existence of an offer to settle. Such a failure can constitute a
violation of the DTPA.480 In Bleeker, the insurance company's failure to
make such a disclosure was not proved to have caused any damages. 481
At a minimum, plaintiffs needed to prove that if the insured had been
informed of the settlement offer, the offer would have been accepted.4 82
There was no such proof. "There is no evidence that Bleeker would have
wanted to accept the settlement offer if he had been informed of it,"' 4 83 So
there could be no proof of causation. Hence, the court reversed the
DTPA components of the judgment. Since the award of attorneys' fees
was contingent upon the DTPA finding, that component of the judgment
was reversed as well.484 Thus, the court reduced the size of the judgment
473. See Bleeker, 944 S.W.2d at 675.




478. See id. at 676-77.
479. See id. at 677. The dissenting judge disagreed with his colleagues on this point:
"Bleeker's uncontroverted satisfaction with the representation he received from Trinity left
no viable Stowers claim to be turned over to the plaintiffs." Id. at 682. The majority distin-
guished Charles v. Tamez, 878 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied),
in which an insured objected to a court order to turn over his cause of action against his
lawyers under the Stowers Doctrine. There, the insured stated that he would not have
accepted the settlement offer anyway. See Bleeker, 944 S.W.2d at 677.
480. See id. at 679; American Physicians, 876 S.W.2d at 847 n.l; Ecotech Int'l, Inc. v.
Griggs & Harrison, 928 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
481. See Bleeker, 944 S.W.2d at 679.
482. See id.




by nearly $65 million. 485
One wonders if this case is correctly decided. The Texas Supreme
Court has said that when there are multiple claimants making demands
upon insurance proceeds, the insurance company does not violate Stowers
when it fails to accept an offer within policy limits, when that offer ex-
ceeds the amount left under the policy. 486 Of course, hospital liens are
different than actual payments, but in the real world, hospitals pursue
their liens and often enforce them. Under the circumstances, it is not
clear that an insurer should be held liable for extra contractual damages
when it fails to interplead a sum. Moreover, all Stowers offers must in-
volve a willingness to release the insured. If there had been an offer to
release in exchange for an interpleader, that would have done the claim-
ants no good at all. If the insurance company interpleaded the sum, and,
in exchange, claims had been released against the tortfeasor, they would
have no continuing claim to the sum interpleaded. The Stowers Doctrine
is designed to prevent insurance companies from being obstinate when
their insureds are faced with clear liability where the insurance company
will clearly have to pay. Situations like Bleeker are simply too compli-
cated, and a reasonable insurance company might well not know what to
do.
The Stowers Doctrine was addressed again in Birmingham Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. American National Fire Insurance Co. 487 This case arose out
of a brutal murder at a shopping center in Irving, Texas. The decedent's
family filed a premises liability action against the owners and operators of
the shopping center. Birmingham Fire was the primary carrier, and
American National was the excess carrier. Birmingham Fire had $1 mil-
lion in limits. It never offered more than $250,000, but the plaintiffs never
considered any amount below $3.25 million. The underlying tort case was
tried twice. The first trial ended in a defense verdict. The trial judge
determined that the jury verdict was against the great weight of evidence
and granted the plaintiffs a new trial. The insurance companies still of-
fered no more than $250,000. In the second trial, the jury returned a
verdict in excess of $10 million. This time, Birmingham tendered the ex-
485. See id. The plaintiffs brought a cross-point. They argued that it was error for the
trial judge to fail to submit a jury issue on unconscionability under the DTPA. The court of
appeals agreed. The order of the court of appeals is somewhat confusing. It affirmed the
trial court judgment as to the Stowers claim, but it reversed the judgment with respect to
the DTPA and insurance bad faith claims, and it remanded the case on the issue of uncon-
scionability. See id. at 682. What happens now?
486. See Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994). On April 14,
1998, a unanimous Texas Supreme Court reversed the Stowers components of the court of
appeals' judgment, affirmed the Stowers judgment of the trial court, and remanded the
DTPA unconscionability claim for trial. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Bleeker, 1998 WL
169689 (Tex. Apr. 14, 1998). In all other respects, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals' judgment and rendered judgment that Bleeker take nothing. The court
assumed that Villegas's letter was actually a settlement offer, and it further assumed that "a
Stowers demand may be made on behalf of only some of the total pool of potential plain-
tiffs, [nevertheless], Villegas did not meet the requirement [of the Stowers Doctrine] that
he offer to release those claims fully." Id. at *2.
487. 947 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, writ denied).
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cess carrier $1 million in supplementary payments in excess of $400,000.
The excess carrier negotiated a $7.9 million settlement and sued the pri-
mary carrier, claiming that it had suffered $6.5 million in damages.
The centerpiece of the case was a Stowers action.488 The Texarkana
Court of Appeals held that there was no Stowers liability.489 In order for
an insurer to be liable upon a Stowers theory, the plaintiff in the underly-
ing tort case must present a reasonable opportunity to settle the case.
While it may not have to present a formal demand for a settlement within
policy limits, there must be a clear indication that such a thing is possible.
Only then does an insurer have Stowers duties. All things being equal,
the insurer does not have to make settlement offers. It does not even
have to solicit settlement offers from the third-party plaintiff.490 "Liabil-
ity is thus premised purely on negligent failure to accept a reasonable
offer; it cannot arise from a 'failure to negotiate' because the insurer has
no duty to undertake actions often required for negotiation, such as mak-
ing a counteroffer. '49 1
The excess carrier argued that insurance companies that affirmatively
misbehave should have a duty to make settlement offers, even in the ab-
sence of a within-limits demand from the tort plaintiff. The Texas
Supreme Court has held out the possibility that there may be an "affirma-
tive misconduct" exception to the within-limits demand requirement of
the Stowers Doctrine,492 and a leading scholar of insurance law has en-
dorsed this idea.493 The Texarkana Court of Appeals, however, did not
accept this argument. It refused to create an "affirmative misconduct"
exception to the standard Stowers rule, and it said that even if there were
such an exception, it would not apply it in this case. 494 The court was
very uncomfortable with the idea of an "affirmative misconduct" excep-
tion, and it stated that "[s]uch an exception would reintroduce chaos and
uncertainty into the neat conceptual framework erected by American
Physicians.'495 Moreover, American National apparently tried to suggest
that the primary carrier owed an especially high duty to it. The Texar-
kana Court of Appeals rejected this view, as well.496 Indeed, the primary
carrier owes no duty at all to the excess carrier. It owes duties only to its
own insured, to which the excess carrier may become subrogated. 497
Thus, the "affirmative misconduct" exception, even if it existed, would
not give an excess liability carrier any additional rights.
488. See American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex.
1992) (excess carrier may bring Stowers actions against primary carriers).
489. See Birmingham Fire, 949 S.W.2d at 597.
490. See id.; Insurance Corp. of Am. v. Webster, 906 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
491. Birmingham Fire, 947 S.W.2d at 597.
492. See American Physicians, 876 S.W.2d at 850 n.17.
493. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1166-68 (1990).
494. See Birmingham Fire, 947 S.W.2d at 598.
495. Id.




American National suggested that, although there was not an explicit
demand to settle within policy limits, there was the equivalent of such a
demand. Both insureds, the excess carrier, and the tort plaintiffs all re-
quested that Birmingham tender its policy limits. There was no factual
dispute about this matter. Nevertheless, according to the court of ap-
peals, this was not the equivalent of an offer to settle within policy lim-
its.498 Indeed, the tort plaintiffs wanted policy limits tendered from the
underlying carrier so they could pursue the excess carrier for a settle-
ment. "Because the [tort] plaintiffs did not promise to fully release [the
insureds] in exchange for Birmingham's tender, the request did not trig-
ger the Stowers duty. '499
Stowers-type liability came up again in Keightley v. Republic Insurance
498. See id.
499. Id. Birmingham Fire involved another issue pertaining to the "supplementary pay-
ments" section of the policy. Virtually all liability policies contain such sections. They
obligate primary insurers to pay court costs, unlimited amounts of pre-judgment interest
assessed on those portions of the policy which the insurer is obligated to pay, and all post-
judgment interest on the entirety of a judgment that accrues before the insurer pays, offers
to pay, or deposits money with the court on that part of the judgment which is insured. On
April 14, 1992, Birmingham tendered in excess of what it thought its policy limits were as
supplementary payments on one of the two primary policies. These supplementary pay-
ments covered the time interval between the entry of the judgment and the point in time in
which Birmingham entered its limits, attorney ad litem fees to be taxed as costs, and other
costs. Thereafter, on May 26, 1992, the excess carrier settled the underlying case for less
than the judgment amount. Hence, there was no longer a judgment to trigger the insurer's
duty to make supplementary payments. According to the court of appeals, therefore, the
fundamental question was whether "a subsequent settlement obligate[s] an excess insurer
(or, for that matter, an insured) to return supplementary payments which it was entitled to
retain had it merely paid the judgment." Id. at 604-605. The court answered the question
in the negative. The primary insurer's duty to make supplementary payments accrues
when the judgment is entered, and thereafter continues through the passage of time. See
id. at 605. Moreover, if a primary carrier tenders while the judgment is in place, it is com-
plying with its duty as of that time, even if the judgment is subsequently extinguished by
way of settlement. See id. The text of the insurance policy does not subject the insurer's
duty to pay to a condition subsequent. Not only is that an unreasonable construction of
the policy, but it would contravene the strong public policy in Texas favoring settlements.
See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991). There was yet another
"supplementary payments" issue. The excess carrier claimed that Birmingham owed four
years of post-judgment interest on the entire underlying judgment because it did not
tender its limits on the second policy for four years. That would have entitled the excess
carrier to an additional recovery in excess of $6 million. In fact, the excess carrier was
seeking interest on the entire judgment, even though it had settled four years earlier. The
court of appeals was unsympathetic to this argument. Post-judgment interest accrues only
on judgments that are in place. Once the judgment is extinguished by settlement, post-
judgment interest no longer runs, and the supplementary payment section of the policy no
longer applies. See Birmingham Fire, 947 S.W.2d at 606. Interestingly, the excess carrier
would have been able to recover interest over the four-year period as prejudgment inter-
est, since the court of appeals had held that Birmingham should have tendered its limits on
the second primary policy four years earlier. See id. However, the sole argument on ap-
peal related to payment of interest as post-judgment interest. Nevertheless, the court com-
pelled Birmingham to make a supplementary payment from April 14, 1992, the date it
tendered one of its policies, to May 26, 1992, the date of the settlement. The court rea-
soned that Birmingham erroneously failed to tender both of its policies. See id. In the
absence of a full tender, it would be required to pay additional interest.
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Co.500 The insured purchased liability insurance from National County
Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The company reinsured its policies
with Republic. Because of National's financial difficulties, Republic be-
gan administering the policies that it reinsured in October of 1987. These
activities continued until October 1988, when a court appointed a re-
ceiver to take over National's property and affairs.
Allegedly, Republic failed to conduct itself properly while administer-
ing the insured's claim. The insured's assignee sued Republic under arti-
cle 21.21 of the Insurance Code, 50 1 the DTPA, and a Stowers claim. The
trial court granted Republic summary judgment on all claims. The court
of appeals agreed on the DTPA action because the insured was never a
consumer in connection with the reinsurer.502 On the other hand, the
court held that there might be a claim under article 21.21, section 16(a)
and that there might be a Stowers-like claim under the law of negli-
gence.503 The court noted that section 16(a) of article 21.21 does not re-
quire privity of contract, and the insured met all of the stated elements of
that section (i.e., damages caused by deceptive acts). 50 4
With respect to the Stowers claim, the court noted that ordinarily an
insured would not have a Stowers type claim against a reinsurer.50 5 How-
ever, since Republic voluntarily injected itself into settlement negotia-
tions, the action could be viable since "the law places a duty of ordinary
care upon any person who voluntarily enters upon an affirmative course
of action affecting another's interest. '506 As an affirmative defense, Re-
public contended that after the court appointed a receiver for National,
its hands were tied. The Austin Court of Appeals rejected this defense
since the insured's assignee was complaining only about conduct that oc-
curred after Republic took over the administration of National's policies
and before the receiver was appointed.50 7
VII. UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED AUTO COVERAGE
Uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage is a peculiar
form of first party coverage. 50 8 If A collides with B and is at fault, B
generally recovers from A's liability carrier. Sometimes B has to sue A to
do this. Occasionally, B recovers from his own auto carrier for property
damage, and thereafter, B's auto carrier may subrogate against A. (Or,
B's health carrier may pay for B's hospital bills and then proceed against
500. 946 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, n.w.h.); see supra notes 171-73 and ac-
companying text. The court of appeals withdrew its judgment as an unpublished opinion.
See supra note 171.
501. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
502. See Keightley, 946 S.W.2d at 127-28.
503. See id.
504. See id.
505. See id. at 129.
506. Id. at 129; see Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983); Colonial
Savings Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. 1976).
507. See Keightley, 946 S.W.2d at 129-30.
508. Lack of space prevents discussion of other types of auto insurance cases.
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A.) But what if A does not have any insurance or has insufficient insur-
ance? B may buy coverage under his own auto policy which will insure
him against losses from bodily injury and property damage for which he
could have recovered from the tortfeasor's insurance company if there
were such a company providing coverage in sufficient amounts. The im-
portant thing to remember about uninsured/underinsured motorist cover-
age is that the insured victim must be able to prove the tort case against
the uninsured/underinsured motorist. Within this general domain, all
sorts of technical problems arise.
A. WHO IS AN INSURED?
The Texas Supreme Court considered UM/UIM once during the Sur-
vey period in the case of Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mc-
Kee.509 The issue was whether the minor daughter of the principal of a
closely-held corporation was an insured.
Future Investments, Inc. was a corporation solely owned by Jerrell Mc-
Kee, who was also its president. McKee's daughter was injured in a one-
car accident. The car was not an insured vehicle, the daughter was not on
corporate business, and she was not covered under the policy. The "who
is an insured" section of the policy provided that "[y]ou and any desig-
nated person and any family member of either" is an insured. 510
The Court held that the injured daughter was not an insured.511 The
word "you" referred to the corporate entity, Future Investments. It was
the named insured. Corporations, by their very nature, do not have fami-
lies. Consequently, the injured daughter was not a family member of the
corporation.512 The phrase "designated person" was explicitly defined in
the policy as "an individual named in the schedule." The corporation did
not name any designated persons in the schedule. Consequently, the in-
jured daughter was not a designated person.513
McKee suggested that, for the purposes of insurance, he was the corpo-
ration. In effect, McKee suggested that the fundamental postulates of
corporate law do not apply in insurance situations. The Court declined
this gambit and applied the rule that corporations are distinct entities and
not to be regarded as identical to the shareholders. 514 More significantly,
McKee utilized staple arguments in insurance controversies, and the
Texas Supreme Court rejected them. For example, it is axiomatic in in-
surance law (as it is in contract law) that terms should not be rendered
509. 943 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1997).
510. Id. at 457 (emphasis added). PIP coverage was also involved. This coverage in-
volves small first party payments for injuries. It is designed to be administered mechani-
cally. It is unnecessary to prove fault, for example. The PIP endorsement provided that
the following are insureds: "[y]ou or any family member while occupying or when struck




514. See id. at 458.
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mere surplusage. McKee suggested that the phrase "family member"
would be surplusage if his corporation, rather than he, were counted as
the named insured. Justice Abbott, writing for all of the members of the
Court except Justice Spector, who dissented, rejected this ploy.515 He ob-
served that insurance contracts are typically form contracts involving a
number of options that an insured may select or reject. Under those cir-
cumstances, terms may be surplusage without violating fundamental rules
of construction. 516 McKee also argued that unless he personally was the
named insured, coverage under the UM/UIM endorsement would be illu-
sory. The Court rejected this view on the ground that it was simply false.
The fact that McKee's daughter did not have coverage for this accident
did not imply that there was a lack of coverages for many other types of
accidents. 517 Finally, McKee suggested that the statutes requiring UM/
UIM coverage impliedly require, as a matter of public policy, that his
daughter be an insured. The Court rejected this view on the ground that
article 5.06-1(1) and article 5.06-3(b) both permit UM/UIM coverage to
be restricted to persons covered under the policy.518 This means that the
public policy issues inherent in the statutes are carefully circumscribed. It
is not part of the business of any court to expand on policy carefully de-
lineated by the Legislature.519
In McKee, the Texas Supreme Court joined a substantial majority of
jurisdictions that have held that no ambiguity is created by the combina-
tion of "family member" language with an entity as the named insured.
In general, Justice Spector's dissenting opinion relies upon a group of mi-
nority decisions. 520
B. PUNITIVE/EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
A continuing controversy in insurance law is whether punitive damages
should be covered by ordinary liability insurance policies. Some states
say Yes, while others say No.521 A side show in this general controversy is
whether UM/UIM provisions cover punitive damages. Texas courts are
divided on this matter. 522
In Milligan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,523 one
court of appeals indicated that punitive damages did not fall within UM/
515. See id.
516. See id. at 458-59.
517. See id. at 459.
518. See id.; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 5.06-1(1), 5.06-3(a) (Vernon 1981).
519. See, e.g., Allen v. Mauro, 733 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
520. See McKee, 943 S.W.2d at 460-61.
521. See Michael Sean Quinn, Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance: Whither
Texas? 18. INS. LITG. RPTR. 121, 121 (March 1996).
522. See id. at 146-47.
523. 940 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
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UIM coverage, thereby overruling one of its own cases. 524 Milligan was a
drunk driving case. Both Milligan and her insurer agreed that the driver's
conduct was grossly negligent. State Farm resisted paying punitive dam-
ages assessed because of the gross negligence. Article 5.06-1(5) of the
Texas Insurance Code provides that UM coverage shall include "payment
... of all sums... as damages ... because of bodily injury. ' 52 5 The Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act has long required that drivers have in-
surance and has long specified minimum coverages for damages arising
"because of bodily injury. ' 526 In addition, the legislative intent behind
article 5.06-1(1) of the Insurance Code and the Motor Vehicle Safety Re-
sponsibility Act was to "protect conscientious motorists from 'financial
loss caused by negligent financially irresponsible motorists.' ' 527
The precise language of the State Farm UM/UIM coverage was this:
"We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to re-
cover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because
of bodily injury sustained by a covered person, or property damage
caused by an accident. ' 528 The issue was: what does "because of bodily
injury" mean? Are punitive damages assessed because of bodily injury?
In this case, the court of appeals said no. Instead, punitive damages are
awarded because of the malicious conduct of the tortfeasor and for the
purpose of punishment and deterrence.529 Punitive damages are not for
compensating losses, and so they are not because of bodily injury.
The court of appeals seemed troubled by the fact that punitive damages
are recoverable under the liability portions of such policies as auto poli-
cies, homeowners policies, and the like,530 but were able to side step the
issue. The parties had not provided the court with the entire insurance
policy, and so it was not part of the record. As more and more Texas
courts refuse coverage for punitive damages under UM/UIM coverages,
tension grows in Texas insurance jurisprudence about the insurability of
punitive damages.
C. UNUSUAL USES
One of the most interesting and comprehensive opinions of the Survey
period, Mid Century Insurance Co. of Texas v. Lindsey,531 considered
524. See Milligan, 940 S.W.2d at 232 ("We no longer accept the position taken in
Tyler."); Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
525. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(5) (Vernon 1981).
526. TEX. TRANS. CODE § 601.072(a) (Vernon 1998).
527. Milligan, 940 S.W.2d at 231 (quoting Act of Oct. 1, 1967, ch. 202, § 3, 1967 Tex.
Gen. Laws 448, 449) (emphasis added).
528. Id. at 229.
529. See id. at 231.
530. See American Home Assur. Co. v. Safeway Steel Prod. Co., 743 S.W.2d 693, 705
(Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied) (holding that umbrella liability policies covered pu-
nitive damages and that no public policy was thereby violated).
531. 942 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. granted).
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whether the accidental discharge of a rifle would constitute an auto acci-
dent in the use of an automobile.
The insured was seated in his truck, which was parked next to an empty
truck, near a lake in the countryside. A young boy returned to the empty
truck. He was fishing with his father, who owned the truck; he had be-
come chilly and had returned for coveralls. While moving about in the
empty truck (the truck was locked, and the boy had to crawl into the
truck through a sliding back window), the boy brushed against a loaded
shotgun, which was positioned on a gun rack over the rear window of the
truck. The gun discharged and wounded Lindsey in the next truck. Lind-
sey's damages exceeded the policy limits of the truck owner, so he pro-
ceeded against his own carrier for UIM coverage.
The trial court found coverage, and the court of appeals affirmed. It
found that there was an accident within the meaning of the UM/UIM
provisions of the policy, that the accident did arise out of the use of a
underinsured motor vehicle, and that finding coverage would not contra-
vene public policy. 532
The UM/UIM language of the policy provided coverage for bodily in-
jury caused by an accident. The question before the court concerned the
meaning of the term "accident" in the context of UM/UIM coverage.
Mid Century argued that it means "auto accident" or "motor vehicle acci-
dent," and then suggested that such accidents are essentially collisions.
The court of appeals rejected this view.533 The phrase "auto accident"
and the phrase "motor vehicle accident" appear elsewhere in auto insur-
ance policies, but they do not occur in the UM/UIM coverage sections.
Hence, the coverage under the UM/UIM component of the policy may be
somewhat broader than in the liability section. 534 Moreover, the term
"accident" is surely not restricted to collisions. "An accident, when
viewed from the standpoint of the victim, is an unexpected happening
without intent or design. '535
At the same time, the only accidents insured under the UM/UIM pro-
visions of the policy were those where the liability of the owner or opera-
tor arose from the "ownership, maintenance or use" of the uninsured
motor vehicle. The issue in Lindsey was use. Was the boy using the truck
when he caused the firearm to discharge? The court of appeals reviewed
a number of different tests for use and a number of different contexts in
which the discharge of firearms has been said to constitute the use of a
motor vehicle. These included loading and unloading, the use of the car
as a gun rest, accidental discharge caused by the movement of the car,
and accidental discharge of a firearm while being removed from a gun
rack. 536 The Lindsey court thought the case before it most analogous to
532. See id. at 143-49.
533. See id. at 143.
534. See id.
535. Id.
536. See id. at 145-46.
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the last component of the above taxonomy, and it observed that the ma-
jority of cases had found that the removal of a gun from a gun rack in a
motor vehicle constituted a use of the motor vehicle. 537 Insurance issues
such as this one are, of course, contract issues. Consequently, the con-
trolling question was whether gun rack-related firearm discharges were
within the contemplation of the parties to the insurance contract. The
court of appeals observed that most of the cases that have considered the
issue have held that they were: "It especially can be assumed to be within
the contemplation of the parties that a pickup truck in Texas might be
used to carry a gun.'"53s The court also regarded it as important that the
boy was trying to get into the truck when he caused the firearm to dis-
charge.539 Surely, entering a vehicle is a use of the vehicle.
The court distinguished its holding from other superficially similar
cases. 540 Lindsey was not a deliberate drive-by shooting. It did not in-
volve pointing a gun at anybody. It was not something that simply hap-
pened inside the truck with no relevance to the fact that it was a motor
vehicle; thus, it was not like being bitten by a dog inside a car.541
Notably, the court also distinguished the recent holding of the Texas
Supreme Court in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Merchants Fast
Motorlines.542 In National Union, the Texas Supreme Court held that
there was no duty to defend a lawsuit when the allegations in the petition
merely alleged that the driver of a vehicle negligently discharged a fire-
arm resulting in injuries, since such allegations were insufficient to allege
a "use" of the automobile. 543 In Lindsey, the court noted that the de-
tailed facts indicated that the discharge occurred in the course of the
boy's entry into the vehicle. 544
Finally, the court of appeals gave short shrift to Mid Century's public
policy argument. The insurer probably did not take its own argument
seriously. It simply suggested that if there were coverage in the Lindsey
case, then all sorts of absurdities would result. Apparently, Mid Century
argued that if there were coverage in Lindsey, there would be coverage in
the Oklahoma City bombing. The court responded that the public policy
in favor of protecting the insured articulated in the UM/UIM sections of
the Insurance Code is quite broad.545 It is supposed to include many
things. Moreover, "slippery slope" arguments should never be used to
537. See id. at 146.
538. Id. at 148. (One wonders if this statement is as true in cities as it is in rural areas.)
539. See id.
540. See id. at 148-49.
541. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peck, 900 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995,
no writ) (The court of appeals acknowledged that since Griffin bases itself on this case, it
has taken on a new sheen.).
542. 939 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1997); see supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
543. See National Union, 939 S.W.2d at 141.




deny coverage where coverage is actually warranted. 546
VIII. INSURANCE ARBITRATION
Many insurance disputes are resolved by arbitration. Contracts of rein-
surance almost always specify arbitration as the preferred mode of dis-
pute resolution. When insurance companies squabble with each other,
they frequently arbitrate the dispute in the end. Property insurance poli-
cies often involve "appraisal," which is a dispute resolution mechanism
restricted to valuation and is very similar to arbitration. Title insurance
policies often contain arbitration clauses.
One such clause was addressed in Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v.
Mack.547 Mack purchased real property for $160,000 and paid $1,670 to
Stewart Title for a title insurance policy. Problems with the title arose.
Mack sought coverage under the contract. Stewart Title denied coverage,
and Mack sued. Stewart Title then sought to compel arbitration based
upon provisions in the contract. The district court refused to compel arbi-
tration under either the Texas General Arbitration Act 548 or the federal
Arbitration Act.549 The Texas act provides for interlocutory appeal, but
the federal act does not. Hence, Stewart Title filed an appeal from the
order denying arbitration of the Texas act and sought a writ of mandamus
from the order denying arbitration under the federal act.550 The court of
appeals denied relief under both statutes.551
The Texas Arbitration Act mandates contractually specified arbitra-
tions under a variety of circumstances.552 However, the Act excludes any
contract that involves an individual person or group of persons acquiring,
among other things, real property, personal property, or services, where
the total consideration paid is $50,000 or less. 553 This exclusion contains
the following exception: if all relevant parties and their attorneys have
signed a writing agreeing to submit to arbitration, that agreement is en-
546. See id. Although the court does not seem to realize this, its critique of "slippery
slope" arguments implies that they never prove anything. This is a truth, but most lawyers,
including most judges, do not seem to know it. For other UMIUIM cases, see Davis v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 945 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ dism'd by
arg.) (Insureds may not recover under UM/UIM provisions if they release the tortfeasor
and thereby prejudice the insurance company's subrogation rights. There must be actual
prejudice. If the tortfeasor has no assets to satisfy any judgment that the insurance com-
pany might get, the settling tort victim/insured has not prejudiced the insurer.). UM/UIM
provisions may exclude uninsured motor vehicles owned by governmental bodies. See
Ohio Cas. Group of Ins. Cos. v. Chavez, 942 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1997, writ denied) (The exclusion contained an exception where the operator of the vehicle
was uninsured. The court of appeals rejected the proposition that the term "uninsured" in
the exception to the exclusion should be construed to include "under-insured" vehicles as
well.).
547. 945 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
548. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
549. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
550. See Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992).
551. See Stewart Title, 945 S.W.2d at 332-33.
552. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.017.
553. See id. § 171.017(a)(1).
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forceable. 554 Mack contended that he was exempt from compelled arbi-
tration because the consideration he paid for his insurance policy was less
than $50,000, and there was no written agreement signed by the parties
and their attorneys mandating arbitration. Stewart Title contended that
the court should look not at the cost of the insurance policy but to the
coverage limit ($160,000) or to the purchase price of the real estate
($110,000). The court of appeals sided with Mack. It pointed out that the
value or the price of the real estate was completely irrelevant. 555 The
issue was what consideration was paid for the insurance policy.
The federal Arbitration Act applies only to contracts involving inter-
state commerce. 556 Stewart Title, as the party seeking to compel arbitra-
tion, had the burden of establishing its right to invoke the federal act.557
Therefore, it had the burden of demonstrating involvement in interstate
commerce.558 It failed entirely in this regard. To be sure, title insurance
business activities, in the aggregate, implicate interstate commerce. 559
But it does not follow that a single title insurance transaction involving an
individual implicates interstate commerce. 560
IX. INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS
The law of insurance agents and brokers is an enormous, semi-systema-
tized branch of the law, which is heavily impacted by the Texas Insurance
Code. Because those engaged in the selling of insurance are frequently,
by statute, the legal agent of the insurer, the conduct of agents and bro-
kers can have an enormous impact upon the liabilities of insurers.
A. RISK POOL
This impact was addressed in McKillip v. Employers Fire Insurance
Co.561 McKillip applied for automobile insurance on April 3, 1992. She
understood, from her agent, that the insurance would be provided
through the assigned risk pool, which is administered by the Texas Auto-
mobile Insurance Plan (TAIP). The agent forwarded the application to
TAIP, and on April 9, 1992, TAIP assigned McKillip to Employers. Em-
ployers issued insurance with an effective date of April 14, 1992. On
April 11, 1992-three days before the issuance of the insurance-McKil-
lip was seriously injured in an auto accident. Employers denied coverage
on the ground that the policy had not been issued yet. McKillip con-
554. See id.
555. See Stewart Title, 945 S.W.2d at 332.
556. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987); Anglin, 842 S.W.2d at 269-70.
557. See Stewart Title, 945 S.W.2d at 333.
558. See Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996).
559. See Golfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784-85 (1975) (holding statewide
price-fixing by lawyers conducting title searches to be impermissible).
560. See Stewart Title, 945 S.W.2d at 333. For another arbitration case involving an
agency agreement, see American Employers Ins. Co. v. Aiken, 942 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ) (Arbitration agreements are favored, construed broadly,
and not unconscionable even if insisted upon by the insurer.).
561. 932 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Texarkana, 1996, no writ).
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tended that the agent told her that she would be insured as of that very
moment and, hence, that Employers was bound.
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of Employ-
ers.562 Although an "insurance agent can act as an agent for both the
insured and the insurer," this dual role requires that the agent have the
relationship of legal agency with the carrier. 563 TAIP's operating proce-
dure prevented this from happening. Even assuming the truth of plain-
tiff's view of the matter, when the agent spoke, he could not have had the
authority to speak for Employers. Indeed, as of the time of the represen-
tation, TAIP had not yet designated Employers as the insurer.
B. BROKER'S DUTY TO SPEAK LIMITED
In Cogan v. Triad American Energy,564 one of the issues was whether
an insurance intermediary had a duty to make disclosures to persons be-
yond the insurer and the insured. Triad American Energy Company or-
ganized a limited partnership for the purposes of developing "wind
parks" to generate electricity from desert winds and selling them in
southern California. Financial arrangements were typical of the specula-
tive, tax-benefit driven, high leverage investment schemes that were com-
mon in the early 1980s. In 1985, Triad bought ESI, one of the companies
that had manufactured turbines to be used in the wind parks. Triad ar-
ranged for ESI to purchase an insurance policy to secure its manufac-
turer's warranty. Part of the Cogan lawsuit involved a suit against the
insurance brokers who arranged the policy between Lloyds and ESI. Ap-
parently, that policy had been subjected to a number of endorsements so
that the private placement memorandum did not accurately describe the
policy, nor were the investors made aware of the changes in the insurance
policy by any other means. Cogan and his cohorts tried to make the in-
surance broker liable for these problems, even though the broker "did
not generate the representation about insurance in the placement memo-
randum. '565 At no time was the broker ever the legal agent of the inves-
tors. In fact, it was never the legal agent of Triad, but only of ESI (in the
context of presenting claims) and of Lloyds (in the context of the issuance
of the policy).
Insurance brokers do not have an affirmative duty to make disclosures
to investors in insured entities. 566 An insurance broker may have a confi-
dential relationship in the insurance context to the insurer and to the in-
sured. However, it does not have such a relationship with anyone else,
and once the policy is issued and the premiums are collected, the broker's
duty is over. If there is no affirmative undertaking,
562. See id. at 270.
563. See id.
564. 944 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
565. Id. at 1331.
566. See id. at 1332.
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neither an underwriter nor a broker has a duty to disclose the terms
of an insurance policy [which] it has issued [to any nonparty to the
contract]. An insurance relation is not fiduciary to the potential
creditors of the assured .... Investors, lenders, contractors, custom-
ers, and others that deal with a company have the means to protect
themselves by requiring certificates of insurance, by examining the
policies, or by accepting the risk that inheres in their transaction with
the assured.567
Moreover, the terms of an insurance policy are confidential and proprie-
tary as between the insurer and the insured. 568
The court was openly contemptuous of the plaintiff's claims. It summa-
rized the insurance broker component of the claims as follows: "The un-
derwriter agreed to furnish a service, and that service may have turned
out to be different from what the general partner had told its investors it
would be." 569 This is not to be charged to the account of the broker. The
court remarked that the plaintiff's "claims at common law and under state
and federal securities and consumer laws are worse than their
investment. '570
X. INSURANCE INSOLVENCY
The insolvency of insurance companies is extensively regulated by state
law. It is, therefore, largely exempt from the federal Bankruptcy Code.
571
Consequently, there is a wealth of state cases throughout the country
concerning the details of processing insurance insolvency. Texas is no
exception. 572
A. ATrORNEYS' FEES
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 105.002 provides that
when a state agency files a frivolous claim, an opposing litigant may re-
cover attorneys' fees. 573 In El Paso Electric Co. v. Texas Department of
Insurance,574 the Texas Supreme Court held that when the State Insur-





570. Id. at 1328. At one point, the investors complained that a bank recklessly lent
them money. The court responded that reckless lending was not actionable by the bor-
rower. "If the banker lent recklessly, the law furnishes no redress for imprudent receipt of
funds. No harm was done to the borrowers .... Recovery for 'reckless lending' belongs to
the bank, its shareholders, and its insurers, not to the borrowers who spent the lent
money." Id. at 1329.
571. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
572. Sometimes, the law of several states and principles of interstate comity and feder-
alism can be at stake. See Clark v. Fitzgibbons, 105 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 1997) (federal court
abstained from deciding a case involving orders of the "Arizona insurance receiver.").
573. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 105.002 (Vernon 1997).
574. 937 S.W.2d 432, 435-37 (Tex. 1996).
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El Paso Electric purchased $70 million in annuities from First Service
Life Insurance Company. First Service obtained government securities,
which it pledged as collateral to secure the El Paso Electric annuities.
First Service encountered severe financial problems. The Commissioner
of Insurance appointed a conservator. The conservator disputed the va-
lidity of El Paso Electric's security interest in the government securities.
El Paso Electric filed a declaratory judgment action to vindicate its inter-
est. The conservator counterclaimed and alleged that El Paso Electric
had conspired to collateralize the securities unlawfully. Thereafter, First
Service was placed in receivership, and the State Insurance Liquidator
was appointed receiver. He continued to prosecute the conservator's
counterclaim and added additional alleged conspirators as parties. Even-
tually, El Paso Electric obtained partial summary judgment on the en-
forceability of its security interest and on the conspiracy claim.
Subsequently, the receiver dismissed these counterclaims with prejudice
as to all defendants. Each counter-defendant filed an action under sec-
tion 105.002 for attorneys' fees. Since these parties claimed that the liqui-
dator was acting on behalf of the State Board of Insurance, the Board
intervened, "contending that the conservator and receiver did not act on
behalf of any state agency. ' 57 5 The trial court accepted this argument and
dismissed the attorneys' fees motions without reaching the issue of
whether the claims were frivolous. The court of appeals affirmed, holding
that the conservator and the receiver were acting in private representa-
tive capacities on behalf of First Service and its creditors and that they
were not acting in any public capacity on behalf of the State Board of
Insurance. 576
The Texas Supreme Court began with the fundamental premise that
"the Texas Insurance Code sets forth a comprehensive scheme for the
liquidation, rehabilitation, and reorganization of insolvent insurers." 577
Nevertheless, according to the Department of Insurance, "the receiver
essentially acts as a private trustee, representing the interests of the in-
surer and its creditors, not the interests of the State. '5 78 For this reason,
the Department of Insurance argued that its actions could not be attrib-
uted to the State and that section 105.002 did not apply.
The Court rejected this view on several grounds. First, even if the re-
ceiver were a private trustee, and nothing more, he reports to the State
because he is subject to the control of a relevant state agency. 579 Second,
the receiver is not merely a private trustee, but "[t]o the contrary, the
receiver principally performs a public, regulatory function. '580
575. Id. at 434.
576. See id.
577. Id. at 434-35.
578. Id. at 435.
579. See id. at 436.
580. Id. ("While the receiver stands in the shoes of the insurer for purposes of asserting
the insurer's rights on behalf of its creditors, the receiver also performs a public function in
assuring an orderly and efficient liquidation.").
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Third, the Department of Insurance argued that "the receiver is an
agent of the receivership court, and thus cannot be deemed to be an
agent of the State" for the purposes of section 105.002.581 After all, that
statute is restricted to executive agencies only. The Court rejected this
view because, although the receivership court has some supervisory con-
trol, it is quite clear that the Legislature intended "to vest a significant
amount of control in the executive branch, specifically for the purpose of
creating a centralized, efficient liquidation system.
582
Fourth, the Department of Insurance argued that the receiver is not a
state agency because the statute does not authorize the Attorney General
to represent the receiver, and if the receiver were a state agency, the stat-
ute would have authorized such representation. The Court rejected this
argument because private representation of receivers is characteristic of
the common law. "The Legislature's retention of one particular charac-
teristic of common law receiverships (i.e., the selection and compensation
of the receiver's counsel) does not alter the fundamentally public nature
of this statutory scheme. '583
B. STATE GUARANTY ASSOCIATIONS
State Guaranty Associations are entities created by the Legislature to
mitigate the consequences of insurer insolvency, at least to some degree.
There are several types of guaranty associations. During the Survey pe-
riod, one reported case arose with respect to the Texas Life, Accident,
Health and Hospital Service Insurance Guaranty Association.584 An-
other case involved the Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty
Association.
Texas Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association v. Boy
Scouts of America585 arose out of the insolvency of Mission National In-
surance Company, which had issued two liability policies to the Boy
Scouts. Mission was placed in liquidation in 1987. This case concerned
three negligence lawsuits against the Boy Scouts and certain councils in
581. Id. at 437.
582. Id. at 438.
583. Id. at 439. Chief Justice Phillips applied the analogous reasoning to the conservator
and found that he too was included within section 105.002 as the result of the State's com-
prehensive control over insurance insolvency. See id. at 440. Justice Gonzalez filed a dis-
senting opinion with which Justice Spector joined. Judge Gonzales subscribed to the
arguments set forth by the Department of Insurance: "The power to appoint or remove
and set compensation is not coextensive with the power to control, especially when the
receiver assumes a specific legal capacity distinct from the Board." Id. at 442. Moreover,
according to Justice Gonzalez, the "Legislature must use clear and unambiguous language
to waive sovereign immunity." Id. at 443.
584. See Unisys Corp. v. Texas Life, Accident, Health & Hospital Serv. Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 943 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied). The issue in this complex
case was whether certain annuity contracts benefiting the Texas employees of Unisys and
Marathon Oil were covered under the Texas Life, Accident, Health and Hospital Service
Insurance Guaranty Association Act. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28-D (Vernon
Supp. 1998). This case arose out of the failure of Executive Life Insurance Company.
585. 947 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, n.w.h.).
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Pennsylvania. The Boy Scouts filed claims with Texas Guaranty on their
own behalf and with the Pennsylvania Guaranty Fund on behalf of the
Pennsylvania councils. Both guaranty funds rejected the claims. The Boy
Scouts paid the costs of defending and settling the lawsuits and then filed
suit in Texas. Both guaranty funds moved for summary judgment. The
trial court awarded the Pennsylvania council damages and attorneys' fees
of nearly $350,000 to be paid by Pennsylvania Guaranty. It also awarded
the Boy Scouts $126,500 for damages and attorneys' fees to be paid by
Texas Guaranty.
In brief, the court of appeals held that Texas courts lacked personal
jurisdiction over Pennsylvania Guaranty and, hence, that the litigation
had violated its constitutional rights of due process.586 The appellate
court rejected the idea that "a guaranty association stands in the shoes of
an insolvent insurer [for the purposes of personal jurisdiction]." 587 Fur-
thermore, Pennsylvania's enabling statutes did not somehow consent to
its guaranty fund being sued in a variety of jurisdictions because Penn-
sylvania Guaranty had not purposely established minimum contacts.588
The court held that Pennsylvania Guarantee had little to do with Texas,
and, in fact, the underlying lawsuits had little to do with Texas.589
The appeal of Texas Guaranty involved a scout who was rendered a
quadriplegic while at scout camp in Pennsylvania. Eventually, the claim
was settled for $4.75 million. The Boy Scouts paid $1.5 million, which
included a self-insured retention of $500,000 and Mission's share of $1
million. It was Mission's share that the Boy Scouts sought to recover
from Texas Guaranty. As stated above, the trial court granted the Boy
Scouts summary judgment and awarded it $126,500. 590
Texas Guaranty took the position that the Boy Scouts were not legally
obligated to pay this sum and that they elected to pay it as a volunteer.
Texas Guaranty contended that the Pennsylvania councils were legally
obligated to pay claims and that the parent organization was not. The
court of appeals rejected both of these arguments, holding that the Boy
Scouts were legally obligated to pay.591 That legal obligation arose out of
settlement. The claims were covered, and since Mission had to pay, the
guaranty fund had to pay.592 Indeed, the Mission policy specifically pro-
vided that the Boy Scouts would become legally obligated to pay as the
result of the compromise of a claim.
The court of appeals had no more patience with the volunteer argu-
ment. The court observed that it could not say that the Boy Scouts had
586. See id. at 693.
587. Id. at 687.
588. See id. at 689-90.
589. See id.
590. Although the underlying settlement against the Boy Scouts was for $4,750,000, the
Texas Act limited the recovery against Texas Guaranty to $100,000. See id at 690 n.7; TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28, § 5(8) (Vernon Supp. 1997). The balance of $26,500 constitutes
attorneys' fees.




no potential liability as a matter of law.593 Hence, settlement might have
been a prudent course. As a result, the Boy Scouts did not act as a
volunteer. 594
There was a more serious problem, however. Texas Guaranty chal-
lenged the reasonableness of the settlement. The Boy Scouts asserted
that Texas Guaranty could not challenge the reasonableness of the settle-
ment because they denied the claim.595 The court rejected that argument,
however, because the insurer had no duty to defend, so its rejection could
not possibly have been prejudicial. 596 Therefore, the court held that
Texas Guaranty could challenge the reasonableness of the settlement.
This part of the case had to be tried.
C. INSOLVENCY AND PREMIUMS
In Webb v. Reynolds Transportation, Inc.,597 the insured bought auto
liability coverage from Employers National Insurance Company. The
state insurance regulation requires that all such policies shall be endorsed
to provide for adjustment or modification of the rates in accordance with
the relevant experience modifier.598 Employers National failed to in-
clude the endorsement. Shortly after the policy took effect, the insurer
sent Reynolds Transportation a substantially enhanced bill for premiums
due. Reynolds refused to pay. Subsequently, the insurer became insol-
vent, although there was no suggestion that Reynolds' nonpayment
caused the insolvency. The receiver pursued Reynolds for the payment.
As Chief Justice Hardberger observed, this case creates a square con-
flict between insurance regulatory law and contract law. State insurance
regulatory law mandates the use of an experience modifier, while con-
tract law would forbid a change in the premiums unless it is rooted in the
express language of the contract. The San Antonio Court of Appeals
sided with the insured; the contract trumps the regulation, even when the
endorsement allowing premium modifications is mistakenly omitted by
the insurer.599 As the author of the adhesionary contract, the insured
should have the right to rely on insurers, and so, the insurer should bear
the loss. 600 Even though the receiver did nothing wrong, he could not
have greater rights than the insurer had. Consequently, contract trumps
regulation in premium assessment. 601
593. See id. at 692.
594. See id.
595. See id. (relying upon Employer's Cas. Co. v. Block, 744 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1988)).
596. See id. at 693.
597. 949 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, n.w.h.).
598. See id. at 365.
599. See id. at 367.
600. See id.
601. The court relied heavily on Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Clemtex, Inc., 807 S.W.2d
824 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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XI. CONCLUSION
In the last few years, substantive insurance law, common law insurer
bad faith, statutory bad faith, and the Stowers Doctrine have become
heavily litigated issues in Texas courts. Decades ago, few insurance issues
were decided by the Texas Supreme Court. For now, times have changed,
and insurance law is where the action is.
